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By
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ABSTRACT
It is common in Buddhist philosophical literature to diﬀerentiate between two
diﬀerent types of truth: ultimate truth and conventional truth. For the philosophers of
the Mahāyāna tradition of Buddhism, it is diﬃcult to give an account of conventional
truth that is both consistent with their anti-realist metaphysics (their ultimate
position) and also robust enough to support truth as a normative concept. This
dissertation addresses this problem by oﬀering a deflationary interpretation of truth
in Mahāyāna that is supported by a pragmatic account of intentionality and meaning.
This account of meaning is developed from the work of the 7th Century Buddhist
epistemologist Dharmakīrti. A careful reading of the Sanskrit source texts reveals
that Dharmakīrti was alive to the problems of truth and objectivity in his tradition
and sought to address them in his work. Dharmakīrti’s work can be read as oﬀering a
Carnapian-type solution to the problem of truth and meaning by way of an account of
conventional knowledge that is grounded in what he calls arthakriyā – goal-driven
human activity. Such an account is consistent with Mahāyāna anti-realist
metaphysics, while at the same time providing an account robust enough to retain a
sense of objectivity and to preserve a normative role for truth.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

This essay is concerned with truth. Specifically it is concerned with what
Buddhists call conventional truth (saṃvṛtisatya), which is truth as it is ascribed to
ordinary propositions asserted and believed in the course of our everyday lives. In
the Buddhist tradition, it is common to distinguish this kind of truth from what is
called the ultimate truth (paramārthasatya). Ultimate truth pertains to claims that
reflect the actual nature of reality, or in other terms, that describe what is ultimately
real. While the understanding of what is ultimately real changes throughout the
course of the historical development of Buddhism, there remains in every tradition
the idea that the actual nature of reality, the way it ultimately is, is not reflected in our
ordinary discourse or in the way we commonly, i.e., conventionally, conceive of it.1
Despite this, however, we are told that we can still ascribe a qualified sense of truth,
“conventional truth,” to such discourse insofar as that discourse plays an important
practical and/or soteriological role in our lives.
Drawing a distinction between ultimate and conventional truth results in the
problem of explaining the sense in which conventional truths are true. The two main
general traditions in Buddhism, the Abhidharma and the Mahāyāna, have diﬀerent
conceptual resources at their disposal with which to address this problem. As a
On some interpretations of Madhyamaka, the conventional truth might be taken to reflect the way
that reality is by nature, but only insofar as that tradition maintains that reality has no ultimate nature;
since reality has no ultimate nature, then ordinary truth claims can’t be said to get that nature wrong.
Furthermore, so long as such claims are recognized to be just conventional, i.e., not true in virtue of
the way reality ultimately is, then they do get reality right. This might be a way of construing the
Madhyamaka claim that the ultimate truth is the conventional truth.
1
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result, the kind of answers they each can give are very diﬀerent. The Abhidharma
tradition of Buddhism can give a reductive account that explains conventional truths
in terms of their indirect reference to entities that are more fundamental and thus
ultimately real. The Mahāyāna tradition, on the other hand, cannot employ such a
strategy because Mahāyānists deny that there is any ontologically basic level to
which conventional entities could be reduced. Therefore, the Mahāyānists have to
give a diﬀerent kind of account of truth at the conventional level than the account
given by the Ābhidharmikas.
The concern that is the focus of this project is that of identifying an account of
conventional truth that is both consistent with Mahāyāna ontological commitments
and that is yet robust enough to support truth as a normative concept. In other words,
I seek here to provide an account of conventional truth for Mahāyāna Buddhism that
can explain the sense in which such truth is true.
The account I present here develops the suggestion made by Priest, Siderits,
and Tillemans (2011) that the sense in which conventional truth is true for
Madhyamaka is a deflationary sense. Expanding this suggestion to apply to all of
Mahāyāna Buddhism, not just Madhyamaka, I argue that the answer that Priest,
Siderits, and Tillemans oﬀer to the question of conventional truth is a plausible one
when it is appropriately supplemented with an account of meaning that is consistent
with Mahāyāna anti-realist commitments. Deflationary accounts of truth, while not
uncontroversial, have been rigorously defended by various philosophers as providing
a minimal yet robust account of truth that preserves a sense of objectivity and can
support the norms associated with truth. Presuming that such an account is
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defensible, it satisfies one of the criterion for an adequate account of truth for
Mahāyāna: a deflationary account is robust enough to support truth as a normative
concept, as Priest, Siderits, and Tillemans claim.
A deflationary account of truth also appears, at least on the surface, to satisfy
the other criterion of an adequate account of truth for Mahāyāna, namely that of
being consistent with Mahāyāna ontological commitments. It is consistent with these
commitments because, as Priest, Siderits, and Tillemans point out, it is ontologically
neutral; it does not presuppose any particular metaphysics. However, as Paul
Horwich, a defender of a version of the deflationary account of truth, points out,
deflationary accounts of truth presuppose that an independent account of meaning
can be provided. Therefore, a deflationary account can be shown to fully meet this
criterion only if it can be adequately supplemented by a theory of meaning that is
consistent with Mahāyāna anti-realist commitments.
In order to show that the deflationary theory of truth does indeed satisfy this
anti-realism criterion, I argue that the required anti-realist account of meaning can be
provided by the work of the 7th Century Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti. His work
provides an anti-realist account of meaning, grounded in a more fundamental account
of intentionality, that can be used to supplement a deflationary account of truth. I
explain that Dharmakīrti, focusing on ordinary empirical claims about things and
events in our environment, provides an account of how it is that the mind can
generate meaningful, intentional mental states about ordinary things and events
without presupposing an ultimate ontology. This account, which describes how
conceptual cognitions can be generated from non-conceptual ones, explains concept
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formation in pragmatic terms. According to Dharmakīrti, we form concepts in order
to use them to help negotiate and predict our environment. This emphasis on use, I
argue, makes Dharmakīrti’s account eﬀectively a use theory of meaning. In fact, I
argue that like Carnap, Dharmakīrti takes concept and language use to determine a
conventional ontology, instead of presupposing one. Thought of in this way, I take
Dharmakīrti to be, in eﬀect, providing an account of what Carnap calls the
“framework of things.”
I argue that Dharmakīrti’s anti-realist account of meaning provides the
resources necessary to supplement a deflationary account of truth in such a way as to
ensure that such an account is consistent with Mahāyāna anti-realism. Provided that
a deflationary account of truth is robust enough to support truth as objective and
normative, as philosophers such as Paul Horwich have argued it is, then I conclude
that the suggestion made by Priest, Siderits, and Tillemans to understand
conventional truth as true in a deflationary sense is a good one. When such an
account is supplemented by the account of meaning provided by Dharmakīrti, it
proves to be both robust enough to support truth as a normative concept and
consistent with Mahāyāna ontological commitments.

Outline of Chapters
In chapter two I trace the development of the distinction between the two
truths from the earliest sūtra literature up to the Mahāyāna tradition of Buddhism. I
explain that the nature of the relationship between the ultimate and conventional
truths for the Abhidharma tradition is reductionist and then show why explaining
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conventional truth in this way is not possible for the Mahāyāna given that tradition’s
rejection of the Abhidharma account of the nature of ultimate reality. The contrast of
the Mahāyāna with the Abhidharma makes clear the problem the Mahāyānists have
of explaining the sense in which conventional truth is true: without any foundational
ontological ground, how can the Mahāyāna draw a distinction between truth and
falsity?
Focusing on attempts that have recently been made to understand the sense in
which conventional truth is true from the perspective of the Madhyamaka tradition of
Mahāyāna Buddhism, in chapter three I address in particular the fictionalist account
of truth that is most often thought to reflect the Madhyamaka position. I argue that
even though such an account does present a way of preserving truth in a context in
which ultimate ontological considerations are irrelevant, a Carnapian approach, such
as the one advocated by Finnigan and Tanaka (2011), is better. Without providing a
non-arbitrary account of what governs the norms within a fiction, in particular what
marks the distinction between truth and falsehood, a fictionalist account fails to give
an adequately robust account of fictional truth. Furthermore, I argue that, since the
Madhyamaka rejects any attempt at giving an ultimate ontology, there is no objective
frame of reference to which the conventional could be contrasted in order to be
understood as a fiction. In a context where everything is a fiction, it is unclear that
the analogy with fiction helps to clarify the sense in which the conventional can still
be true.
For these reasons, after addressing the fictionalist reading, I proceed to
address the suggestion made by Finnigan and Tanaka (2011) to interpret the
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distinction between ultimate and conventional truth in terms of Carnap’s distinction
between claims that are external and those that are internal to a framework. I argue
that this approach has all the advantages of the fictionalist account but without having
to adopt a pretense stance at the level of conventional truth; on this approach truth
can be taken straightforwardly and literally.
A notion of truth that is general enough to operate across frameworks, and is
thus consistent with a Carnapian-type account, is provided by deflationary theories of
truth. In the remainder of chapter three I develop Priest, Siderits, and Tillemans’
deflationary account of conventional truth, highlighting its attractive features while
drawing attention to Horwich’s observation that such an account can only be
successful when supplemented with a truth-independent theory of meaning. This
requirement motivates an examination of Dharmakīrti’s work in search of the
necessary supplementary account of meaning, which I develop in chapter five along
Carnapian lines.
Before arguing that Dharmakīrti’s work provides a compatible theory of
meaning, in chapter four I first defend my reading of Dharmakīrti as a Mahāyānist.
Many scholars, while acknowledging that Dharmakīrti appears to ultimately endorse
a Yogācāra (a school within the Mahāyāna tradition) position, interpret his account of
pramāṇa, and its associated theory of meaning, from a realist, Sautrāntika
Abhidharma perspective. These scholars argue that Dharmakīrti adopts both realist
and idealist perspectives in diﬀerent places of his texts and that his accounts of
intentionality and meaning are given from the realist perspective. I resist the
multiple perspectives interpretation and make a case for understanding Dharmakīrti
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as presenting a unified account that is given from the anti-realist, Yogācāra
perspective. I contend, against the prevailing opinion, that Dharmakīrti’s account can
be understood as internally consistent and thus that the multiple perspectives
interpretation is unnecessary. In chapter four I also explain the sense in which I take
all Mahāyāna Buddhists to be anti-realists.
Having made a case for reading Dharmakīrti as a Mahāyānist, in chapter five I
present Dharmakīrti’s theory of meaning interpreted exclusively from an anti-realist
perspective. Using the Carnapian strategy advocated by Finnigan and Tanaka (2011),
I argue that in giving his account of pramāṇa, Dharmakīrti in eﬀect oﬀers an account
of what Carnap calls the “framework of things.” This account, which is specifically
focused on explaining how we come to understand the empirical world in terms of
discrete and classifiable objects and events, is supported by a use theory of meaning.
This account of meaning, which is grounded in a more fundamental account of
intentionality, explains that the mind generates conceptual cognitions from nonconceptual ones for the purpose of using those concepts to guide behavior. I argue
that because it is a context of pragmatic engagement that fixes the meaning of
concepts in functional terms, the result is a pragmatist account of meaning as use.
The use of concepts can then generate a framework that can support deflationary
accounts of truth and reference.
I then in chapter six conclude the essay by summarizing the argument and
drawing out some of its implications. In general, I take this essay to show that the
account of meaning in Dharmakīrti’s work, when understood from his Yogācārin
perspective, along with a deflationary account of truth, amounts to an account of
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conventional truth that is both consistent with Mahāyāna anti-realism and is robust
enough to support the norms that we ordinarily associate with truth. In meeting these
two criteria I conclude that the goal of explaining the sense in which conventional
truth is true for Mahāyāna Buddhism can be achieved by appealing to the work of
Dharmakīrti. In his distinctively Buddhist way, Dharmakīrti can thus explain “truth
for the rest of us.” Giving an account of such truth is valuable for the Mahāyānist
insofar as it gives her the resources to defend the Buddhist soteriological project, and
more broadly to allow for the possibility of meaningful inquiry and knowledge even
within an anti-realist context.

Dharmakīrti
Before beginning the main argument, I would like first to introduce the main
protagonist of this work: the philosopher Dharmakīrti. Dharmakīrti, who is
commonly thought to have lived in India in the 7th Century, 2 is one of the most
influential thinkers in the history of Buddhist thought. Developing the work of his
predecessor Dignāga, Dharmakīrti established the foundations of a system of logic,
rhetoric and epistemology that came to be considered the definitive Buddhist position
on these matters and helped to shaped the way in which philosophy was conducted in
India during what Taber (2005, xi) describes as its “golden period” from
approximately the fifth century to the thirteenth century.
Eltshinger notes that there is not universal consensus about Dharmakīrti’s dates (398). The 7th
century dates are based on the fact that he is not mentioned in the writings of the Chinese pilgrim
Xuanzang, who was in India from 629 to 645 C.E., but is mentioned by the pilgrim Yijing who was in
India from 675 to 685. This dating has been contested by Lindtner and Kimura who have argued for
an earlier date, as well as by Krasser. Krasser’s argument, which depends on evidence to suggest that
the 6th century philosophers Bhāvaviveka and Sthiramati knew of Dharmakīrti’s work, places
Dharmakīrti in the 6th century.
2
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Dharmakīrti’s principal text, the Pramāṇavārttika, is intended as a
commentary to Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya. Dignāga’s work attempts to explain
what constitutes a valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa) in order to correct the
erroneous views on the matter presented by non-Buddhists (Nagatomi 1957, i-v).
Dharmakīrti, picking up where Dignāga left oﬀ, uses the Pramāṇavārttika to defend
the Buddha and his teaching against rival religious-philosophical positions.3 The
style and method whereby Dharmakīrti defends Buddhism, like Dignāga, involves
making clear the standards according to which the validity of claims is to be
assessed. These standards are based on a sophisticated account of the means by
which individuals come to have knowledge (pramāṇa). These means, which for
Dignāga and Dharmakīrti are limited to perception (pratyakṣa) and inference
(anumāna), are explained and defended in their works so as to be acceptable to
anyone, that is, they do not rely on scriptural authority. In fact, Dignāga and
Dharmakīrti use the doctrinally neutral standpoints that they develop to defend the
authority of the Buddha and his teaching.
This method of defending Buddhist philosophical positions by grounding
them in a clearly articulated account of the means of knowledge had significant
impact on how philosophy was conducted in India. The polemical nature of
Dharmakīrti’s work, along with its method, spurred on a lively period of interdoctrinal debate between Buddhists and non-Buddhists that is characterized by its
emphasis on issues of epistemology and logic (McCrea & Patil 2010, 5). Dreyfus
(1997) explains that the work of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti

3

This is made explicit in the “Pramāṇasiddhi” chapter of the Pramāṇavārttika.
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helped create an epistemological turn that was part of a broader movement
aﬀecting the whole of Indian philosophy. These two authors were part of a
vast movement of thinkers, Hindu and Jain as well as Buddhist, who turned
away from traditional metaphysical questions such as the nature of the self
and the path to liberation. Instead they devoted themselves to the study of
epistemology. After this turning point, the philosophical quest seemed to bear
less on metaphysical truth claims than on the basis for making such claims.
The new concern with validating philosophical and religious claims through
argumentation motivated thinkers to elaborate theories about the sources and
types of knowledge. (16)
Throughout this period characterized by Dreyfus as an “epistemological turn”, it is
the views of Dharmakīrti that are taken to represent the authoritative Buddhist
position on these matters. The debates that continued long after Dharmakīrti’s death
were conducted by Buddhists who carried his torch.
As the representative of Buddhism with respect to epistemological and logical
matters, Dharmakīrti’s work had a profound and lasting influence on the development
of Mahāyāna traditions of Buddhism. Dunne (2004) notes, for example:
Following upon the work of his predecessor Dignāga, Dharmakīrti addressed
at length numerous questions that are of central concern to Buddhist thought
and practice. The impact of his views on Buddhist theories of perception,
inference, and language is diﬃcult to overestimate. Indeed, it would not be
outlandish to claim that his ideas are repeated in every Mahāyāna Buddhist
philosophical work written after his time in South Asia. (2)
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Dharmakīrti’s views, while accepted as authoritative, were developed and changed by
subsequent Buddhist commentators as they worked to address the various objections
raised in the course of their exchanges with their non-Buddhist interlocutors.4
Diﬀerences among commentators gave rise to diﬀerent epistemological views, all of
which claim to represent Dharmakīrti’s true philosophical intention. Some of the
characterizations of Dharmakīrti’s position made by subsequent commentators even
go so far as to attribute to him positions that are the complete opposite of the views
articulated by him (Dunne 2005, 9-10). Despite these diﬀerences, however,
Dharmakīrti’s views serve as the authoritative foundation for the development of all
new epistemological positions within Buddhism, which inherit his vocabulary and
general framework. And for those schools, such as some Madhyamaka schools that
deny epistemology altogether, it is Dharmakīrti’s formulation of it that serves as the
object of refutation (Dreyfus 1997, 19-20).
Because of the central position that Dharmakīrti occupies in the Buddhist
philosophical tradition, his work is well positioned to provide a solution to the
problem I am concerned with in this essay, namely that of providing a robust account
of conventional truth that is consistent with Mahāyāna commitments. As a
Mahāyānist himself (as I argue he is), he already shares the relevant commitments
with his co-religionists and it is thus natural and charitable to read his work in a
manner consistent with those commitments. When this is done, as I hope to show, an
important result is an account of conventional truth and meaning that can be
acceptable to even the most skeptical of Mādhyamikas.
An excellent example of this is the work of Jñānaśrīmitra. For an excellent presentation of his views
see McCrea & Patil (2010).
4
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In presenting the solution that I see in Dharmakīrti’s work to the problem of
conventional truth, I take myself to be joining the eﬀorts of the many commentators
that have come before me, both ancient and modern. Like them, I aim to use the
insights provided by Dharmakīrti’s work to solve philosophical problems that arise
for Mahāyāna Buddhism. Unlike many of those commentators, however, I do not
contend that the views I present will be the ones that Dharmakīrti himself intended; I
recognize the futility of attempting to divine his true intention. My goal is only to
arrive at a historically informed interpretation of Dharmakīrti’s work that thinks along
with him, takes his views seriously, and can be used to develop and clarify his
position in light of new objections, concerns, or contexts. In the case of the present
project, the ‘new’ concern is really an old one -- that of explaining conventional truth
-- made new by being framed within the context of twenty-first century analytic
philosophy. The result of bringing Dharmakīrti into dialogue with Western analytic
philosophy, as I do in this essay, is undoubtably something new, but it need not be the
worse for that. The interpretation I provide may not be what Dharmakīrti could have
himself intended, but it is consistent with his texts and, most importantly, in keeping
with the spirit of his work. What I present here is what I imagine Dharmakīrti would
say, were he able to engage in this inquiry in my stead.
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CHAPTER 2
TWO TRUTHS
In this chapter I will briefly trace the historical development of the distinction
between the two truths in Buddhism in order to highlight a fundamental diﬀerence
between how the Abhidharma and Mahāyāna traditions of Buddhism understand the
sense in which conventional truth is true. This diﬀerence results from the radically
diﬀerent ontologies that these two traditions have. The Abhidharma tradition
maintains that reality is ultimately composed of entities called dharmas.5 In virtue of
having this kind of realist ontology the Abhidharma tradition can account for truth at
the conventional level by appealing to some kind of reductionist account that
explains the referents of conventional discourse in terms of the ultimately real
dharmas that constitute them.
The Mahāyāna tradition on the other hand, which is characterized in part by
the rejection of the view that dharmas (or anything else) constitute the fundamental
building blocks of reality, cannot in that way explain truth at the conventional level by

The Abhidharma tradition that will be the focus of comparison is the post-canonical tradition,
especially the one that developed in the north of India. Ronkin (2005) argues that canonical
Abhidharma (“Abhidhamma” in Pali), in contrast with the post-canonical tradition, was not concerned
with issues of ontology but was instead concerned with providing a psychological account of the
various states of consciousness and their intentional objects that arise and constitute the experience of
the Buddhist practitioner as she progresses along various stages of the Buddhist path (34-85, 245).
Thus the discussion of the dharmas (“dhammas” in Pali) in the canonical Abhidharma cannot be
properly described as presenting an ontology. In the post-canonical tradition that developed in the
south, which is refered to as “Theravāda Abhidhamma,” the ontology that develops is described by
Ronkin as“a sort of psychological ontology” that still is only concerned with presenting a
phenomenology of experience rather than presenting what might be properly called a realist
metaphysics (181). That is to say, the Theravāda Abhidhamma does not understand dhammas to be
the ultimate constintuents of an objective reality but rather the elements that constitute the world as
experienced by the mind. The post-canonical Abhidharma traditions that developed in the north, i.e.,
the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika and the Sautrāntika traditions, in contrast, do seem to present a proper
realist account of dharmas that takes them to be the ultimate constituents of an objective reality.
5
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appealing to some ultimate ontology. The anti-realist metaphysics of the Mahāyāna
precludes giving such a reductionist account of conventional truth.
This important diﬀerence in ontology between the Mahāyāna and the
Abhidharma helps to make clear the problem that is the impetus for this essay: given
that a Mahāyāna Buddhist cannot appeal to some ultimate reality to explain the sense
in which conventional truth is true, how can she explain it? In the chapters that
follow I will examine various attempts to answer this question, as well as provide one
of my own that is inspired by the work of Dharmakīrti.

Two Truths in Early Buddhism
The Buddhist distinction between ultimate and conventional truth is almost as
old as Buddhism itself. Initially this distinction was drawn as a hermeneutical device
to resolve apparent contradictions in the Buddha’s teaching by diﬀerentiating those
parts of the teaching that require interpretation from those that could be taken
literally (Newland & Tillemans 2001, 5). This first sense of the two truths doctrine
originally stems, as has been argued by Karunadasa (2006), from a distinction drawn
in the early canonical sūtra texts between discourses “whose meaning needs to be
inferred” (neyyattha) and discourses “whose meaning has already been fully drawn
out” (nītattha) (1). For example, in the Neyyattha Sutta of the Aṅguttara Nikāya it is
stated that:
Monks, these two slander the Tathagata [the Buddha]. Which two? He who
explains a discourse whose meaning needs to be inferred as one whose
meaning has already been fully drawn out. And he who explains a discourse
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whose meaning has already been fully drawn out as one whose meaning needs
to be inferred. These are two who slander the Tathagata.
In this sūtra the distinction between what Karunadasa calls “direct and indirect
meaning” is clear (1). A disciple of the Buddha, is expected to appreciate the
diﬀerence between those teachings that require interpretation and those that do not.
The doctrine of two truths is not explicitly present in this sūtra, or anywhere else in
the sūtra literature; however, the distinction between direct and indirect meaning that
is mentioned here is interpreted by subsequent commentators as alluding to a
distinction between two kinds of truth. Karunadasa explains that in commentaries,
such as the Aṅguttaranikāya Aṭṭhakathā, the passages that are to be taken literally,
whose meaning has already been drawn out, are understood as those that express the
ultimate truth (paramatthasacca). Those passages whose meaning needs to be
inferred and thus require interpretation are then taken to be conventionally true
(sammutisacca) (2).
To see the problem and the solution this initial distinction provides, take for
example two separate passages from the Saṃyutta Nikāya, one of the texts from the
Buddhist canon. In one passage, when one of the Buddha’s disciples, the bhikkhunī6
Vajirā, is asked by the Evil One, Māra:
By whom has this being been created?
Where is the maker of the being?
Where has the being arisen?
Where does the being cease?

6

A bhikkhunī a Buddhist nun.
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the bhikkhunī Vajirā responds in the following way:
Why now do you assume ‘a being’?
Māra, is that your speculative view?
This is a heap of sheer formations;
Here no being is found.

Just as, with an assemblage of parts,
The word ‘chariot’ is used,
So, when the aggregates exist,
There is the convention ‘a being.’

It’s only suﬀering that comes to be,
Suﬀering that stands and falls away.
Nothing but suﬀering comes to be,
Nothing but suﬀering ceases. (Bodhi 2000, 230)7
Here in this passage we have the bhikkhunī Vajirā giving an articulation of what is
considered to be one of the Buddha’s most fundamental teachings: the doctrine of noself (anattā). This doctrine maintains that there is no underlying enduring substance,
entity, self, or soul that makes a person the particular person that he or she is.
Instead, the Buddha teaches that each “person” is really nothing more than a bundle
of impermanent, dependently originating, and constantly changing factors he calls
“aggregates” (khandha in Pali or skandha in Sanskrit) that neither individually nor

7

Saṃyutta Nikāya part/book I, section 5, verses 552-555.
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collectively can constitute a being that endures through time and is the subject of
aﬄictions like suﬀering. Now compare the previous passage with a diﬀerent passage
appearing earlier in the same text, where the Buddha is giving a lesson to a King:
If one regards oneself as dear
One should not yoke oneself to evil,
For happiness is not easily gained
By one who does a wrongful deed.

When one is seized by the End-maker
As one discards the human state,
What can one call truly one’s own?
What does one take when one goes?
What follows one along
Like a shadow that never departs?

Both the merits and the evil
That a mortal does right here:
What is truly one’s own,
This one takes when one goes;
This is what follows one along
Like a shadow that never departs.

Therefore one should do what is good
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As a collection for the future life.
Merits are the support for living beings
[When they arise] in the other world.8 (Bodhi 2000,168)
In this passage it appears that the Buddha is referring to the very entity -- the person
or being -- that his doctrine of no-self articulated in the first quoted passage denies.
In order to explain away this apparent contradiction, the commentarial tradition
argues that passages like the first passage express ultimate truth while in passages
like the second passage the Buddha expresses something that is only conventionally
true and therefore cannot be taken literally as positing the existence of the self as an
entity that persists through time and is the owner of its deeds. While the reflective
position of the Buddha is that such a self does not exist, it would be inappropriate and
confusing for him to say to the King in the passage above instead that “a set of
aggregates at a future time will arise having the nature they do at that time because of
the nature of the set of aggregates that exist now, to which they are causally
connected and among which is included factors involving either evil or good action.”
Such a statement might be closer to what is literally true, but it would be less eﬀective
at helping the king understand the importance of present action in determining future
happiness or suﬀering. What the Buddha says is not false, it is just less literal.
In light of these considerations Karunadasa, agreeing with Jayatilleke (1963,
52), is keen to point out that as this distinction was initially understood neither of the
two truths took priority over the other (10-11). At first, as its connection with the
distinction between neyyattha and nītattha might suggest, the distinction between the
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truths was intended simply to reveal two diﬀerent ways that the Buddha presented his
teaching. In fact, that he was able to cater his teachings to the abilities and
propensities of his students, as well as to the context of discussion, was taken to be
indicative of the Buddha’s great skill as a teacher (Karunadasa 2006, 12).9 Teaching
in terms of the ultimate truth and thereby being more literal is not, therefore, taken to
be better, as the above example demonstrates. It is simply a more technical and
specialized way of discussing what might otherwise be discussed more
conventionally.
In order to illustrate this point, Karunadasa provides a “free translation” of
some relevant passages in three Pali commentaries:
Herein references to living beings, gods, Brahma, etc., are sammuti-kathā
[conventionally true speech], whereas references to impermanence, suﬀering,
egolessness, the aggregates of the empiric individuality, the spheres and
elements of sense perception and mind-cognition, bases of mindfulness, right
eﬀort, etc., are paramattha-kathā [ultimately true speech]. One who is capable
of understanding and penetrating to the truth and hoisting the flag of
Arahantship when the teaching is set out in terms of generally accepted
conventions, to him the Buddha preaches the doctrine based on sammutiKarunadasa says the following, drawing from various commentaries, to make this point: “In
presenting the teaching the Buddha does not exceed linguistic conventions (na hi Bhagavā samaññam
atidhāvati), but uses such terms as ‘person’ without being led astray by their superficial implications
(aparāmasaṃ voharati). Because the Buddha is able to employ such linguistic designations as
‘person’ and ‘individual’ without assuming corresponding substantial entities, he is called ‘skilled in
expression’ (vohāra-kusala). The use of such terms does not in any way involve falsehood (musāvādo
na jāyati). Skillfulness in the use of words is the ability to conform to conventions (sammuti), usages
(vohāra), designations (paññatti), and turns of speech (nirutti) in common use in the world without
being led astray by them. Hence, in understanding the teaching of the Buddha one is advised not to
adhere dogmatically to the mere superficial meaning of words (na vacanabhedamattam
ālambitabbam)” (12).
9
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kathā. One who is capable of understanding and penetrating to the truth and
hoisting the flag of Arahantship when the teaching is set out in terms of
ultimate categories, to him the Buddha preaches the doctrine based on
paramattha-kathā. To one who is capable of awakening to the truth through
sammuti-kathā, the teaching is not presented on the basis of paramattha-kathā,
and conversely, to one who is capable of awakening to the truth through
paramattha-kathā, the teaching is not presented on the basis of sammuti-kathā.
There is this simile on this matter: Just as a teacher of the three Vedas who is
capable of explaining their meaning in diﬀerent dialects might teach his
pupils, adopting the particular dialect, which each pupil understands, even so
the Buddha preaches the doctrine adopting, according to the suitability of the
occasion, either the sammuti- or paramattha-kathā. It is by taking into
consideration the ability of each individual to understand the Four Noble
Truths, that the Buddha presents his teaching, either by way of sammuti, or by
way of paramattha, or by way of both. Whatever the method adopted the
purpose is the same, to show the way to Immortality through the analysis of
mental and physical phenomena. (10) 10
According to the views laid out in these commentaries, whether the Buddha
taught in terms of ultimate truth or conventional truth depended on the capabilities of
his students. And since either way of teaching could be eﬀective at helping the
student progress along the path towards becoming an enlightened Arhat, neither was
taken to be a superior form of truth.
See Anguttara Aṭṭhakathā Vol.I pp.54-55; Dīgha Aṭṭhakathā Vol I pp. 251-52; Saṃyutta Aṭṭhakathā
Vol II p.77.
10
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Thus on this view there is nothing objectionable in talking in conventional
ways, just so long as we don’t let our ways of talking confuse us into reifying the
objects of our discussion. The technical and specialized mode of discussion is
intended to help, in more reflective philosophical and perhaps meditative contexts, to
remove such possible confusion. But it is not considered, at least initially, to be
thereby a superior form of truth. In the context of early Buddhism it would therefore
be helpful to think of the terms ‘ultimate truth’ and ‘conventional truth’ as
diﬀerentiating between truth that is conveyed by means of conventions and truth that
is conveyed by means of more discursive reasoning. This distinction indicates two
diﬀerent methods of arriving at the truth rather than as diﬀerentiating between two
distinct kinds of truth.

The Development of Abhidharma
After the Buddha’s death, the Abhidharma tradition of Buddhism developed
out of an attempt to systematize the teachings presented in the sūtra literature. Noa
Ronkin (2005) explains that:
While the Nikāyas [sūtra literature] present the Buddha’s teachings as
addressed to specific audiences at specific times and locations, the
Abhidhamma [Skt. Abhidharma] seeks to describe the structure underlying
the Buddha’s Dhamma [teaching] fully, in ultimate terms that apply in all
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circumstances. In this sense it marks the attempt to establish Buddhist thought
as a comprehensive philosophy. (1) 11
The Abhidharma, as Ronkin here explains, is concerned with distilling the Buddha’s
core and “ultimate” teaching from out of the contexts in which the various sūtra
teachings are embedded. By removing the conventional and context dependent
aspects of the particular teachings presented in the sūtras, the Abhidharma thus hoped
to preserve the essence of the Buddha’s teaching. Using the distinction between those
teachings whose meaning must be drawn out and those whose meaning is explicit, the
Abhidharma aims to systematically draw out the meanings of the neyyattha teachings
so as to make explicit all of the Buddha’s teachings. In doing so the the Abhidharma
presents all of the Buddha’s teachings in ultimate, as opposed to conventional,
terms.12 This goal of presenting the Buddha’s teachings in ultimate terms is reflected
in the name given to this tradition of Buddhism, abhidharma, or abhidhamma in Pali,
which means “higher teaching” (Gethin, 203).13
The way in which the early Abhidharma preserves the core of the Buddha’s
teaching is basically by compiling detailed lists of the various things that the Buddha
Similarly, Bhikkhu Bodhi (2000) describes the Abhidharma project in the following way:”In
contrast to the Suttas [Skt. sūtras], the Abhidhamma Piṭaka is intended to divulge as starkly and
directly as possible the totalistic system that underlies the Suttanta expositions and upon which the
individual discourses draw. The Abhidhamma takes no account of the personal inclinations and
cognitive capacities of the listeners; it makes no concessions to particular pragmatic requirements. It
reveals the architectonics of actuality in an abstract, formalistic manner utterly devoid of literary
embellishments and pedagogical expedients. Thus the Abhidhamma method is described as the
nippariyāya-dhammadesanā, the literal or unembellished discourse on the Dhamma” (6). See also
Gethin 1998, 207-208.
11

See also Bodhi 2000, 5-6; Gethin 1998, 207-208; Harvey 1990, 83; Karunadasa 2006, 15; Pruden
1988, xxx; Williams 2000, 90.
12

Term also can mean simply ‘regarding the teaching’and this is the sense in which the term is used in
the sūtra literature. This sense of the term is also present in the literature of the Abhidharma tradition
but it is clear that the sense of “higher teaching” is the one that is often highlighted to distinguish the
Abhidharma texts from the sūtra literature (Ronkin 2005, 26).
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taught. These lists were probably developed from summary lists that were already
present in the sūtra literature referred to as mātṛkā (mātikā in Pali) (Ronkin 2005, 28;
Frauwallner 1995, 3). These lists, which were probably used as aids for
memorization, included items like the four noble truths, the five aggregates, the four
states of meditative absorption, the five hindrances, the six sense faculties along with
the six corresponding object fields, the eightfold path, the seven factors of awakening,
the twelvefold chain of dependent arising, etc. (Ronkin 2005, 27). These various
elements all represent things that the Buddha taught and thus represent in shorthand
his teaching as a whole. This teaching is taken to consist of both descriptive and
prescriptive claims that reflect the Buddha’s understanding of the way things really
are, the way things work, and the path an individual ought follow in order to escape
from the cycle of rebirth, saṃsāra.
The early canonical Abhidharma developed, categorized, and expanded these
mātṛkā so as to make explicit the details that are only implicit in the sūtra literature.14
Initially this amounted to nothing more than enumerating the various teachings that
were scattered throughout the sūtra literature in order to preserve them (Frauwallner
1995, 8), however, as the Abhidharma tradition developed, more and more emphasis
was placed on systematizing the teachings -- on explaining how the various elements
fit together to form a systematic whole. This resulted in the proliferation of lists that

The development of these lists is preserved in the two surviving sets of Abhidharma canonical
literature belonging to the Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma traditions. Frauwallner compares
the two Abhidharma canons in order to show that they shared a common origin (1995, 14-37). Ronkin
(2005) agrees that these two canons share a common ancestry in the Vibhajjavādin lineage.
Frauwallner attributes the diﬀerences in content between the two canons to a geographical separation
between the two groups that resulted from their continued development each as distinct missions
begun at the time of Aśoka. The Sarvāstivāda developed in the north and the Theravāda in the south,
in Sri Lanka ( 40-42).
14
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became more analytically detailed both with respect to the basic elements of the
teaching and how those elements relate to one another. The divisions of these lists
are finer and more exhaustive (Karunadasa 1996, 4). For example, items such as the
five aggregates come to be understood as general categories for what are considered
to be more fundamental elements. Rūpa, the material form aggregate, in the
Theravāda tradition, for example, is taken to be a class that contains 28 diﬀerent
kinds of more fundamental elements (Gethin 1998, 210).
The most fundamental elements of the Abhidharma lists are called dharmas
(dhammas in Pali). Initially, these elements were so called simply because they
constitute the elements of the Buddha’s teaching in general, which is also referred to
as (the) dharma. This use of the the term to refer to things the Buddha taught as well
as to the teaching in general is consistent with a use of the term dhamma in the the
original sūtra literature. Ronkin (2005) explains that the term dhamma in the sūtra
literature is ambiguous and that “[a]mong those meanings are included Buddhist
teaching in general, any doctrine which forms part of that teaching, an element of
experience, principle, phenomenon, nature, mental object, idea and others” (34).15
Picking up on these uses of the term dhamma, the early Abhidharma uses the term to
refer to the wide variety of things referred to in their lists, which collectively
constitute the content of the Buddha’s teaching in general -- his Dhamma.
As the Abhidharma canons developed and the tradition attempted to
exhaustively list and characterize all the dharmas and to explain their interaction, the
Ronkin states that “the scholarly literature on the history of the term dhamma in Buddhist thought is
fairly extensive and focuses on the ambiguity of the term caused by the wide range of meanings it
covers” and cites Carter 1978, Conze 1962, Warder 1971, Watanabe 1983 among others as providing
studies of Buddhist dhamma (34).
15
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term dharma came explicitly to take on ontological significance. Since the
Abhidharma understood itself to be presenting the Buddha’s ultimate teaching, and
the Buddha’s teaching is understood to present the the way things really are, it is not
surprising that the Abhidharma comes to view the elements in terms of which it
analyzes that teaching to be the ultimate constituents of that reality. The account that
develops thus comes to understand the dharmas to be the basic building blocks of the
experienced world. Paul Williams (2000) explains that,
Abhidharma texts set out to oﬀer a list of all the types of factors into which
experiences can be analyzed when we aim to find what is ‘really there’. They
also explain how these link up causally and relate to each other in order to
provide us with the actual world of lived experience. (90)
The dharmas are understood to be those elements of experience that cannot be
further analyzed. They are the elements that are explanatorily basic and that in
conjunction with one another explain and account for the totality of experience.
Diﬀerent schools of Abhidharma give diﬀerent lists of dharmas and
understand their nature in diﬀerent ways. The Sarvāstivādins, for example, maintain
that there are 75 types of dharma while the Theravādins maintain that there are 82
(Gethin1998, 210; Williams 2000, 87). Despite their diﬀerences, however, all
schools, at least in the post-canonical period, “attempt to give a systematic and
exhaustive account of the world by breaking it down into its constituent physical and
mental events (dharma/dhamma)” (Gethin 204).16 According to the Abhidharma, it is
Ronkin (2005) argues that the Theravāda tradition of Abhidharma in the canonical period is not
concerned with ontology but rather with explaining how the world is experienced, independent of the
question of of what the world is really like. She concedes, however, that the dharmas get reified and
“become ontologically laden” in the subsequent commentarial tradition (34).
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through attaining insight into the nature of reality -- both physical and mental -understood in terms of its most fundamental elements that an individual can come to
eradicate the ignorance that according to the Buddha is the fundamental cause of
suﬀering.17 Of particular concern is the experience of the Buddhist practitioner at
various stages of meditative attainment, the general patterns of which are laid out in
the Buddha’s teaching (Ronkin 2005, 37). The dharmas, the vast majority of which
are mental, account for the various experiences that may possibly occur along the
path to complete spiritual attainment (Ronkin 50).

Two Truths in Abhidharma
The two truths in early canonical Abhidharma were probably understood in
much the same way as they were in the sūtras, as two diﬀerent ways to express and
present the same reality. The Abhidharma is, on this understanding, exclusively
concerned with the “ultimate,” in the sense of more technical and literal, manner of
expression (Karunadasa 1996, 26-28). However, as the Abhidharma developed, both
in the Theravāda and (especially) in the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma traditions, the
understanding of the two truths changed as the dharmas came to be understood in
explicitly ontological terms. The two truths came to be understood in terms of two
Bhikkhu Bodhi (2000) describes the role of ontology in the Abhidharma in the following way: “This
project [of ontological systemization] starts from the premise that to attain the wisdom that knows
things ‘as they really are,’a sharp wedge must be driven between those types of entities that possess
ontological ultimacy, that is, the dhammas, and those types of entities that exist only as conceptual
constructs but are mistakenly grasped as ultimately real. Proceeding from this distinction, the
Abhidhamma posits a fixed number of dhammas as the building blocks of actuality, most of which are
drawn from the Suttas. It then sets out to define all the doctrinal terms used in the Suttas in ways that
reveal their identity with the ontological ultimates recognized by the system. On the basis of these
definitions, it exhaustively classifies the dhammas into a net of pre-determined categories and modes
of relatedness which highlight their place within the system’s structure. And since the system is held to
be a true reflection of actuality, this means that the classification pinpoints the place of each dhamma
within the overall structure of actuality” (4).
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distinct kinds of reality: ultimate reality (the dharmas) and conventional reality (the
things composed of dharmas). On this view, the ultimate comes to be understood as
that into which the conventional gets analyzed -- an idea that is absent in the sūtra
literature (Karunadasa 2006, 3-4).
Take for example the following exposition given of chapter 1, section 2 of the
Abhidhammattha Sangaha, an Abhidharma commentary from the Theravāda
tradition. In that section of the text, it is explained that in the Abhidharma, ultimate
reality is constituted by four main classes of dharmas: consciousness, mental factors,
matter, and nibbāna (Skt. nirvāṇa). Commenting on this section, Ven. Rewata
Dhamma and Bhikkhu Bodhi (2000) explain that:
According to the Abhidhamma philosophy, there are two kinds of realities -the conventional (sammuti) and the ultimate (paramattha). Conventional
realities are the referents of ordinary conceptual thought (paññatti) and
conventional modes of expression (vohāra). They include such entities as
living beings, persons, men, women, animals, and the apparently stable
persisting objects that constitute our unanalyzed picture of the world. The
Abhidhamma philosophy maintains that these notions do not possess ultimate
validity, for the objects which they signify do not exist in their own right as
irreducible realities. Their mode of being is conceptual, not actual. They are
products of mental construction (parikappanā) not realities existing by reason
of their own nature.
Ultimate realities, in contrast, are things that exist by reason of their
own intrinsic nature (sabhāva). These are the dhammas: the final, irreducible
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components of existence, the ultimate entities which result from a correctly
performed analysis of experience. Such existents admit of no further
reduction, but are themselves the final terms of analysis, the true constituents
of the complex of manifold experience. (25) 18
According to the view presented here, the objects of our ordinary experience, such as
tables and chairs, are considered to be conceptually constructed composite wholes
that are made up of dharmas. They are considered to be wholes because they are
reducible by analysis to more fundamental components, and they are understood to
be conceptually constructed because they are conceived to be unified, stable, and
persistent despite the fact that what appears to be one thing is really many dharmas
and none of those fundamental components endure for more than a moment.
Ordinary objects are only conventionally real because their natures depend on
other things -- on the more fundamental dharmas and on the conceptualizing activity
of the mind. For this reason these ordinary objects are not aﬀorded the same
ontological status as dharmas, which do not depend on anything else for their natures.
As Williams (2000) notes, “Each dhamma has its own specific characteristic by
which it is recognized” (91), its salakkhana (Skt. svalakṣaṇa), and it does not
therefore depend on any other dhamma for being the kind of dhamma that it is. It is
irreducible to any other element. Dhammas also do not depend on the
conceptualizing activity of the mind in order to have the particular character that they
do. Each exists as it is by its own nature -- its sabhāva (Skt. svabhāva).
The exposition provided here is derived from a commentary originally made by Ven. Mahāthera
Nārada in consultation with two of the principal commentaries to the Abhidhammattha Sangaha, the
Abhidhammatthavibhāvini-Ṭikā by Ācariya Samangalasāmi and the Paramatthadīpani-Ṭikā by Ledi
Sayadaw.
18
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Another similar example of the way in which post-canonical Abhidharma
comes to understand the two truths in terms of two realities is provided by
Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, a text from the Sarvāstivāda tradition. After
indicating that the Buddha declared that there are two truths: conventional truth
(saṃvṛtisatya) and absolute truth (paramārthasatya), Vasubandhu (1989) presents the
following verse:
The idea of a jug ends when the jug is broken; the idea of water ends when, in
the mind, one analyzes the water. The jug and the water, and all that
resembles them, exist relatively. The rest exist absolutely. (6.4)
He explains this verse in his commentary in the following way:
If the idea of a thing disappears when this thing is broken into pieces, then this
thing has relative existence (saṃvṛtisat); for example, a jug: the idea of a jug
disappears when it is reduced to pieces. If the idea of a thing disappears when
this thing is dissipated, or broken to pieces, by the mind, then this thing should
be regarded as having relative existence; for example, water. If we grasp and
remember the dharmas, such as color, etc., in the water, then the idea of water
will disappear.
These things, -- jugs, clothes, etc., water, fire, etc., -- are given their
diﬀerent names from the relative point of view or conforming to conventional
usage. Thus if one says, from the relative point of view, “There is a jug, there
is water,” one is speaking truly, and one is not speaking falsely. Consequently
this is relatively true.
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That which diﬀers is absolute truth. If, when a thing is broken to
pieces or dissipated by the mind, the idea of this thing continues, then this
thing has absolute existence (paramārthasat); for example, physical matter.
(910-911)
This passage from Vasubandhu is very similar in spirit to the account given in the
Theravāda text quoted earlier. Both traditions of Abhidharma maintain two diﬀerent
kinds of real entities, ultimately real entities and conventionally real ones, and both
traditions understand the ultimately real entities to be those which withstand
reductive analysis. Conventional realities, on the other hand, do not withstand
analysis.
In this passage Vasubandhu makes it clear that assertions that make reference
to conventionally real entities are true conventionally in virtue of being in conformity
to conventional usage. Since the entities referred to lack ultimate ontological status,
and the way in which they are conceived as enduring, stable, unified wholes cannot
be predicated of the underlying dharmas that ultimately make them up, the truth of
claims that make reference to ordinary objects must be accounted for not simply by
appealing to the underlying reality but must also by appealing to linguistic
convention.
In order to explain why linguistic convention is important Siderits (2003) uses
the classic simile of the chariot, used, for example, by the monk Nāgasena in the
Milindapañha, as an example of how human convention shapes the way in which
objects are understood. He explains,
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Consider the set of chariot parts: wheels, felly, axle, etc. Now first consider the
set when its members bear to one another the set of relations we might
collectively dub the ‘assembled chariot’ relation: wheels attached to felly, felly
to axle, etc. Second, consider the set when its members bear to one another
what we might call the ‘scattered across the battlefield’ relation: a wheel
beneath this tree, axle ten meters to the southeast of the tree, etc. We have a
name for the set when its members are in the ‘assembled chariot’ relation, but
we have no name for the set when its members are in the ‘scattered across the
battlefield’ relation. It is obvious why this should be so: we have an
institutionalized use – as a means of transportation – for the parts when
assembled, but there is no institutionalized use for us of the parts when strewn
across the battlefield that way. Now consider that we tend to readily conceive
of the set as a single entity when its members stand in the first relation, but not
when they stand in the second relation. This makes it clear that our
ontological intuitions are being guided by our institutionally arranged
interests… if we wish to know the ultimate nature of reality, we would do well
not to allow our views to be shaped by conventions that reflect our interests.
The ultimate nature of reality is how things objectively are – independent of
our subjective wants, needs, and interests. (7-8)
Here Siderits illustrates the idea that it is in virtue of the kinds of creatures we are,
with certain interests and needs, that we come to see and understand the world in the
way that we do. Thus, one of the motivations of the Abhidharma for denying that
composite objects are ultimately real is that their particular composition is something
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that rests in part on the activity of the mind. Thus for the Abhidharma, wholes
borrow their nature not only from the dharmas that make them up, but also from the
interests of the beings that take certain bundles of dharmas (but not others) to be
unified wholes. Our conventional practices and pragmatic interests play a role in
determining which bundles of dharmas we consider to be discrete objects and which
we don’t. Since ultimately there are no such discrete objects, the positing of them
must be due to the constructive activity of the mind. And whether or not our
assertions with respect to these kinds of conventional objects are true will thus
depend in part on the way we use language conventionally to help carve up the world.
It is important to note here that the mental construction involved in
understanding the world as composed of unified, stable, and enduring objects is not
something that the Abhidharma maintains that we do either consciously or
deliberately. The vast majority of this kind of mental bundling happens at what we
would call a subconscious or sub-personal level. However, insofar as this activity
occurs, it distorts the actual nature of reality. Even instances of what we would call
natural kinds are artificially constructed entities that derive their nature both from the
elements that make them up and the constructive activities of the human mind.
The account presented above suggests a reductionist interpretation of the
relationship between ultimate and conventional reality. Williams (2000) explains:
The Abhidharma is characterized by some sort of reduction. Throughout this
reductive process the search is driven by a quest for what factors, what
elements, are actually there as the substratum upon which the forces of mental
imputation and reification can form the everyday ‘life-world.’ An ‘ultimate
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truth/reality’ is discovered as that which is resistant to attempted dissolution
through reductive analysis. (93)
This interpretation of Abhidharma ontology as reductive has been most rigorously
argued for by Siderits, who characterizes the Abhidharma account as a form of
ontological reductionism and then shows how such a view works to explain the
Buddhist doctrine of the two truths.
Siderits (2003) defines ontological reductionism as the view that “holds that a
certain sort of thing that is ordinarily thought to exist turns out to be reducible to
certain other sorts of things that are in some sense ontologically more basic” (1). In
order to help elucidate this particular ontological position he asks us to imagine a
linguistic community that makes regular reference to things of kind K and then
juxtaposes the reductionist position to the other two possible ontological positions
one could take with respect to Ks, non-reductionism and eliminativism (1).19 A nonreductionist about Ks will claim that Ks are ultimately real and that they thus should
be part of any complete theory about the nature of reality. Non-reductionists about
Ks are realists about Ks and claim that Ks are among the class of entities that really
exist.
The eliminativist about Ks, on the other hand, will claim that there are no such
things as Ks. Eliminativists will argue that the positing of Ks rests on an adherence
to a false theory and thus that all talk of Ks should be expunged from the language as
a bunch of non-sense. The example that Siderits uses to illustrate this view is that of

The other possible ontological position that Siderits discusses later is that of superveinience. Since I
am not here defending the reductionist view against rivals but only seek to elucidate the reductionist
position, I will not discuss suprevienience here.
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understanding human illness in terms of disease-causing demons (2-3). There was
once a time when people explained human illness by claiming it was caused by
possession by incorporeal demons. Siderits invites us to imagine a community of
people who shared this theory of about human illness and who made regular
reference to the various demons they took to be responsible for various illnesses. He
explains that:
The eliminativist about demons would obviously claim that demons do not
exist. For now we know that diseases are caused by microbial infection, not
demon possession, and our only reason for supposing there to be demons had
to do with the explanatory role they played in the now-discredited theory. (3)
Such an eliminativist would be in favor of replacing demon talk with language that
reflects the theory that has supplanted the old, false one. “The theory in which such
talk is ensconced is simply incompatible with the theory we now accept. Demons
should be eliminated” (3). Likewise, those who are eliminativist about Ks will say
that we should replace talk of Ks with talk that is in congruence with the theory that
has supplanted the theory of which Ks were a part. We should eliminate Ks from our
ontology and our language.
With respect to the Abhidharma case, given that the Buddha himself, as well
as subsequent generations of Buddhist teachers, employed terminology that they
ultimately thought reflected an inaccurate description of the nature of reality, the
Ābhidharmikas are not eliminativists about wholes. Insofar as such Buddhists wish
to retain a place for such language in their philosophy, as we will see, their position is
thus better understood as reductionist rather than eliminativist.
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The reductionist about Ks will maintain, Siderits explains, that “while Ks may
be said to exist (pace the eliminativist), their existence just consists in the existence
of things of a more basic sort, things of which the Ks are composed, so that (pace the
non-reductionist) Ks do not belong in our final ontology” (1). The reductionist,
unlike the eliminativist, retains talk of Ks and thus is willing to grant a sense in
which they exist, because unlike the demons of the example above, talk of Ks turns
out to be a useful way to refer to what is found to be more ontologically basic and
thus to be ultimately real. For the Ābhidharmikas, these ontologically basic and
ultimately real entities are the dharmas.
If there is a relationship between the theory of which Ks are a part and the
more foundational theory we now find to be more accurate and we can explain the
phenomena referenced in Ks’ theory in terms of phenomena at the ultimate level,
then it is possible to use talk of Ks as a method of talking about the real phenomena
that are explanatorily more basic. This will be desirable when talk of Ks is
pragmatically preferable to talk of the ontologically more basic entities. With respect
to the Abhidharma case, just like organic chemistry talk, for example, is still useful
despite the fact that we now know that quantum mechanics is more fundamental, so
too, the Buddhist will argue, talk of tables and chairs is still useful despite the fact
that we now know that they are really composed of dharmas that are more
fundamental.
With reference to just such a reductionist account, Williams (2000) makes it
clear that a reductive view about ordinary objects is not the same as denying their
reality. He says,
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Note (and this is important) that to be a conceptual existent (you, me, a chair,
table, or a forest) is not thought in Sarvāstivāda to be the same as not existing
at all. It is to bear a particular sort of existence, the existence of an entity that
is quite correctly treated as a unity for pragmatic purposes but nothing more.
It can be analyzed into a plurality of constituents which are thus to be taken as
ontologically more fundamental. A conceptual existent is the result of a
particular sort of causal process, a conceptual reification or unification out of a
plurality. (94)
Conventional objects are real, on this view, but derivatively and thus not in the same
sense in which dharmas are real. While the ordinary objects of our experience are
considered to be ultimately unreal, they are taken to be conventionally real, and our
talk about them conventionally true, because these ‘objects’ are made up of real
dharmas and talk about these objects thus makes indirect reference to entities that are
ultimately real. The truth at the conventional level can thus be accounted for in terms
of truths at the ultimate level.20 Furthermore, by explaining conventional entities in
terms of dharmas, the Ābhidharmikas are able to explain why it is that beings like us
came to understand the world the way we mistakenly do. We do so because this
mistaken worldview is based in something that is real, only misunderstood.

Two Truths in Mahāyāna
In the next chapter I will explain in detail various attempts made to explain
the doctrine of the two truths in the Madhyamaka tradition of Mahāyāna Buddhism
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and the sense in which conventional truth is true in those accounts. Here I want to
conclude this chapter by quickly giving a characterization of Mahāyāna Buddhism in
general and then explaining why the doctrine of the two truths is particularly
problematic for the Mahāyāna. This problem is made especially clear by contrasting
the Mahāyāna position with that of the Abhidharma tradition just dealt with.
Scholars believe that the earliest Mahāyāna texts began showing up around
the first century BCE (Gethin1998, 225). Evidence suggests that the origin of
Mahāyāna was not sectarian but rather that it began simply as “esoteric teachings of
interest to small groups of monks from various ancient schools” (Gethin 225). These
teachings emphasized a group of related ideas that came to characterize the tradition.
According to Peter Harvey (1990), the Mahāyāna tradition of Buddhism has three
main characteristics: (1) “a wholehearted adoption of the Bodhisattva path,” (2) “a
new cosmology arising from visualization practices devoutly directed at the Buddha
as a glorified, transcendent being,” and (3) “a new perspective on Abhidharma, which
derived from meditative insight into the deep ‘emptiness’ of phenomena, and led to a
new philosophical outlook” (89-90).21 It is this last characteristic that is relevant to
the discussion of the nature of the two truths.
The “new perspective” oﬀered by the Mahāyāna is the perspective that
understands all phenomena to be empty of svabhāva. The term svabhāva, or sabhāva
in Pali, is used by the Abhidharma to characterize dharmas. According to the
Abhidharma, dharmas are the ultimately existing foundation elements precisely
because they have their own natures, svabhāva, and thus do not depend on any other
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thing for their nature -- not a conceptualizing mind or any other existent. In claiming
that all phenomena are empty (śūnya) the Mahāyānist rejects the ultimate reality of
the dharmas (Harvey 97).
Harvey explains the Mahāyāna attitude towards dharmas, as reflected in the
Perfection of Wisdom (Prajñāpāramitā) literature, in the following way:
The Perfection of Wisdom literature... regards all dharmas as like a dream or
magical illusion (māyā). There is something there in experience, and one can
describe it well in terms of dharmas, so it is wrong to deny these exist; yet
they don’t have substantial existence either. What we experience does not
exist in an absolute sense, but only in a relative way, as a passing
phenomenon. (98)
In this passage Harvey explains that for the Mahāyānists, the dharmas are considered
to be as conventional as ordinary objects. In a conventional sense it may be
permissible to claim that they are real and exist, but the Mahāyāna deny the
Abhidharma claim that dharmas are the ultimate real constituents of reality. Gethin
(1998) explains that:
Central to the Abhidharma is the distinction between the conventional truth
(that persons and selves exist) and the ultimate truth (that persons and selves
are ultimately simply aggregates of evanescent dharmas -- physical and
mental events). The main teaching of the Perfection of Wisdom is that from
the perspective of perfect wisdom, even this account of the way things are is
ultimately arbitrary. (235)
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According to the Mahāyāna the Abhidharma did not go far enough in their analysis
and thus failed to realize that the dharmas also were only conventional entities that
derive their nature from other (equally conventional) things and, importantly, from
the conceptualizing activity of the mind.22
The Mahāyānist not only deny the ultimacy of dharmas: they deny that any
entity has such ultimacy. All things are characterized by emptiness (śūnyata). What
this means is that nothing can serve as ultimate ontological foundation or ground.
This means that the method of explaining truth at the conventional level in terms of a
reductive ontological dependence of conventional referents to ultimately existing
entities is precluded for the Mahāyānist. Whether or not the Ābhidharmika can in the
end be successful at giving a reductive account of the two truths, this reductive
approach is at least available to her as an option given her ontological commitments.
This is not the case for the Mahāyānist. While it is still clear that Mahāyānists
maintain a distinction between the two truths (Harvey 2000, 98), they cannot account
for truth at the conventional level by appealing to some ultimate level because
Mahāyāna rejects that there is any ultimate ontological ground.
It is this ontological anti-realism that creates a problem for understanding
truth in the Mahāyāna tradition of Buddhism. If there is no ultimate ground, no
ultimately existing entities, then the question arises: how and in virtue of what are
claims assessed for truth or falsity? There appears to be no objective standard to
which the Mahāyāna can appeal. How then can the Mahāyāna retain a meaningful

Williams (2000) importantly notes that the Mahāyāna do not totally reject Abhidharma analysis, in
fact most think that it is a necessary step along the path to the perfection of wisdom. However, they
are insistent that it is not the final stage (137). This sentiment is echoed by Gethin 1998, 235-236.
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sense of truth in general, and between two senses of truth in particular? This is the
problem that serves as the impetus for this project.
Giving an account of non-arbitrary standards according to which any claim
can be assessed for truth is particularly important for the Mahāyāna because, as
Gethin (1998) points out, according to the Mahāyāna even “the conceptual constructs
of Buddhist theory are ultimately no less artificial and arbitrary entities than the
conceptual constructs of the ordinary unawakened mind which sees really existing
persons and selves” (236). The Buddhist path, including the insights of the
Mahāyāna itself, are all on this view conventional. If the Mahāyāna wants to defend
the Buddhist path as the conventionally right one, as opposed to the paths proposed
by others in the religious marketplace, then there must be some non-arbitrary
standard according to which to assess and compare rival positions. However, it is
unclear what that standard is or could be for the Mahāyāna. In the next chapter I will
explore some attempts made by others to explain the sense in which conventional
claims are to be understood as true in the Mahāyāna before I proceed in the
subsequent chapters to present my own account.
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CHAPTER 3
TWO TRUTHS IN MADHYAMAKA BUDDHISM

Much has been written regarding how the relationship between the two truths
is (or should be) interpreted by the Madhyamaka schools of Mahāyāna Buddhism -in particular how issues surrounding this distinction have been taken up by the
tradition in Tibet. Since issues that arise in the Madhyamaka context are similar for
all Mahāyāna Buddhists, as I will explain, it will be fruitful to examine the ways in
which this issue has been dealt with in the Madhyamaka context.
First I will explain the sense in which all Mahāyānists are anti-realist and why,
in light of their anti-realist commitments, the Mādhyamika like all Mahāyānists must
explain the standards that govern conventional truth in a way that does not rely on
some ultimate ontology. I will then address a couple of the most promising ways to
understand conventional truth in light of that anti-realist position.
The first view I will address attempts to understand Madhyamaka as a kind of
fictionalism. While this view explains how truth at the conventional level could be
insulated from truth at the ultimate level, I will argue that this position is in tension
with Madhyamaka anti-realism. I will also raise the challenge that it lacks a nonarbitrary account of the norms that govern the fiction. If the Mahāyāna want to retain
a robust notion of truth at the conventional level, then some non-arbitrary account
must be given of what marks the diﬀerence between truth and falsity.
Another view that I will address is the view that interprets the distinction
between ultimate and conventional truth in terms of Carnap’s distinction between
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claims that are external and those that are internal to a framework. This view has all
the advantages of a fictionalist view but without having to adopt at the conventional
level a pretense stance with respect to truth claims. This kind of a view also helps to
temper the concern that conventions are arbitrary by incorporating pragmatic
considerations to regulate the acceptance of conventional frameworks.
While the Carnapian approach is very promising as a general strategy, as it
stands the view needs elaboration in order to make clear that it can be used to support
an account of conventional truth. I will leave this issue undecided in this chapter but
will revisit it in chapter five, where I will attempt to employ and elaborate this
general strategy in giving Dharmakīrti’s account of meaning. There I will use
resources from Dharmakīrti’s philosophy to flesh out the Carnapian account in a
distinctively Buddhist way.
The last view I will discuss in this chapter is the deflationary account provided
by Priest, Siderits, and Tillemans. I will explain the virtues of this view with respect
to Madhyamaka ontological commitments and show that while promising, this view
requires a supplementary account of meaning in order to be a successful account of
conventional truth for Mahāyāna. In chapter five I will look to the philosophy of
Dharmakīrti for the resources to provide a Buddhist account of meaning that could
supplement a deflationary theory of truth.

Mahāyāna Anti-realism
In the last chapter I characterized Mahāyāna as anti-realist. Before
proceeding to examine some attempts to understand conventional truth in
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Madhyamaka, I want to make clear the relevant sense in which all Mahāyāna
Buddhism is anti-realist and thereby make clear the position that the Mādhyamikas
share with their Mahāyāna co-religionists.
Characterizing Mahāyāna as anti-realist may seem inaccurate, given that
much of Mahāyāna is often taken to accept that reality has an ultimate nature. While
all Mahāyānists maintain that all phenomena are empty (śūnya) and reject the
ultimacy of dharmas, some Mahāyāna schools such as the Yogācāra/Vijñānavāda,
Pure Land, and Zen schools-- even the Madhyamaka by some interpretations -- still
claim that there is an ultimate reality that underlies ordinary experience. For these
Mahāyānists, the lesson to be drawn from the doctrine of emptiness is not that there
is no way that reality absolutely and ultimately is, but rather that absolute reality as it
exists in itself is ineﬀable and beyond conceptualization.23 Siderits (2003) explains
that “the idea seems to be that if no real entity may be said to have its own essence,
then the reals must lack determinate natures, and so must somehow transcend all
eﬀorts at conceptualization” (132).
For the Yogācāra/Vijñānavāda tradition of Mahāyāna, for example, we are
told that the experienced world is nothing more than a continual flow of ideas
(vijñapti-mātra) that when experienced in its perfected (niṣpanna) nature reveals the
way things really are, a pure tathatā (‘thusness’ or ‘suchness’).24 The ordinary
unenlightened mind, we are told, experiences the world as composed of distinct
subjects and objects. According to the Yogācāra, this, however, is just an illusion.

23

See, for example, Conze (1967).

See the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, Tathāgatagarbha Sūtra, Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra,
and Śrīmālādevī-siṃhanāda Sūtra. (Cited in Gethin 1998).
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All there is is just an ever-changing flow of ideas or information (vijñapti) that in
itself is non-dual and non-conceptual. The mind superimposes conceptual
distinctions and then mistakenly takes these to be real. However, ultimately they are
not -- they are empty. Understood in a metaphysical, even an idealist, way, this view
seems to posit an ultimate reality -- the ineﬀable ‘thusness’ of the flow of ideas.25
Another, related, Yogācāra position goes further to posit an even more
fundamental Absolute. Wood (1994) explains that
the Vijñānavāda “Absolute” was not mind (vijñāna) -- not even absolute or
non-dual mind -- but rather non-mind (acitta). (Mind, however, was its
manifestation.) The Vijñānavādins identified this Absolute with emptiness,
and its attainment was said to ensue upon the realization that the mind is
empty (śūnya), in the sense that it is devoid of imagined and totally unreal
external objects (i.e. matter). (xii)
According to Wood, the Vijñānavāda clearly endorses an underlying ultimate reality,
rejects the mind-independent existence of physical objects, and gives ontological
priority to the mind.
Pure Land and Zen traditions of Mahāyāna use and develop notions such as
the tathāgatagarbha, the ‘womb’ or ‘embryo’ of the Buddha (Gethin 1998) or
“buddha-nature” to refer to the intrinsic nature of all beings. This is the nature that is
said to be realized upon becoming enlightened. On this view too, there appears to be

Even if this is read as idealist, it cannot be subjective idealism because the Yogācāra reject the
reality of subjects as well as that of external objects. It would have to be a kind of idealism that
claimed that only mind or ideas exist without thinking of the mind as a subject. This would have to be
a kind of impersonal idealism. For more on the nature of Yogācāra idealism see Wood (1994).
25
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some way that reality ultimately is. In this case it is Buddha-nature.26 Equating this
buddha-nature with tathatā, Kalupahana (1976) goes so far as to describe this
ultimate reality as a “transcendental monism” or a “noumenal reality,” emphasizing
its inexpressibility and non-conceptuality (118, 122).27
Since all these schools maintain that there is some way reality ultimately is,
they would seem to qualify as realist views. Siderits (2003, 132), for example,
categorizes these views as realist precisely for this reason. By this reckoning, a
realist view is one that posits an ultimate nature for reality and an anti-realist view is
one that denies that reality has such a nature. Only the Madhyamaka views that
apply the doctrine of emptiness to absolutely everything would count as anti-realist.
Only these views would reject the notion that there is some way reality is objectively,
in and of itself.
While this is certainly a plausible way to mark the distinction between realism
and anti-realism, it is not the way I would like to mark the distinction given the
interests of this essay. Instead, I would like to follow those like David Chalmers
(2009) who mark the distinction with respect to metaontological or metametaphysical
considerations about the objectivity of ontological assertions. According to
Chalmers, ontological realism and anti-realism are diﬀerentiated with respect to the

Gethin (1998) is very good about pointing out that the ontological and metaphysical construals of
these doctrines, which I am here trying to highlight, are contentious. There is still a lot of debate about
how best to understand these doctrines and whether or not an ontological reading is the best way to go.
I do not mean here to take a stand in the debate since, as I will shortly show, it does not make a
diﬀerence for the problem I am trying to address in this essay. I mean only to indicate what the
ontological readings are generally like.
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Even Madhyamaka is interpreted by some as positing a positive absolute that is by nature empty.
Siderits cites Mohanty 1992, 278; Matilal 1990, 149; Murti 1955; Inada 1970, 24-26; and Ruegg 1977,
18-20 as philosophers who have interpreted Madhyamaka as concluding from the doctrine of
emptiness that the real is ineﬀable (2003, 37; note q).
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distinct answers each gives to the metaontological question: does the basic question
of ontology have objective answers? He explains, that “the basic question of
ontology is ‘What exists?’ The basic question of metaontology is: are there objective
answers to the basic questions of ontology? Here ontological realists say yes, and
ontological anti-realists say no” (77).
The basic question of ontology, ‘what exists?’ has objective answers,
according to the robust realist, because, according to her, the fundamental nature of
reality determines an absolute domain that includes everything that fundamentally
exists.28 Answers to the basic ontological question, when given in a specifically
ontological or philosophical mode (as opposed to being part of ordinary discourse),
are taken to quantify over this absolute domain, which determines the objective truth-
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Chalmers diﬀerentiates between diﬀerent kinds of realism that vary in strength. One weak form,
which he refers to as “lightweight realism,” agrees that the basic ontological question has objective
answers because the answers are trivial, being simply analytically or conceptually true (95). The
position that I refer to here as “robust realism” corresponds to what Chalmers calls “heavyweight
realism,” which maintains that “ontology is the study of the fundamental structure of reality” and takes
the ontological existence assertions to be substantive and to reveal the fundamental structure of reality
(97). I think the Buddhists would agree with Chalmers that when we look at the way in which
ontological discourse functions in the “ontology room” (as opposed to ordinary discourse) it is clear
that it is heavyweight not lightweight considerations that are at play. It is the heavyweight position
that is the target position (the pūrvapakṣa) of the Buddhist anti-realist critique.
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value of the answer.29 Because the world is taken to come with this built-in, absolute
domain, the basic question of ontology has objective answers.30
There is a variety of reasons for an anti-realist to conclude that the basic
question of ontology does not have objective answers. The reason why Mahāyāna
Buddhists must so conclude is that they all must deny that the fundamental nature of
reality determines an absolute domain that ontological existence assertions can
quantify over. Even those Mahāyānists who maintain that reality does have a
fundamental nature, still deny that ultimate reality has the kind of structure that could
determine a domain of entities. According to Mahāyāna, ultimate reality is nonconceptual and ineﬀable. It lacks the object-property structure that would be required
in order for thought, which has a subject-predicate structure, to be objective.
According to the Mahāyāna family of views, the conceptual structure of thought is an
artificial superimposition on the non-conceptual and ineﬀable structure of
fundamental reality. Another way to put this is to say that while the Mahāyāna may
have a positive metaphysical position, this position does not amount to an ultimate
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Chalmers diﬀerentiates between what he calls “ontological existence assertions” and “ordinary
existence assertions” (81). Unlike ontological existence assertions, ordinary existence assertions are
not necessarily sensitive to ontological matters and in virtue of this it is possible for those who hold
diﬀerent ontological positions, say a realist and a nihilist, to agree that in the context of ordinary
discourse it could be appropriate or correct to say that there are three glasses on the table, even if the
nihilist will ultimately claim that such a claim is untrue. So the claim ‘there are three glasses on the
table’ would be correct when used as an ordinary existence assertion though false when used as an
ontological existence assertion. See Chalmers (2009, 81-88) for more on this distinction.
In claiming that there are objective answers to the basic questions of ontology the ontological realist
is claiming that “every unproblematic ontological existence assertion has an objective and determinate
truth-value” (92). Chalmers explains that “an assertion is unproblematic when its nonquantificational
vocabulary does not pose any obstacle to the assertion’s having an objective and determinate truthvalue: this requires (perhaps inter alia) that the nonquantificational vocabulary is truth-apt, not vague,
and not relativistic, and such that assignment of a truth-value to the sentence does not generate
paradoxes akin to the liar paradox” (92). There is a question whether Buddhists like the Mādhyamikas
would consider any assertion unproblematic, but I will leave that question aside for now since it does
not matter for the point I am trying to make.
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ontology. Ultimate reality is not composed of distinguishable entities and their
properties -- not even dharmas. This is the lesson to be learned from the doctrine of
emptiness. And since there is no absolute domain, ontological existence assertions
do not have objective truth-values. Thus, Mahāyāna is a form of ontological antirealism.
This characterization fits with Mark Siderits’ (2003) characterization of
Buddhist anti-realism as a rejection of realism understood as the view that
(i) there is one true description of the world; (ii) with truth understood as the
property that a statement possesses when the state of aﬀairs that it expresses
in fact obtains; and (iii) with the understanding as well that the states of aﬀairs
the obtaining of which makes up the world are independent of whatever
relevant concepts we employ. (114)
In Chalmers’ terms, (i) would be an articulation of the metaontological position that
asserts that the basic question of ontology has objective answers. The conjunction of
all ontological existence assertions that are true would constitute the one true
description of the world. Claim (ii) expresses the idea that the objectivity of those
answers depends on the fundamental nature of reality, which determines the absolute
domain that the ontological existence assertions quantify over. Claim (iii) makes
clear that the fundamentality of reality and the absoluteness of the domain preclude
any concept dependence, contextualization or relative determination. The reality that
is the subject of realist theories is the reality that is there anyway. Reality is taken to
have the nature it has, and to exist as it exists independently of the way in which it
happens to be cognized by beings like us. Siderits explains that for the realist,
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To obtain truth we must let the world determine the nature of our
representations. To be sure, our representations will make use of concepts,
which we could agree are in some sense mental contents that do not exist
apart from the minds that employ them. What we must insure, says the realist,
is that it is the world that dictates the shape these concepts take... True
statements reflect how the world is independent of the concepts we employ in
describing it. (2003, 114)
Here Siderits emphasizes the importance for the realist that the direction of fit go
from world to thought and not the other way around. The nature and structure of the
world, as it is in itself, is taken to determine the structure of our thoughts when those
thoughts are true, and it is in virtue of the fact that the world has a given nature that
determines an absolute domain of entities that ontological existence assertions can be
objectively true or false. The anti-realist, of course, rejects all this.
Chalmers notes that anti-realists have a diﬃcult time accounting for the
correctness conditions of ordinary existence assertions. For realists with revisionary
metaphysics, it is possible to see how they might account for the correctness of
ordinary existence assertions by making indirect appeal to the absolute domain (2009,
106). The Buddhist reductionist, for example, can take ordinary existence assertions
to be correct as paraphrased sentences that indirectly make reference to the entities
within the absolute domain. So, for example, the ordinary statement “There is a
table” is correct if “there are dharmas arranged table-wise” is true (2009, 84).
However, Chalmers points out that
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without an absolute domain, it is less obvious how an ontological anti-realist
is in a position to analyze truth- or correctness-conditions for either
ontological or ordinary existence assertions. In the case of ontological
existence assertions, this might not be seen as too much of a cost, as the
ontological anti-realist might deny that these assertions have truth-conditions
or correctness-conditions at all. But there will remain the challenge of
handling ordinary existence assertions, without the advantage of appealing to
a built-in domain. (106) 31
This problem that Chalmers identifies is precisely the problem that I have identified
the Mahāyāna as having. If we understand ordinary existence assertions as
conventional, the problem all Mahāyānists have with respect to the notion of
conventional truth is that of explaining what the truth or correctness conditions are
for ordinary or conventional kinds of claims. This is a problem all Mahāyāna share,
even if we grant that some schools retain the notion of ultimate reality. Given that all
schools must deny the possibility of an absolute domain of entities, they all share this
problem. In what follows I will examine some recent attempts to address this
concern with respect to Madhyamaka Buddhism in particular.

Two Truths and Fictionalism
One way that the truth- or correctness-conditions of conventional claims
(what I have, following Chalmers, been calling ordinary existence assertions) have

Denying that ontological existence assertions lack truth-conditions would amount to claiming that
there are no assertions that are ultimately true. On this view, as Siderits (2003) puts it, “the ultimate
truth is that there is no ultimate truth” (133). All truth is conventional truth.
31
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been explained is in terms of fictionalism: roughly the view that assertions made
within a certain discourse do not aim at literal truth but rather are circumscribed by
the fictional domain to which they refer. Garfield (2006), for example, makes a case
for a fictionalist reading of conventional truth in Madhyamaka and Tillemans (2011)
reads the Mādhyamika Candrakīrti in particular as endorsing the same view. Their
truth is not determined by objective facts but rather by the world of pretense facts
that compose the fictional domain of discourse.
The paradigmatic cases of a fictional domain of discourse are, of course,
works of fiction, like novels or plays. Garfield explains that
Works of fiction are diﬀerent from factual reports. The latter aim at getting it
right about the actual world, and the former, for the most part, do not (though
they nonetheless may rely on and comprise claims that are non-fictional). So,
measured against reality, many of the claims in works of fiction are simply
false, and nobody frets about that. (2006, 1)
So, the claim that Sherlock Homes lived at 221B Baker Street is true with respect to
the fictional world that Sir Arthur Conan Doyle created, but is untrue with respect to
the actual world where the person did not exist. As Garfield points out, no one finds
this discrepancy between truth values problematic or mysterious. It is part of our
understanding of what a fiction is that it is not aiming at presenting literal truth, so it
is insulated from concerns about what the world is really like.
Advocates of fictionalism claim that, as in the case of literary fiction, it is
possible to make unproblematic sense of claims being true within a domain of
discourse while at the same time acknowledging that outside that domain, with
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respect to reality, they may actually be false. Likening a domain of discourse to a
fiction allows those with revisionary metaphysics to allow for the continuation of
discourse involving the entities that they deny really exist. By relegating discourse
involving the suspect entities to a fiction, the revisionary metaphysician can continue
to deny that those entities really exist while allowing that they do exist within the
confines of the non-literal, ‘fictional’ domain of discourse to which they belong. And
like in the case of fictional works, this should be unproblematic and unmysterious. If
these discourses, like fiction, do not aim at literal truth, then they too can be insulated
from real world ontological considerations.
Garfield (2006) maintains that fictionalism is a natural way to understand the
Madhyamaka account of conventional truth (4). By adopting a fictionalist account of
conventional truth, the Madhyamaka can allow for ordinary, conventional discourse
to continue while at the same time maintaining their radically revolutionary
(anti-)metaphysics that denies the ultimate existence of the entities ordinarily
referred to in conventional discourse. Both Garfield (2006) and Tillemans (2011)
find historical evidence for this kind of a view, especially in the works of Candrakīrti
and Tsongkhapa. According to this reading of Madhyamaka, the claims of
conventional discourse are from the ultimate perspective wholly erroneous; yet from
the conventional perspective, which is understood to amount to a fictional
perspective, conventional claims can be assessed for conventional truth and falsity by
the standards internal to that perspective.
As promising as this approach may seem, using fictionalism to understand the
truth-conditions for ordinary, conventional discourse in Madhyamaka is problematic
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for several reasons. The first problem has to do with the intelligibility of the analogy
with fiction when there is no contrasting non-fictional domain. As both Garfield and
Tillemans point out, for the Madhyamaka, fictionalism would go “all the way
down” (Garfield 2006, 6) and should be thus characterized as a
“panfictionalism” (Tillemans 2006). But in the absence of a non-fictional reality, it is
unclear in what sense one can say that ordinary discourse is fictional.
Usually the term fiction is used to indicate a non-literal, pretense context. To
be a fiction is to be at variance with fact. To mark this distinction Garfield contrasts
the conventional with the ultimate. He says that conventional truths when measured
by the standpoint of ultimate reality are false (2). This seems in keeping with things
that Candrakīrti in particular says to the eﬀect that conventional truth is entirely false
(2). However, if my characterization of the Madhyamaka position as a form of
ontological anti-realism is correct, then there is no standpoint of ultimate reality to
which ordinary discourse could be contrasted in order to deem it false, or merely
pretense, or in some other way at variance with the facts. The point of Madhyamaka
anti-realism is to deny that there are any objective facts to which conventional claims
could be at variance. This seems to undermine the force of calling conventional
discourse fictional. If everything is a fiction, then it seems that nothing is.
Garfield (2006) acknowledges that “for Madhyamaka, the very notion of there
being an ultimate nature of reality is incoherent” and that for them there is no
ultimate substratum behind the fiction (5). He cites this as the reason why the
Mādhyamika Nagarjuna identifies the ultimate and conventional truths; the only truth
to be had is whatever truth we can get from a conventional standpoint since,
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according to Madhyamaka, there is no ultimate standpoint. Garfield quotes
Tsongkhapa as saying that “without being posited through the force of convention,
existence is not possible,” which makes the same point (5). There is no absolute
domain of entities that existential claims can quantify over. The only entities that can
be said to exist do so only with respect to some conventional domain. Calling
conventional domains fictions may be helpful for highlighting the fact that these
domains are independent of ultimate ontological considerations, however, it is also
misleading since it suggests that there is some ultimate frame of reference according
to which the conventional can be judged to be false, which is precisely the position
that Madhyamaka wants to avoid. I think this provides a good reason to avoid
thinking of the Madhyamaka account of conventional truth in fictionalist terms.
Another problem with the fictionalist account, which Tillemans (2011)
highlights, is that this view threatens to amount to what Tillemans calls the “dismal
slough,” the view that “one should accept ‘conventional truth,’ or truths for the
world, as being only as the world accepts them” – a view that seems “to imply an
extreme conservatism that nothing the world ever endorsed could be criticized or
rejected and that, on the conventional at least, a Mādhyamika’s principal epistemic
task was just to passively acquiesce and duplicate” (152). Tillemans argues that
Candrakīrti and his followers (the Prāsaṅgikas), as interpreted by Kamalaśīla,
understood the dismal slough to follow from a fictionalist understanding of the
conventional. Finnigan and Tanaka (2011) concur that
for the Prāsaṅgika, emptiness of all things is often thought to entail that a
conventional truth is an unreflective endorsement of the world's beliefs. A
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consequence of this Prāsaṅgika view, as was pointed out by Kamalaśila and
others, is that truth in conventional truth has no normative role and that, as a
result, conventional epistemic practices lack any authority. This means that
the truth of conventional truths is unexplained, and so no sophisticated
analysis of anything can be given. (186)
The idea seems to be that in adopting the fictional stance one must play make-believe
according to the rules of the adopted conventional fiction and one cannot
substantially challenge the fiction on the grounds that what it claims is ultimately
untrue. Since the fictions are insulated from external ontological considerations,
there is no way to critique the fiction from the outside. The best attempts one can
make to reform the story must come from within, invoking concerns of coherence
and consistency among the claims made in the fiction. However, Tillemans notes that
still, “a considerable portion of the story needs to be taken as brutely given” and
furthermore, with respect to the tradition historically, “the Prāsaṅgika seems to have
perceived the desirability for reform to have been quite limited indeed and seems to
have felt that because no account could ever be true, the world’s story should be
accepted largely intact by default” (159).
In calling this kind of position the “dismal slough” Tillemans acknowledges
that “[m]ost of us would agree that the potential flattening of the normative roles of
truth and knowledge that such duplication [of what everyone else already accepts]
brings is quite dismal” (152). Newland and Tillemans (2011) further claim that,
the obvious danger is that if saṃvrtisatya [conventional truth] is not true at all
but only mistakenly thought to be true, then it carries no normative force,
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collapsing the important distinction between what is true and what is merely
thought to be true. There would be little of interest to say about such “truth”
beyond simply describing what people believe. (14)
These passages highlight some important concerns about the normativity of truth. If
the norms of correctness are determined by the fiction and there is no perspective
from outside the fiction from which those norms can be challenged, then the concern
is that there is no way to challenge or test those norms.
Related to these concerns about truth as a normative concept, there is a further
concern that the Cowherds (2011) do not address: 32 that such an uncritical
fictionalism denies the Buddhist the resources necessary to defend her normative
position. In adopting the fictional stance, the typical Prāsaṅgika can identify and
describe the norms of the conventional fiction she finds herself in, presumably
established by her culture and its customs, but denies them any normative force
independent of the conventions that institute them (Garfield 126-127). What this
means is that outside cultural and social contexts that are already Buddhist, the
Prāsaṅgika has no justification for asserting and conforming to Buddhist norms. In a
context in which there are conventionally accepted claims that conflict with Buddhist
claims and present alternative normative orientations, in adopting the Buddhist
doctrine the Prāsaṅgika is put in the position of having to defend her choice. The
fictionalist position, as presented by Tillemans, seems to leave her with no way to

Many of the authors cited above are contributors to Moonshadows, a collection of essays that
addresses the Buddhist notion of conventional truth. The contributors are collectively refered to as the
Cowherds.
32

57

justify her choice at the conventional level if the conventions of her social and
cultural context do not already accept Buddhist claims as true.
This is especially problematic when one considers the cultural context in
which the Buddha taught or in which Nāgārjuna, the founder of Madhyamaka, wrote.
In neither of these contexts were the Buddha’s teachings obvious or non-contentiously
accepted by the society at large. The claims of Buddhism did not reflect the truths of
the culture -- either its common-sense, custom, or law. In fact, the Buddha was in
many respects a revolutionary. For example, he challenged traditional views about
duty by leaving at a young age the householder life as father and husband to become
a wandering ascetic; he challenged traditional views about piety by rejecting the
Vedas and the role of ritual and sacrifice in religious life; he challenged the social
hierarchy of the caste system and traditional gender norms by accepting all people –
men and women – into the Buddhist monastic community. And with regard to the
Mādhyamika Nāgārjuna, the wider cultural context in which he wrote was not much
diﬀerent than that of the Buddha, except that there were more fully developed
orthodox philosophical positions to compete with in the religious marketplace. These
deviations from the conventional norm cannot be explained or justified, it seems,
from the fictionalist perspective. Nor can Buddhist truth claims be defended in a
cultural or social context in which the truths of Buddhism are not in some sense
already presupposed as part of that culture’s fiction.
Garfield (2006), Garfield (2011), and Thakchöe (2011) make clear that not all
Prāsaṅgikas drew the conclusion that one ought simply to accept what the ordinary
person accepts as true from the position that the only truth is conventional truth.
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Tsongkhapa, in particular, seems to have advocated the acceptance at the
conventional level of epistemic instruments (pramāṇa) as authoritative. This, in
eﬀect, gives Madhyamaka an epistemology that provides a standard of correctness
through which a distinction can be made between conventional truth and
conventional falsity. This account is non-foundationalist because the method of
arriving at truth, the pramāṇa, are not considered to be self-justifying or
foundational. Like everything else, the pramāṇas too are empty of inherent
existence. They are not by nature instruments of knowledge, they are simply taken to
be so conventionally. Garfield (2011) explains that on this view (which he attributes
to Nāgārjuna, Candrakīrti, and Tsongkhapa)
epistemic instruments depend for their authority on their epistemic objects,
and the objects, in turn, depend for their actuality on the instruments in a
coherentist spiral that defies grounding but characterizes epistemic practice in
the only way we could ever hope to do so. (36)
The Mādhyamikas who endorse this kind of a view are keen to demonstrate that
pramāṇas are as dependently originated as the objects they reveal. The “coherentist
spiral” that Garfield refers to here is intended to highlight the fact that the means of
knowledge and the objects known co-determine and support one another in a way
that aims at coherency and that lacks any ultimate, foundational support. This is
intended to highlight the fact that the pramāṇas operate within the fictional realm of
discourse, are determined by that realm of discourse, and act with respect to the
fictional entities within that discourse. They are not to be understood as providing a
perspective external to the fiction that can somehow validate it from outside.
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This acceptance of pramāṇas at the conventional level allows someone like
Tsongkhapa to claim that “there is a standard of correctness for conventional
truth...And the standard for the truth of a judgment regarding conventional truth is
that it is vouchsafed by the authority of conventional epistemic instruments and
cannot be undermined by those instruments” (Garfield 2011, 34). Thus for him, the
conventional truth is "that which is delivered by unimpaired cognitive faculties when
they are used properly" (35). For those Mādhyamikas who accept pramāṇas at the
conventional level, the lesson to be learned from the realization that ultimately
nothing has intrinsic nature is that there is no such thing as ultimate truth, meaning
that there are no claims that are true in virtue of some ultimately existing things or
state-of-aﬀairs. What this means is that the only truth that is left is the conventional
truth, which then can be understood through accounts of pramāṇa theory.
This account of the role of pramāṇas in conventional discourse appears to be
addressing another concern that arises for Madhyamaka fictionalism, which Siderits
(2006) raises in his comments to Garfield (2006). The term ‘fiction,’ he notes, has
the connotation of something that is arbitrarily invented. Calling conventional reality
and its related discourse fictional suggests that it too is arbitrarily determined (17).
The fictional world of Sherlock Homes, for example, was arbitrarily created by Sir
Arthur Conan Doyle and it serves as the standard according to which all claims made
about that world are judged. So the question that Siderits asks is, how according to
this analogy are we to understand where the conventional world fiction originates?
And is this origin arbitrary?
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This concern with the possibly arbitrary origin of conventional reality on a
fictionalist account seems to get at the heart of both Tillemans’ concern about the
flattening of norms and the related concern about the ability to defend revolutionary
ways of thinking. In the absence of an absolute standard, if conventional reality is
arbitrarily determined, and that arbitrarily determined reality serves as the standard
according to which claims made with respect to that reality are judged, is there any
room for critical evaluation or must everything simply be accepted at face value?
The concern is that, as with literary fiction, on a fictionalist account the answer is no.
With respect to pramāṇa theory one problem that arises is that there is not
consensus among Indian philosophers about which pramāṇas are authoritative. There
is not even consensus among the Mādhyamikas themselves about which pramāṇas
are authoritative. Candrakīrti, for example, seems to have accepted the Nyāya
account that allows four epistemic instruments: perception, inference, testimony, and
analogy (Siderits 2011, 172). Other Mādhyamikas, Tsongkhapa for instance, seem to
follow Dignaga and Dharmakīrti in allowing only two: perception and inference.
Which account is the conventionally correct one? Without an answer to Siderits’
question concerning the origin of the conventional fiction, it is unclear how such a
dispute could be resolved non-arbitrarily or non-dogmatically.

Carnapian Approach to Conventional Truth
The advantage of a fictionalist account is that it presents a way of preserving
truth in a context in which absolute ontological considerations are irrelevant. As
Garfield (2006) points out, “fictions can constitute a world against which truth can be
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assessed” (1). These fictional worlds are “neither reducible to nor ontologically
supervenient upon the actual world” and so they are entirely independent of any
claims about how the world actually is (1). These virtues of fictionalism might,
however, be better captured by a Carnapian distinction between claims made internal
and those made external to a framework. Thinking of the truth of claims as being
dependent on something like a framework can insulate claims from absolute
ontological considerations while still taking those claims to be earnest attempts to say
what is literally true (as opposed to taking them to be a kind of pretense). Since there
is no framework-independent context of assessment, literal truth on this kind of a
view is framework-dependent truth. There is no need for a literal versus pretense
distinction.33
According to Carnap (1950), existence assertions are only meaningful with
respect to the linguistic framework that establishes the structure, system, and rules
for the forms of expression involving the type of entity that is the subject of the
assertion. Existence assertions are, in light of this, answers to what Carnap calls
“internal questions,” which are questions that are internal to a framework. What
Carnap calls “external questions” about the existence of entities are questions that
purport to ask about the ontological status of their subjects independent of any
framework. Such questions are meaningless or “non-cognitive”, according to
Carnap, because the positing of the reality of the entity is inextricably tied to the
framework of which it is a part. Thus, for Carnap, an external question about the

Although, if someone really wanted to consider the worlds determined by the frameworks as
fictions, I suppose the Carnapian approach could be taken as a kind of fictionalism.
33
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reality of an entity really amounts to a question about the acceptability of the
framework that contains it.
Accepting a framework, according to Carnap, is not a matter of checking it
against reality since the notion of reality is for him a notion that is frameworkdependent. So for Carnap, the acceptability of a framework is not a factual matter
but a pragmatic one. The question for him is whether or not the way of speaking that
is systematized and structured by a framework, which involves taking as objects
certain kinds of entities, is a useful way of speaking. He says,
The purposes for which the language is intended to be used, for instance, the
purposes of communicating factual knowledge, will determine which factors
are relevant for the decision [whether or not to accept the language]. The
eﬃciency, fruitfulness, and simplicity of the use of the thing language [for
example] may be among the decisive factors. (23)
Focusing here on the linguistic framework of what he calls “the world of things” or
the “thing-language,” Carnap emphasizes that the purpose of constructing a system
of language is to communicate with others. The acceptability of a linguistic
framework, which is for him a matter of degree, is closely tied to the purposes to
which we put the language. The thing-language -- “the spatio-temporally ordered
system of observable things and events” -- for example, has proven to be very useful
for the purposes of everyday life and is widely accepted on these grounds.
According to Carnap, then, when accepting a particular form of expression
involving a particular kind of entity, one implicitly accepts the associated framework
to which the entity is connected (31). However, he says that “the acceptance of a
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framework must not be regarded as implying a metaphysical doctrine concerning the
reality of the entities in question” (32). Metaphysical doctrines positing the reality of
entities independent of frameworks are confused, according to Carnap, and cannot be
made meaningful.
The suggestion to use Carnap’s distinction between internal and external
questions to understand the distinction between ultimate and conventional truth is
oﬀered by Finnigan and Tanaka (2011). In emphasizing the pragmatic aspect of
Carnap’s account they explain how such an account can help the Mādhyamikas avoid
Tillemans’ “dismal slough.”
Finnigan and Tanaka explain that the conclusion that some Prāsaṅgika
Mādhyamikas draw, that common norms and beliefs should be unreflectively
adopted, relies on the assumption that the norms of truth rely on the existence of
ultimate truth-makers, which ontological anti-realism denies (186). The argument
seems to go something like this:
(1) The doctrine of emptiness requires the denial of ultimate truth-makers.
(2) Ultimate truth-makers are the only things that can ground the norms of
truth and serve as the standard of assessment for what we say.
(3) Therefore, there is no standard that can be appealed to to assess common
views,
(4) so we should accept those views uncritically.
According to Madhyamaka, (1) is correct; the doctrine of emptiness entails
the rejection of the notion that there is some absolute domain of entities -- ultimate
truth-makers -- that existence assertions can quantify over. However, the conclusion
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of the argument above can be avoided if, like Carnap, the Mādhyamika rejects (2),
the presupposition that assessment of truth depends on ultimate truth-makers.
Instead, the standards of truth can be understood to be already implicit in our
everyday linguistic practices. On this view we should think of Buddhist conventional
reality as being constituted by the frameworks implicit in our ordinary ways of
talking. These frameworks will determine a non-absolute domain of entities that our
ordinary existence assertions can quantify over. No ultimate truth-makers are
necessary in order to have a standard of assessment.
Insofar as the linguistic practices and the frameworks that structure them are
tied to our practical purposes, a Carnapian account also addresses the concern about
arbitrariness that was raised with respect to fictionalism. According to Carnap the
particular linguistic frameworks we adopt can be assessed with respect to whether or
not they serve our pragmatic interests, the foremost of which is eﬀective
communication. Eﬀective communication requires intersubjective norms of
correctness, which the structure and rules of the frameworks provide. Truth is then
assessed with reference to the framework and its structure. Whether or not the
framework as whole is acceptable will depend on its success in allowing us to
communicate with others what we need to communicate in order to support our ways
of life. This concern for the pragmatic utility of adopting a particular way of talking
is also an important concern for the Buddhists, who often cite pragmatic utility as a
rationale for speaking in conventional ways.
Employing the Carnapian distinction between internal and external modes of
inquiry, might also help us understand the debate mentioned earlier between
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Mādhyamikas regarding which pramāṇas to adopt. The question of which
epistemological framework one should adopt, for example between Nyāya and
Dharmakīrtian accounts of praṃāna, could be considered an external question that is
to be answered by taking into account pragmatic considerations, for example,
Carnap’s “eﬃcacy, fruitfulness, and simplicity” (23). Thus, internally, whether or not
a claim is true would depend on whether or not it is established by conventionally
held pramāṇas. Which pramāṇas are accepted as part of the framework that decides
these questions is an external matter that takes into consideration which pramāṇa
system works better, given our interests. A critical account of pramāṇas on this view
need not appeal to some absolute and foundational standard, but rather a pragmatic
one.
The Carnapian approach to conventional truth is a more promising approach
than the fictionalist approach but it is still not without problems. The main concern is
about how the frameworks are determined and how they work to fix the domain of
entities that are the referents of existence assertions. While the appeal to pragmatic
utility helps to temper the charge that the frameworks are arbitrary, there is still a
question about how exactly the frameworks are formulated. In the case of
introducing a new entity for some technical purpose, describing the method as one of
stipulating the system of language that will refer to these entities and fix their domain
seems appropriate. But the frameworks that lay out the system of language for the
entities of our ordinary discourse, like the thing-language for example, surely were
not generated in this way by stipulation. So how did they arise? In addition to
questions surrounding the origin and function of frameworks, there is also the
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possibly related question of the revisability of frameworks. Are frameworks revised
as our use of terms in the language changes and develops? Or must frameworks be
adopted and rejected altogether?
The concern here is that if the use of a term entails an implicit acceptance of
the linguistic framework in which the term is embedded and that framework is
inflexible and static, then it would seem that there would be little room for growth
and development of the use the term without abandoning the framework altogether.
This all or nothing adoption of static frameworks does not seem to reflect the way in
which language is commonly thought to develop. If frameworks allow for
development and revision, the question then is about how this occurs in a manner that
preserves the normativity the structure of the framework is supposed to provide.
As a general strategy the Carnapian approach is promising, but as these
questions suggests, the devil is in the details. I will revisit this strategy in chapter five
where I will attempt to incorporate it in giving an account of Dharmakīrti’s theory of
meaning. There I will use resources from Dharmakīrti’s philosophy to flesh out the
details of a Carnapian account in a distinctively Buddhist way.

Conventional Truth as Deflationary Truth
Another promising and related attempt at giving an account of conventional
truth in Madhyamaka is suggested by Priest, Siderits, and Tillemans (2011). They
suggest that for the Madhyamaka school of Mahāyāna Buddhism, conventional truth
might best be understood as deflationary truth. The deflationary theory of truth
recommends itself because it retains a strong norm- supporting, non-relativistic
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distinction between what is true and what is false at the conventional level but
without involving any ultimate metaphysical commitments – two goals that are
important for Mādhyamikas. Thus Priest, Siderits, and Tillemans propose the
following as a possible understanding of Madhyamaka conventional truth:
Retain correspondence as our understanding of the “truth” in “conventional
truth” but go deflationary about correspondence. In that case, the absence of
robust truthmakers to stand behind our acceptance of conventionally true
statements need not be an embarrassment. For then when we are asked what
makes it true that there is a pot on the ground, we can simply reply that there
is a pot on the ground… [A] deflationist theory, like that of Horwich, does not
involve anything metaphysically charged. It might then seem that the
deflationist’s version of truth, purely along the lines of <p> is true iﬀ p and
stripped of the excess baggage of truthmakers and ontology, would give an
elegant reconstruction of Madhyamaka’s own oft-repeated principles. (143)
The family of views commonly referred to as deflationary theories of truth, which
include disquotational, redundancy, or minimalist theories, all share the view that
truth lacks a substantive nature.34 The most carefully worked out version of a
deflationary theory of truth is presented and defended by Paul Horwich.35 As Priest,

I use the term “deflationary theory of truth” liberally to apply to any theory in this family of view,
although I acknowledge that there are important diﬀerences between the various formulations.
34

In what follows I will rely heavily on Horwich’s “minimalist” account of truth in presenting a
deflationary theory of truth. I do this because it is the deflationary theory that Priest, Siderits, and
Tillemans use and also because it seems to be the version that is the most rigourously defended. My
aim here is simply to present his view as a well developed way to articulate a deflationary account and
then examine the use to which the theory can be put to help resolve the issue that is the impetus of the
paper. I will here employ the view without defending it.
35
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Siderits, and Tillemans explain, this theory maintains that there is nothing more to the
concept of truth than the equivalence schema:
(E) <p> is true iﬀ p
where ‘<p>’ is short for ‘the proposition that p’, ‘p’ presents the conditions under
which the proposition is true -- which are specified by the proposition itself -- and
‘iﬀ’ is the logical operator ‘if and only if.’ The classic example of one of these
equivalences is
<snow is white> is true iﬀ snow is white
which is just one of the infinite number of equivalences that together constitute the
axioms of the deflationary theory of truth.
Deflationists, such as Horwich, argue that the equivalence schema is suﬃcient
on its own to explain everything there is to know about truth. The deflationary
theory of truth, Horwich maintains, is basic, maximally deflationary, and yet
complete, leaving nothing necessary out of the account of truth. According to the
deflationist, the property of truth is neither complex nor naturalistic and thus has no
underlying nature, has no hidden structure that needs to be elucidated, and is not
susceptible to conceptual or scientific analysis. There are no necessary and suﬃcient
conditions generally for some proposition’s being true beyond those specified by each
proposition individually. All the facts about truth are given in the equivalence
schema or can be derived from the axioms of the theory (Horwich 1998, 12).
Horwich explains that “the truth predicate exists solely for the sake of a certain
logical need,” namely the ability to infer from <p> is true, p, and vice versa and “to
enable the explicit formulation of schematic generalizations” (37). As Quine pointed
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out, certain generalizations, such as ‘Every sentence of the form “p or not p” is true,’
require the use of the truth predicate in order to indirectly assert every sentence of
that form (Quine 1970, 11). This amounts to a “semantic ascent” whereby we talk
about sentences instead of using them. Quine explains,
This ascent to a linguistic plane of reference is only a momentary retreat from
the world, for the utility of the truth predicate is precisely the cancellation of
linguistic reference. The truth predicate is a reminder that, despite a technical
ascent to talk of sentences, our eye is on the world. This cancellatory force of
the truth predicate is explicitly in Tarski’s paradigm:
‘Snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is white.
Quotation marks make all the diﬀerence between talking about words and
talking about snow. The quotation is a name of a sentence that contains a
name, namely ‘snow’, of snow. By calling the sentence true, we call snow
white. The truth predicate is a device for disquotation. We may aﬃrm the
single sentence by just uttering it, unaided by quotation or by the truth
predicate; but if we want to aﬃrm some infinite lot of sentences that we can
demarcate only by talking about the sentences, then the truth predicate has its
use. (13)
Here Quine highlights the disquotational aspect emphasized by some deflationary
theories of truth but also points out an important instance in which we cannot do
without the truth predicate; the one wherein we cannot simply use language but must
make reference to it. While we need the truth predicate in these instances, it does not
add anything conceptually to a sentence that the sentence itself does not already
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contain. Thus, Horwich maintains that the entire conceptual and theoretical role of
truth may be explained on the basis of the equivalence schema (5). Everyone is
prepared to infer that the proposition that snow is white is true from snow being
white and vice versa. This use is captured by the equivalence schema, and beyond
this there really is nothing more to say about the nature of truth.
Priest, Siderits, and Tillemans are right to note that the deflationist theory
“does not involve anything metaphysically charged” and that the theory is “stripped
of the excess baggage of truth makers and ontology.” Horwich claims, for example,
that “truth is metaphysically trivial – nothing more than a device of
generalization” (146). This is indeed an attractive feature for a Mādhyamika.
However, just because the theory of truth itself is metaphysically neutral does not
mean that ontology is not still lurking in the background. In fact, the theory requires
an independent, though supplementary, theory to explain the meaningfulness of
propositions and their assertability conditions. Tarski (1944), for example, points
out that,
In fact, the semantic definition of truth implies nothing regarding the
conditions under which a sentence like (1):
(1) snow is white
can be asserted. It implies only that, whenever we assert or reject this
sentence, we must be ready to assert or reject the correlated sentence (2):
(2) the sentence ‘snow is white’ is true. (140)
Wittgenstein (1999) makes a similar point by saying,

71

For what does a proposition’s ‘being true’ mean? ‘p’ is true = p. (That is the
answer.) So we want to ask something like: under what circumstances do we
assert a proposition? (112)
and
Really ‘The proposition is either true or false’ only means that it must be
possible to decide for or against it. But this does not say what the ground for
such a decision is like. (114)
To clarify these points, it might be helpful to look at a possible inference:
(1) <A pot is on the ground> is true iﬀ a pot is on the ground.

(By E)

(2) A pot is on the ground.

(?)

(3) Therefore, <a pot is on the ground> is true.

(By 1 & 2)

Tarski and Wittgenstein point out that the equivalence schema, which is instantiated
in the first premise, allows us to infer (3) from (2). However, they also point out that
the schema itself says nothing about the assertability of the second premise, about
whether or not the condition given in (1) is met. It is in virtue of this fact that the
deflationary theory of truth can be neutral with respect to questions of ontology. The
question remains, however, as to how the assertability of the second premise is to be
established. What is the ground for a decision for or against it? An account of when
the conditions given on the right-hand side of the equivalence schema, which amount
to the propositions itself, are fulfilled is not given by the deflationary theory.
The question concerning the assertability of the second premise of the above
argument is important for the supposed normative role of the concept of truth
because ordinarily we would be inclined to say that we ought to assert (2) or include
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it in our inference if it is true. That is to say, in addition to the norms that govern the
use of the term ‘true’ in drawing inferences (e.g., inferring (3) from (2)), we are
usually inclined to use the concept of truth normatively to give an account of when it
would be appropriate to assert a sentence or include it as a premise in an argument.
We ordinarily take this to be part of the normative aspect of truth. It is on these
grounds that Crispin Wright (1999) criticizes deflationism saying,
No deflationist has wanted, or ought to have wanted, to deny that believing
and statement-making are normatively constrained activities – activities
governed by standards, non-compliance with which opens a thinker to
criticism. However, once that is accepted, the question has to be confronted of
what the relevant standards are… What, for deflationism, are these norms?
(211)
In order to answer this question, the deflationary theory must locate this normative
role somewhere else, in a theory that is distinct from the theory of truth that it oﬀers.
In fact, this is exactly what Horwich does. He argues that this normativity is
misplaced, attributed to truth when really it concerns something else. Norms of
assertion and of belief are not, properly speaking, norms that concern truth. They are
related to truth but part of a diﬀerent theory. According to Horwich, an account of
the assertability of (2) would have to be given by a separate theory.
While Horwich takes his theory of truth to be complete, he does not maintain
that the deflationary account alone will engender all the facts about truth. He states
that in determining a deflationary or minimal theory of anything,
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Our goal… is to find a simple theory of X, which together with our theories of
other matters, will engender all the facts… The virtue of minimalism, I claim,
is that it provides a theory of truth that is a theory of nothing else, but which is
suﬃcient, in combination with theories of other phenomena, to explain all the
facts about truth. (24-25)
Horwich thus assumes that the deflationary theory of truth will have to work in
conjunction with theories about other matters in order to “explain all the facts about
truth.”
One of the things the deflationary theory of truth needs as a supplement is an
account of meaning that explains the proposition on the right-hand side of the
equivalence schema and thereby explains when the proposition is assertable. The
deflationary theory is itself neutral with respect to which supplementary theory is to
be advanced and in particular it is neutral with respect to the ontology such an
account presupposes.
While the deflationary theory of truth is neutral with respect to ontology,
Horwich argues that it is nevertheless consistent with correspondence intuitions. In so
arguing, Horwich maintains that the conditions on the right-hand side of the
equivalence schema can be established through some kind of appeal to the nature of
reality or the way the world is. He says that the deflationary theory of truth
does not deny that truths do correspond – in some sense — to the facts; it
acknowledges that statements owe their truth to the nature of reality; and it
does not dispute the existence of relationships between truth, reference, and
predicate satisfaction… It is indeed undeniable that whenever a proposition
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or an utterance is true, it is true because something in the world is a certain
way – something typically external to the proposition or utterance. (104)
In order to explain these statements he continues,
For example,
(1) <Snow is white>’s being true is explained by snow’s being white.
That is to say,
(2) <Snow is white> is true because snow is white.
But these [correspondence] intuitions are perfectly consistent with
minimalism [deflationism]. In mapping out the relations of explanatory
dependence between phenomena, we naturally and properly grant ultimate
explanatory priority to such things as the basic laws of nature and the initial
conditions of the universe. From these facts we attempt to deduce, and
thereby explain, why, for example,
(3)

Snow is white.

And only then, invoking the minimal theory, do we deduce, and thereby
explain, why
(4)

<Snow is white> is true.

Therefore, from the minimalist point of view, (3) is indeed explanatorily prior
to (4), and so (1) and (2) are fine. Thus we can be perfectly comfortable with
the idea that truths are made true by elements of reality. Since this follows
from the minimal theory (given certain further facts), it need not be an
explicitly stated part of it. (104-105)
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In this passage Horwich makes reference to ‘facts,’ the ‘elements of reality,’ and the
‘nature of reality’ in order to account for (3), which then explains (4). This
demonstrates that while the deflationary theory of truth does not itself explain truth
in terms of correspondence, it does not necessarily dispense with the ontology that is
usually associated with the correspondence theory of truth (which the Mādhyamikas
are thought to be trying to avoid); it is perfectly consistent with such a view. Of
course it does not require such a view either, which is why it is available as a possible
interpretation of truth for Madhyamaka.
Given the ontological neutrality of the deflationary theory of truth we do not
need any “robust truthmakers to stand behind our acceptance of conventionally true
statements,” however, we do need some account of the proposition given on the righthand side of the equivalence schema. We need an account of propositions as the
content of our beliefs and the meaning of our statements. The deflationary theory of
truth presupposes that it is possible to give such an account without appealing to the
notion of truth. Therefore, if the Mahāyāna is to be interpreted as employing a
deflationary theory of truth, then it must also be able to give an account of the content
of our beliefs and the meaning of our statements that is independent of the notion of
truth. This will be challenging for the Mahāyāna given that her anti-realist
commitments make it diﬃcult to account for aspects of meaning such as reference
and predicate satisfaction.
A further consequence of adopting a deflationary interpretation of truth in
Madhyamaka is that any distinction made between conventional and ultimate truths
cannot be explained as a distinction between two diﬀerent kinds of truth. According
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to the deflationary theory, all propositions conform to the equivalence schema and all
propositions are thus equally true when true and false when false. There is no room
for degrees; there is only one truth according to the deflationary theory of truth.
Given the character of Mahāyāna anti-realism, this is exactly the result we want since
claims made with respect to an absolute domain of entities cannot have determinate
truth values. This means that the only truth is conventional truth, which on this
account would be deflationary.
The deflationary account is the most promising account of conventional truth
for Mahāyāna for the reasons Priest, Siderits, and Tillemans give. In chapter five I
will argue that Dharmakīrti can provide the necessary supplementary account of
meaning. This account is compatible with both the limitations of deflationism and
the ontological commitments of the Mahāyāna. With this account in hand I conclude
that the suggestion made by Priest, Siderits, and Tillemans to use the deflationary
theory of truth to understand conventional truth in Madhyamaka is a good one for all
Mahāyāna, when it is supplemented by Dharmakīrti’s account of meaning.
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CHAPTER 4
DHARMAKĪRTI AS A MAHĀYĀNIST

In the last chapter I discussed some recent promising attempts to articulate the
sense in which conventional truth is true for Madhyamaka Buddhism. In particular I
focused on the suggestion made by Priest, Siderits, and Tillemans to understand
conventional truth as deflationary truth. While this suggestion seems the most
promising way to understand the way truth operates at the conventional level, it alone
cannot generate, as Horwich puts it, “all the facts about truth.”36 Generating all the
facts about truth requires in addition a supplementary theory of meaning.
In the next chapter I argue that a Buddhist theory of meaning that is consistent
with both Mahāyāna ontological anti-realism and with the deflationary theory of truth
can be developed from the work of Dharmakīrti. However, before I proceed to
present that account, I first want to make clear why Dharmakīrti himself should be
understood to be a Mahāyāna anti-realist. The reason this is important is that the
parts of his work that I hope to develop in answering the question of meaning are
usually interpreted as presenting a Sautrāntika Abhidharma position. As a version of
Abhidharma, this account would be a version of ontological realism. If Dharmakīrti
is understood to be a realist of this kind, or to be presupposing such an account in
giving his account of meaning, then his account could not help to explain the sense in
which conventional truth is true for Mahāyāna since it could not address the issues
that arise with respect to the anti-realism of that position. So before I present
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See page 70.
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Dharmakīrti’s account of meaning, I first want to make clear the sense in which his
account is anti-realist.

Dharmakīrti as a Yogācārin
It is common in the commentarial tradition, as well as in the work of modern
Dharmakīrti scholars, to interpret Dharmakīrti’s ultimate philosophical position to be
a Yogācāra one. Vācaspatimiśra, for example, in commenting on Dharmottara’s
commentaries to Dharmakīrti’s texts, interprets Dharmakīrti as adopting both
Sautrāntika and Yogācāra points of view at diﬀerent places in his texts but taking the
Yogācāra point of view to be the one ultimately defended.37 There he argues on
behalf of the Yogācāra that external objects can be neither known through sensation
nor through inference, and since these are the only two means of knowledge
available, according to Dharmakīrti, the external object, even if it were to exist, could
not be known.
Similarly, Devendrabuddhi in his commentary on certain key verses in
Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika, and Śākyabuddhi in his commentary to
Devendrabuddhi’s commentary, compare Dharmakīrti’s reasoning in these verses with
those “presented by powerful thinkers such as Master Vasubandhu” and take him to
be likewise concluding that “external objects do not exist,” a common Yogācāra
position.38

See the relevant passages Vācaspitimiśra’s Nyāyakaṇikā, translated in Appendix IV of Stcherbatsky
(1993).
37
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From Śākyabuddhi’s Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā translated in Dunne (2004, 404-405, fn. 14).
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Some of the key verses that Vācaspatimiśra, Dharmottara, Devendrabuddhi,
and Śākyabuddhi comment on that lead them to interpret Dharmakīrti as a Yogācārin
are verses 208-219 of the Pratyakṣa chapter of his Pramāṇavārttika. Leading up to
these verses, in verse 194 Dharmakīrti begins a long discussion whereby he argues
against the contention that objects can exist as wholes over and above their parts.
The discussion begins with an objector challenging Dharmakīrti’s claim that
perception is non-conceptual by appealing to the Abhidharma view that sensory
cognition is the result of an aggregate (sañcita) of atoms. According to that view,
only a group of atoms in close proximity to one another can give rise to sensory
cognition. Isolated atoms alone are insuﬃcient. Since an aggregate is a kind of
sāṃānya, or universal, and is thereby a kind of conceptual entity, it follows that
perception is conceptual, contrary to what Dharmakīrti claims.
Dharmakīrti responds by clarifying the Abhidharma position. Even though
Abhidharma might refer to the collection of atoms as an aggregate, Abhidharma
does not consider the collection itself to be a distinct entity over and above the atoms
that comprise it. The basis of the perceptual cognition is still nothing but the atoms,
according to that view. While that collection of atoms might be called an aggregate,
in the sense of just a plurality of atoms, this does not commit Abhidharma to consider
the aggregation as a distinct entity. And since the basis of perception is not strictly
speaking a conceptuality entailing aggregate, but rather discrete atoms, the objector’s
argument fails to undermine Dharmakīrti’s claim that perception is non-conceptual.
At verse 197 the objector persists by pointing out that the Abhidharma
account is at odds with the commonly held view that perceptual cognitions only
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cognize one object at a time. According to that view, for example, the perception of a
patch of yellow and a perception of a patch of blue do not happen at the same time
but rather occur as distinct cognitions. It is only because cognitions happen rapidly
in succession that it appears to us as if we see more than one object at the same time.
If it is true that cognition only takes one object at a time, then it would not be possible
for a perceptual cognition to cognize a bunch of atoms all at once.
In reply, Dharmakīrti argues against the premise that cognition can only take
one object at a time. That assumption, he argues, would make it impossible to
explain the perceived diﬀerence between things occurring simultaneously and things
occurring in succession. If all cognitions arise and disappear at the same rate, and it
is in virtue of their rapid succession that we see things as occurring together, then
why is it not the case that everything appears as if occurring simultaneously? The
objector’s proposed account of perception would not be able to explain how it is
possible that we experience some objects as occurring in succession and others as
occurring simultaneously.
Furthermore, at verse 200, Dharmakīrti argues that such a view cannot make
sense of the experience of seeing an object that is multicolored. What could be the
diﬀerence, on this view, between seeing a loosely assembled group of things of
various colors, like a collection of jewels, and seeing one thing, like a butterfly, that
has a plurality of colors? Dharmakīrti’s opponent wants to use the view that only one
object is seen at a time to argue that whole, discrete, medium-sized, recognizable
objects are perceptible -- a claim that Dharmakīrti denies. However, Dharmakīrti
here points out that the account of perception that the opponent oﬀers could not
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account for the diﬀerence between seeing one whole thing that has various colors and
seeing a bunch of diﬀerent things that each has its own color. And the attempt that
some realists make to resolve the problem by referring to a distinct color they call
“variegated color” (citra), Dharmakīrti rightly ridicules as ad hoc and ridiculous.
Dharmakīrti points out that as in the case of a bunch of discrete objects, like a mass
of jewels, in the case of a single object, like a butterfly, each of the separate colors is
identifiable as distinct. Yet the appeal to one color identified as “variegated” as
characterizing whole objects, like the butterfly, would preclude the ability to identify
the various colors individually (under the assumption that distinct colors preclude
one another), which goes contrary to experience. Calling the collection of colors by
one name does not change the fact that they are distinct.
As a result of his analysis, Dharmakīrti claims at verse 204 that “A
manifoldness of entities (bhāvas) is due to the manifoldness of cognitions,” 39 by
which he means that whatever plurality of entities we posit must come from the
plurality of objects we experience in cognition.40 There is no other way, he claims,
for us to determine what kinds of entities there are. And since perceptual experience
presents us with the same visual appearance, i.e. of distinct colors at certain locations,
whether there is a loose collection of objects or there is what we take to be a single
object, strictly speaking there are no wholes that are perceived. Rather what is
perceived is a plurality of entities, in this case colors, that we only take to be whole
objects in some cases and not in others. In verse 207 Dharmakīrti concludes “from
This and subsequent translations of Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika are developed from an
unpublished translation by John Taber, unless otherwise noted.
39

In this context, Dharmakīrti is concerned only with empirical entities. Nothing he says here has any
direct bearing on the question of abstract entities.
40
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that it follows that a single cognition may have various objects and that such a
cognition is non-conceptual.” 41
In reply to Dharmakīrti’s conclusion, in verse 208 the hypothetical opponent
raises the following objection: “If oneness is not possible with respect to objects that
appear variegated [such as a butterfly or a multicolored cloth], then how is the
cognition that appears variegated one?” Here the opponent complains that, if
Dharmakīrti’s reasoning is enough to establish the unreality of wholes, then it should
also be enough to establish the unreality of the cognition over and above the plurality
of objects that it takes as representations.
The opponent is presumably hoping that, in accepting the possibility that
cognition is a whole over and above its parts, the Buddhist will be forced to accept
that this is possible also with respect to object-wholes. However Dharmakīrti
surprisingly concedes to this objection by saying in verse 209 that, “this which the
wise say is obtained by the force of reality itself, namely that the more things are
reflected on, the more they fall apart.” Here begins what is taken to be the
presentation of Dharmakīrti’s Yogācāra position. In the verses that follow this
concession, Dharmakīrti explains that while it ordinarily appears as though cognition
has two distinct aspects, one which is subjective and internal and another that is
objective and external, thus giving the impression of there being a single, unified,

According to Dharmakīrti, the cognition with a plurality of objects must be non-conceptual since it
is not possible to have in mind at the very same time all of the concepts associated with every object
present. One way to put this is that it is not possible to “see as” every qualitative particular that we see
at any given moment. The “seeing as,” argues Dharmakīrti, happens in a subsequent non-perceptual
cognition. Because of this it might be helpful to think of Dharmakīrti’s perception (pratyakṣa) as
sensation.
41
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subject that is distinct from the various external objects that it represents, in reality
this duality is an illusion. He states in verses 212-215:
Ascertainment appears as if located inside, this other portion i.e., the object
form appears as if situated outside. For there are two distinct forms of a
cognition which is really without diﬀerence, so the appearance is an error
(212). In regard to that, by means of the non-existence of even one or the two,
either object-form or subject-form, both of them are abandoned. Therefore,
the very reality of that cognition, too, is the emptiness of duality (213). And
this establishing of a diﬀerence of entities is based on their diﬀerence viz., of
object and subject. And when that has the nature of error, the diﬀerence of
those entities also is an error (214). And there is no characteristic other than
object-or subject-form. Therefore, because they are empty of characteristics
(lakṣana-śūnyatva), entities are shown to be without essence (niḥsvabhāva)
(215).
In his commentary on these verses, Śākyabuddhi explains Dharmakīrti’s position in
the following way:
Cognitive appearances such as blue seem to be external to awareness, but
when one analyzes whether those appearances are singular or plural, they are
unable to withstand that analysis; hence, they are not suchness. Therefore,
there is ultimately no object that is distinct from awareness itself, and since
that object does not exist, we say “the subject does not exist”; in saying this
we mean the “subject” that occurs in expressions or concepts that are
constructed in dependence on the [apparently external object], as in “this is
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the real entity that is the subject which apprehends that object, which is the
real entity that it cognizes.” Since an agent and its patient are constructed in
dependence upon each other, these two [i.e., subject and object] are posited in
dependence on each other. The expression “subject” does not express mere
reflexive awareness, which is the essential nature of cognition itself. The
essential nature of cognition is not constructed in mutual dependence on
something else because it arises as such from its own causes. The essential
nature of cognition is established in mere reflexive awareness. Since it is
devoid of the above described object and subject, it is said to be non-dual.42
In these comments Śākyabuddhi interprets Dharmakīrti to be endorsing a
Yogācāra position. He explains that Dharmakīrti ultimately maintains that subject
and object are non-diﬀerent and that it follows from this ultimate unity that both the
supposed objects external to consciousness and the supposed subject of the
perceptual experience, that is to say both the perceived and the perceiver, are
ultimately unreal. As verse 214 suggests, the only grounds we have for thinking that
there are objects external to consciousness is that that is how our experience seems to
us to be. However, our analysis shows that neither subjects nor objects can exist the
way they seem to us to exist. The appearance of subject and object are illusions. All
that remains is the true, non-dual nature of cognition, which is undiﬀerentiated
consciousness -- “suchness” or tathatā. However, since ordinary beings that suﬀer
from ignorance (avidyā) cannot help experiencing consciousness as stratified
between subject and object, in verse 219 Dharmakīrti explains,
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From Śakyabuddhi’s Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā translated in Dunne 2004, 406-407, fn. 15.
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Thus by those who disregard the truth (upekṣitatattvārthaiḥ), imitating an
elephant closing one eye, the thought of an external thing is displayed merely
by means of the understanding of an ordinary person.
Therefore, the Buddha (and Dharmakīrti too) talk as if there are objects external to
consciousness in order to be able to engage with beings that due to their karma are
not able to see past the illusion of subject and object. However, ultimately there are
no such things.
The view that the apparent distinction in consciousness between subject and
object is illusory and that these two are “empty of characteristics” (lakṣana-śūnyatva)
and ultimately “without essence” (niḥsvabhāva) is a view that is characteristic of
Yogācāra. It is probably for this reason that the Yogācāra view is attributed to
Dharmakīrti.43
Furthermore, that Dharmakīrti is ultimately read as a Yogācārin is not
surprising given that Dignāga, the philosopher that Dharmakīrti comments on in his
Pramāṇavārttika, is also read as a Yogācārin by the commentarial tradition. For
example, Jinendrabuddhi’s commentary on Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya argues that,
while Dignāga intended his work to be compatible with both the realists who
maintain the existence of an external world and those idealists who deny it, ultimately

Kellner (2011) is skeptical about whether or not the arguments presented in these verses really
establish the Yogācāra position. However, she cites verses 301-366 of the same chapter, as well as
verses 34-57 of Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇaviniścaya as presenting arguments for what she calls
Dharmakīrti’s “internalism,” which is the view that the intentional content of cognition does not
represent objects external to consciousness. So while she may locate the relevant arguments
elsewhere, she agrees that Dharmakīrti’s work does endorse a Yogācāra position at least provisionally.
43
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Dignāga sides with the idealists by taking ultimate reality to be undiﬀerentiated
consciousness.44
Most modern scholars of Dharmakīrti’s work, in light of these commentaries,
also take these passages in the Pramāṇavārttika to indicate that Dharmakīrti’s final
position is that of the Yogācāra. Where these scholars tend to diﬀer is with respect to
how one ought to understand the nature of the Yogācāra position that they take
Dharmakīrti to endorse.
Among the scholars that take Dharmakīrti to be a Yogācārin, the Yogācāra
view is most often identified as a kind of idealist position, specifically the kind of
idealism that denies the existence of mind-independent, external objects.45 Georges
Dreyfus (1997), for example, argues that Dharmakīrti’s argumentative strategy leads
the reader up a hierarchy of positions to the Yogācāra view, which, as he
characterizes it, denies the reality of the external world and maintains that objects
exist only as reflections of consciousness. He explains this position in the following
way:
the view that external objects exist depends on the realist assumption that they
exist as they appear to our mind. On this basis of objects appearing to our
mind as existing independent from our consciousness, we decide that there are
objects external to consciousness. Once this basis is questioned, the view that
there are external objects is deprived of main support. We then understand
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Relevant passages are translated in Appendix IV of Stcherbatsky 1993, Vol. II.

This view should not be confused with the subjective idealism often associated with Berkeley.
Unlike Berkeley, Yogācāra idealism does not maintain a distinction between the subject and the idea,
but rather claims that these are ultimately non-dual. Since the reality of both the object and subject are
denied, Yogācāra should not be considered a form of subjective idealism.
45
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the plausibility of the Yogācāra view that consciousness does not need any
external support to perceive objects, not even that of infinitesimal atoms. The
impression of extended external objects is not produced from external
conditions but arises from innate propensities (vāsanā, bag chags) we have
had since beginningless time. Under the power of these internal conditions,
we constantly but mistakenly project the false impression that there are
external objects existing independent of consciousness. (103)
This position is taken by Dreyfus to be reflective of Dharmakīrti’s ultimate position, a
deeper view of reality than the one reflected in the realist or Sautrāntika position that
Dreyfus claims Dharmakīrti adopts only provisionally in other places in his work
(104).46
John Dunne (2004) for the most part agrees with Dreyfus but is reluctant to
label this ultimate position Yogācāra and opts instead to call this position “Epistemic
Idealism,” in order to emphasize that Dharmakīrti’s arguments are from an
epistemological (as opposed to a metaphysical) point of view. He says,
“Dharmakīrti’s critique of extra-mental entities arises in the context of determining
what it is we know in perception” (60). However, he seems to take the conclusions of
the epistemological arguments to be just the conclusions that Dreyfus identifies in the
passage above. Thus he characterizes “Epistemic Idealism” as the view that “all
entities are mental” (59), indicating that he still takes the argument to be of
ontological import. The relevant argument here, which as we saw above can be
found in Dharmakīrti’s work, is something like the following: our only reason for
The view that Dharmakīrti is a Yogācāra and that Yogācāra is an idealism of this sort is also the
opinion of Steinkellner (1990).
46
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believing that there are external objects is that there appears to be a distinction
between internal subject and external object in our awareness. However, such a
distinction is illusory. Since our belief in external objects is based on an error, we
have no reason for believing that such things exist and thus we have no reason for
believing that the objects as they appear in awareness are caused by anything
external. So the claim that there are extra-mental objects is false.
B. K. Matilal (2005) agrees that Dharmakīrti is a Yogācāra idealist, as
characterized above, and provides some additional reasons for believing that such
was indeed Dharmakīrti’s view. He points out that Dharmakīrti wrote a work, the
Saṃtānāntarasiddhi, in which he attempts to refute the charge of solipsism -- a
problem typical of idealist views. Matilal also notes that other non-Buddhist
philosophical interlocutors, for example Uddyotakara, Kumārila, Jayanta, and
Bhāsarvajña, who all tried to refute the Buddhist idealist position, understood
Dharmakīrti to be among the Buddhists that defend such a view.
An interpretation of Yogācāra’s idealism is given by A. K. Chatterjee (1962),
who takes Dharmakīrti’s position, in so far as he accepts the vijñānavāda of Yogācāra
position, to be specifically a form of absolute idealism. The ultimate reality on this
view is pure consciousness free from the duality of subject and object. Chatterjee
has this to say about idealism: “Idealism, in the strictest sense of the term, connotes
three important things, viz. (a) knowledge is creative; (b) there is nothing given in
knowledge; and (c) the creative knowledge is itself real” (x). By “knowledge”
Chatterjee means discursive knowledge. By claiming that knowledge is creative he
highlights that for the Yogācāra discursive knowledge involves construction by the
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mind. In saying that nothing is given in knowledge he highlights the anti-realist
aspect of the Yogācāra position that denies that any kind of conceptualization can
reflect absolute or objective reality. And (c) presents the Yogācāra idealist position
that claims that all there is, what reality ultimately consists in, is just this constructive
activity of mind.
Chatterjee agrees with most scholars that Dignāga and Dharmakīrti accept the
Sautrāntika position provisionally. For this reason Chatterjee distinguishes the
Yogācāra of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti from the “pure idealism” of Maitreya, Asaṇga,
and Vasubandhu. Chatterjee says of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti that “they essentially
accept the doctrine of vijñaptimātratā and the unreality of the object,when they enter
into logical discussions however they endorse the Sautrāntika standpoint of
something being given in knowledge” (x). The Sautrāntika aﬃrm that there is
something ultimately real (i.e., dharmas) reflected in our discursive knowledge,
which the Yogācāra denies. Chatterjee agrees that Dignāga and Dharmakīrti
provisionally accept such a view, even if ultimately they reject it.
While the Yogācāra interpretation is the most widely held reading among
Dharmakīrti scholars, there remain several scholars who do not want to conclude that
the Yogācāra view is Dharmakīrti’s ultimate position. For example Dan Arnold
(2005) and Richard Hayes are of the opinion that Dharmakīrti is purposefully
ontologically neutral. They acknowledge that Dharmakīrti’s work contains allusions
to what they identify as Sautrāntika and Yogācāra philosophical positions, but they
hold that Dharmakīrti does not take sides in the debate between them. Rather, they
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take Dharmakīrti as presenting his epistemology in such a way as to be consistent
with either view.
Arnold (2005), for example, characterizes Dharmakīrti’s epistemology as a
kind of empirical foundationalism involving something like sense-data that “allows
the possibility of bracketing the question of what might finally exist in the
world” (23). Since both perspectives consider that “what we are immediately aware
of – which is diﬀerent from the ontological issue of what there is – is only things
somehow intrinsic to cognition,” whether or not that mental content represents an
external world is not important to his view – “the epistemology is the same either
way” (5).
Similarly, Richard Hayes is of the opinion that Dharmakīrti’s ultimate ontology
cannot be decided on the basis of the available evidence. He argues that the notion
that the argumentative method Dharmakīrti employs constitutes a hierarchy of views
that places the Yogācāra at the top is a view that is presented by later Tibetan
commentators and that such an interpretation is not warranted by the texts
themselves.47
Mark Siderits (2007) agrees that Dharmakīrti and Dignāga were “careful to
formulate their epistemology in a way that is compatible with a variety of
metaphysical positions” (208). However, Siderits is of the opinion that Dharmakīrti
was probably ultimately a Yogācāra idealist (208, fn1), a view he characterizes as
“the metaphysical claim that nothing exists that is independent of the mind” (147,
fn2).
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Another group of scholars interpret Dharmakīrti as a Yogācārin but
understand that position to be a kind of phenomenology. Dan Lusthaus (2002), for
example, reads Yogācāra in general as Buddhist phenomenology and includes
Dharmakīrti in this Yogācāra camp. Lusthaus argues that Yogācāra should not be
understood to be a form of idealism because idealism is a kind of ontology (only
mind or consciousness is real) and Yogācāra is not oﬀering another alternative
ontology. Rather, their position is trying to overcome the propensity to ontologize
altogether (535).
While these scholars vary in their interpretation of what the Yogācāra position
exactly is, they all agree that the claims made in Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika
present ideas that are characteristic of Yogācāra Buddhism. Thus they all agree that
Dharmakīrti, even if only provisionally, accepts such a position. These scholars also
tend to agree that the majority of the text is not presented from that Yogācāra
perspective. The view he is taken to adopt, only provisionally according to most
Dharmakīrti scholars, is a Sautrāntika position. In the remainder of this chapter I will
present that view and then argue that there is an important diﬀerence, relevant to the
question of conventional truth, between Dharmakīrti’s position and the Sautrāntika/
External Realist position: Dharmakīrti’s position, unlike the Sautrāntika, is an
ontological anti-realist position.

Dharmakīrti as Sautrāntika
The Sautrāntika Abhidharma position developed as a critique of SarvāstivādaVaibhāṣika Abhidharma. While the Sautrāntikas accepted most of the Abhidharma
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framework of the Sarvāstivādins, they diﬀer from them in one important respect: they
reject the claim that dharmas exist in the past, present, and future and argue instead
that only present dharmas exist and that these are momentary, lasting only for a
point-instant of time. This key diﬀerence gives rise to various other diﬀerences in
the Sautrāntika account of the dharmas and how they operate.48
One of these diﬀerences concerns how the Sautrāntika account for the delayed
eﬀects of karma. Since they reject the notion that a dharma could be said to exist as
a kind of potentiality before becoming actual, the Sautrāntika also have to reject the
Sarvāstivādin claim that the delayed fruition of karma is explained by appeal to the
existence of a special kind of “possessor” dharma that holds onto the karma from
past actions and intentions as a potentiality to be actualized at a later date. Instead,
the Sautrāntika claim that present dharmas are perfumed by present actions and
intentions, and that they pass along this perfuming as metaphorical seeds to
subsequent dharmas until the conditions are ripe for the karmic “seed” to come to
fruition.49
Another important diﬀerence that the doctrine of momentariness has for the
Sautrāntika position is that it requires that they give an indirect account of
perception. The Sautrāntika argument for indirect perception is presented in a
commentary to the Abhidharmadīpa (a Vaibhāṣika text) in the following way:

I do not mean here to present an exhaustive account of the diﬀerences between Sautrāntikas and
Sarvāstivādins. I only wish to highlight a couple of the key diﬀerences that inform the opinion that
Dharmakīrti adopts a similar view.
48

Gethin (1998) points out that this account served as the precursor to the Yogācāra ideas of a
storehouse consciousness (ālayavijñāna) and Buddha-nature (tathāgatagarbha).
49
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The organs and the objects of the five sense-consciousnesses, being causes of
the latter, belong to a past moment. When the object (rūpa) and the eye exist,
the visual consciousness is non-existent. When visual consciousness exists,
the eye and the object are not existing. In the absence of their duration (sthiti)
there is no possibility of the cognition of the object... [therefore] all
perceptions are indirect. (Kalupahana 1976, 103)
According to this argument, because dharmas exist only for a moment and the
cognition of an object is understood to be the result of the contact of object-dharmas
with sense-organ-dharmas, the resultant cognition cannot exist in the same moment
as the contact of the object and sense organ, since each of these only exists in the
moment of contact. According to the Sautrāntikas there can be no simultaneous
causation so the cognition of the object, as an eﬀect, cannot exist at the same moment
of its cause -- the contact of object and sense organ. This means that unlike the
Sarvāstivādins who gave a direct account of perception, the Sautrāntikas must give an
indirect account of perception.50
Siderits (2007) characterizes this indirect account of perception as
“representationalism” (130). He explains this view as “the theory that in sense
perception, the intentional object is not an external object but a representation” and
then explains that a representation is “a mental image that is caused by contact
between the sense faculty and an external object, and that resembles the external
object” (131). This view is an indirect form of perception because the perceiver is
only aware of the object indirectly through a representation. Siderits explains that
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even though perception is indirect in this way, “a representationalist does not deny
that through our sensory experiences we become aware of things outside the mind.
What they deny is that these are what we are directly aware of” (131). According to
the representationalist Sautrāntika, then, what we are directly aware of is the
representation of the object present in the cognition that arises as a result of the
contact between the object and the sense organ, which occurs before the arising of
the cognition.51
Dharmakīrti’s account of pramāṇa is taken to be a Sautrāntika type account
since it appears to share characteristics of the Sautrāntika Abhidharma view.
Dharmakīrti’s account of pramāṇa is given primarily in his Pramāṇavārttika, which
purports to explain how it is that human beings come to have knowledge. The
knowledge in question is understood by the Indian tradition to be a cognitive event -a knowledge episode (pramā) -- and a pramāṇa is understood to be the means to that
knowledge event. In the Pramāṇavārttika Dharmakīrti presents his distinctive
account of pramāṇa, i.e., of how it is that knowledge episodes (pramā) are generated.
In what is arguably the first chapter of the Pramāṇavārttika, the
Pramāṇasiddhi chapter, Dharmakīrti gives a general account of what, on his view,
constitutes a pramāṇa.52 In what follows I oﬀer a verse-by-verse paraphrase of what
he says in this section. His initial definition of pramāṇa is as follows:
I do not mean here to present an exhaustive account of the diﬀerences between Sautrāntikas and
Sarvāstivādins. I only wish to highlight a couple of the key diﬀerences that inform the opinion that
Dharmakīrti adopts a similar view.
51

There is some debate about the correct order of the chapters of the Pramāṇavārttika. One way to
order the chapters has the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter as the first chapter in order to mirror the order of the
chapters of Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya, for which the Pramāṇavārttika is supposed to be a
commentary. Another traditional ordering puts the the Svārthānumāna chapter, which is the only
chapter for which Dharmakīrti also provided a commentary, first.
52

95

A pramāṇa is a non-contradictory cognition. Non-contradiction amounts to
the sustainability, or non-frustration, of a goal driven activity. Or, a pramāṇa
is that which reveals previously uncognized objects. (3a-c; 7c)
In these verses we are told, first oﬀ, that a pramāṇa is a cognition. This is interesting
because the way in which the cognizing process is usually described in
most Indian pramāṇa theories, the cognition is considered to be the distinct result of
a cognizing process and it is the process that is the candidate for being a pramāṇa. If
the process is one that generates a cognition that is a knowledge episode (pramā),
then the process is a means of knowledge (pramāṇa). According to some authors, in
the case of visual perception, for example, which is widely accepted as a pramāṇa, it
is the process whereby an object comes into contact with a well-functioning eye,
under favorable conditions, that is the pramāṇa and the visual cognition of the object
is the resulting pramā.
Dharmakīrti rejects the typical account of pramāṇa by insisting instead that
pramāṇas are cognitions. According to him, the visual cognition of the object is
itself the pramāṇa. In verses 5 through 7 of the same chapter he explains that:
It is cognition, or thought, that is by nature pramāṇa instead of the contact
between the sense-organs and objects, etc. as the Hindu orthodox schools
maintain because it is cognition that is the principal cause of activity with
respect to things that are to be avoided or to be pursued. The cognition is
pramāṇa also because diﬀerences in apprehension, or knowledge events, are
due to a diﬀerence in the appearance of the objects in cognition, which in turn
is due to the fact that the apprehension takes place only when the form of an
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object is present in cognition. From the cognition itself, its own form is
understood. Whether or not a cognition is a pramāṇa, on the other hand, is
determined in the course of ordinary life. (5b-7a)
In these verses Dharmakīrti cites two reasons for identifying the cognition as
pramāṇa. The first reason is that it is in virtue of the fact that objects appear in
cognition and in virtue of how they appear to us in cognition that we are stimulated to
action. Depending on the particular form the object takes in cognition, it appears
either desirable or undesirable and we are stimulated to action accordingly. Only
cognized objects, not objects simpliciter, stimulate such action and then the particular
actions they stimulate will depend on how those objects appear to us. If pramāṇa is
understood to be the element in the knowing process that presents us with objects we
can then act upon, then it is the cognition of the object that serves this role and thus
that should be identified as pramāṇa.
The second reason Dharmakīrti gives for why the cognition is the pramāṇa is
that knowledge events (pramā or adhigama) can only be diﬀerentiated by means of
the diﬀerences in the appearance of the objects in cognition.53 This is so because in
order for there to be an apprehension of an object in the first place, the object must be
present in cognition. It is this presentation that is apprehended or known, and which
then serves as the distinguishing feature of the apprehension, diﬀerentiating it from
all other knowledge events. If pramāṇa is understood to be the element in the
knowing process that determines the object apprehended and individuates knowledge
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events, then it is the cognition that serves this role and thus should be identified as the
pramāṇa.
Towards the end of this passage when Dharmakīrti writes that “from the
cognition itself, its own form is understood” he tells us that the form the cognition
takes, that is to say its intentional content, is understood from the cognition itself.
This is basically an articulation of “content internalism,” which is the view that
claims that intentional content is determined by properties intrinsic to the mental
state, or in this case cognitive event, for which it is the content. In other words, the
conditions for the content being the kind of content it is are given in the cognition
itself. This view may be compared to that of Locke, who argues that we have an
intuitive knowledge of the identity of our ideas, of the form each takes. This is an
important point because it is in virtue of the fact that the content of a cognition is
determined by and evident from the cognition itself that we can, and do, diﬀerentiate
knowledge events by their content and act accordingly. Thus, the reasons that
Dharmakīrti cites as evidence for pramāṇa being a cognition seem to require a
content internalist account of intentional content.
This account of why cognition and not the contact of the object with the sense
organ is considered to be pramāṇa,, suggests that Dharmakīrti shares the indirect
account of perception of the Sautrāntika Abhidharma. If all we have direct access to
are representations present in cognition, then it stands to reason that it would be
through those cognitions that we would come to have knowledge. Even if we grant
that those cognitions arise due to the contact of object and sense organ, since all we
have direct access to are the cognitions, even that process would have to become
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known to us indirectly through the cognitions they cause, for example, via a process
of inference from cognition to cause.
Attributing an indirect account of perception to Dharmakīrti also explains the
important role that he takes confirmation “in the course of ordinary life” and “noncontradiction,” understood in terms of sustaining goal oriented activity, to play in his
account of pramāṇa. As he says above, while we can know what our cognition is
about from the cognition itself, we cannot know from the cognition itself whether or
not it is a pramāṇa. In other words, we cannot know whether or not what is
presented to us in cognition represents something real from the cognition itself.
Since all we have direct access to is the representation, and it is possible for
cognitions to misrepresent, the only way we can confirm whether or not the cognition
is a pramāṇa is, again, indirectly by testing the cognition against experience.
Because the cognition does not give us direct access to the object, we need to go
beyond the cognition in order to confirm it. According to Dharmakīrti, it is those
cognitions that can withstand the test of experience that are pramāṇas. But
interestingly enough, it is only in virtue of the fact that cognitions present us with a
certain form and generate certain kinds of expectations that we can even be in a
position to test them. So again, the means of coming to know depends crucially on
the nature of the original representational cognition.
In verse 3 above, Dharmakīrti specifies that not all cognitions are pramāṇa.
Only those that are “non-contradictory” and that do not present previously cognized
objects are pramāṇas. The only two kinds of cognitions that fulfill these
requirements are, according to him, perceptual cognitions (pratyakṣa) and inferential
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cognitions (anumāna). In the initial verses of the Pratyakṣa (Perception) chapter of
the Pramāṇavārttika Dharmakīrti begins by distinguishing the two pramāṇas,
perception and inference, on the basis of the distinct content that each pramāṇa has.
These verses are as follows:
Pramāṇa is of two kinds because its objects are of two kinds. The objects are
of two kinds because the object either is or is not eﬃcacious in bringing about
an action that achieves its objective aim. Illusions such as floating hairs, etc.,
are not objective things because they are not apprehended to be such. The
objects of pramāṇa are diﬀerentiated also for the following reasons: one kind
shares a common nature with other objects while the other is totally unique in
nature, one kind is expressible in language while the other is not, and
cognition of one kind of object requires the existence of additional causes
while cognition of the other requires only the presence of the object itself.
That object which is capable of bringing about an action that achieves its
objective aim is considered in this respect to be ultimately real. The other
object, which lacks this capability, is conventionally real. These two are called
the particular (svalakṣaṇa) and the universal (sāmānyalakṣaṇa). (1-3)
In these verses we are introduced to the two kinds of objects that are cognized by the
pramāṇas. In fact, in the above verses Dharmakīrti distinguishes the two pramāṇas
by making reference to the kind of content that each cognizes. What Dharmakīrti
above calls svalakṣaṇas are the objects of perceptual cognitions. These objects are
inexpressible, unique particulars that importantly are eﬃcacious in bringing about an
action that achieves its objective aim. Inferential cognitions, on the other hand,
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cognize what Dharmakīrti calls sāmānyalakṣaṇas. These objects are broadly
speaking conceptual. In a later verse Dharmakīrti cites numbers, universals, actions,
and substances as the kinds of thing that are included in the class of
sāmānyalakṣaṇa.54 This suggests that what Dharmakīrti has in mind are those objects
that require a certain kind of construction by the mind.
In addition to being particular, unique, ineﬀable, and eﬃcacious, svalakṣaṇas
are also understood to be simple and momentary (Dunne 2004, 80). While there is
some debate about whether or not svalakṣaṇas also lack spatial extension, it is clear
that like the Sautrāntikas, Dharmakīrti also understood svalakṣaṇas to be
momentary.55
In verse three above we are told that the object of perception, the svalakṣaṇa,
as that which is capable of being eﬃcacious, is ultimately real (paramārthasat) while
the sāmānyalakṣaṇa is only conventionally real (saṃvṛtisat). This identification of
the svalakṣaṇa as that which is ultimately real, in contrast to the only conventionally
real sāmāṇyalakṣaṇa, suggests that Dharmakīrti is adopting a framework that is like
that of Abhidharma. Like the dharmas of the Sautrāntika, svalakṣaṇas are not the
bearers of properties but are themselves property-particulars. Furthermore, like the
Sautrāntikas, Dharmakīrti claims that these particulars are what are ultimately real

etena samayābhogādyantaraṇgānurodhataḥ| ghaṭotkṣepaṇasāmānyasaṃkhyādiṣu dhiyo gatāḥ ||6||
In this way cognitions are arrived at with respect to number, generality, projections, and [wholes, like]
water-jugs, etc because of compliance with internal factors such as directing [one’s attention] to a
[verbal] convention.
54

Dunne (2004) cites Dharmakīrti’s own commentary to verses 192-196 and 266 of the
Svārthānumāṇa chapter of the Pramāṇavārttika and Dharmakīrti’s Hetubindu as sources of his
discussion of the momentariness of svalakṣāṇas. (30, fn 39). Dunne also discusses the controversy
over whether or not svalakṣaṇas have spatial extension (98-113).
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and adopts a kind of nominalism about everything else, which he terms
sāmānyalakṣaṇas.
Katsura (2011) traces Dharmakīrti’s account of svalakṣaṇas and
sāmānyalakṣaṇas back to the ontology and epistemology of the Sarvāstivādins and
the Sautrāntikas. He highlights the similarities between the Abhidharma’s ambiguous
use of the terms svabhāva and svalakṣaṇa and the distinction Dharmakīrti draws
between svalakṣaṇas and sāmānyalakṣaṇas. Dharmakīrti and the Ābhidharmikas
both use the term ‘svabhāva’ in two diﬀerent ways to refer both to unique individuals
and to members of a class. However, while the Ābhidharmikas use the terms
svabhāva and svalakṣaṇa interchangeably, Dharmakīrti reserves the term svalakṣaṇa
for the unique particulars and uses the term sāmānyalakṣaṇa to refer to members of a
class. Despite this diﬀerence, Katsura argues that Dharmakīrti is still operating
within the same framework as the Abhidharma and basically follows the Sautrāntika
ontology (278).
Similarly, Siderits (2007) explains that the only significant diﬀerence between
Dharmakīrti’s views and the Sautrāntika view is that Dharmakīrti (and his
predecessor Dignāga) was more consistent in his nominalism. Siderits explains that,
Where Abhidharma sees its ultimate reals, dharmas, as falling into natural
kinds, Yogācāra-Sautrāntika [i.e., Dignāga and Dharmakīrti] says its ultimate
reals, the particulars, are each unique and thus indescribable. If the ultimate
nature of reality is how the world is independently of all mental construction,
and shared natures like redness are mental constructions, then no real entity
can be ultimately like any other. The reals are just unique particulars. (213)
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Here Siderits alludes to the same key innovation made by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti
that Katsura (2011) describes. The term svalakṣaṇa for the Abhidharma was used to
refer to the distinguishing characteristic that all dharmas of a particular kind shared
only with themselves and no other kind of dharma. Dignāga and Dharmakīrti limit
this term and use it not to distinguish between classes of entities or to identify
members of a class, but rather to distinguish every particular entity from every other.
As Siderits notes, the analysis that lead the Ābhidharmikas to posit the
dharmas as the foundational and ultimately real entities stopped at the point where
each dharma is characterized by type, by what is referred to as its svalakṣaṇa. But
understanding entities as tokens of a type requires the kind of distribution of one over
many that the Ābhidharmikas argue is a mark of conceptual construction. In order to
complete the analysis, therefore, Dharmakīrti uses the notion of svalakṣaṇa and
radicalizes it by claiming that each ultimately real entity is its own unclassifiable
thing. It is not, of itself, a token of any type. Dharmakīrti reserves the term
sāmānyalakṣaṇa for referring to type-tokens, which he takes to be only
conventionally real.
Dharmakīrti’s version of the dharma, the svalakṣaṇa, is then understood to
function in the same way that the dharmas are understood to operate in the
Sautrāntika framework. For example, Vincent Eltschinger (2010) explains that
Dharmakīrti’s account of pramāṇa presupposes the indirect perceptual process that
the Sautrāntikas accept, with the only diﬀerence being that instead of dharmas it is
svalakṣaṇas that serve as the causally eﬀective entities that through their contact with
the sense faculties give rise to cognition. Eltshinger explains that “this cognition
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reflects the undivided particular in its entirety, in all its aspects (sarvātmanā,
sarvākāreṇa). The image it displays provides a vivid and isomorphic perceptual
counterpart of the (causally eﬃcient phase of the) real entity which it takes as its
object” (402-403). The resultant perceptual cognition, which accurately represents
the svalakṣaṇa, presents the cognizer with undistorted non-conceptual representation
of ultimate reality.

Problems with the Sautrāntika Interpretation of Dharmakīrti
The Sautrāntika interpretation of Dharmakīrti’s theory of pramāṇa is an
ontological realist position. More specifically, this position is understood to be a nonidealist ontological realist position that accepts the existence of objects outside the
mind. Dharmakīrti’s adoption of the Yogācāra position at verse 208-219 of the
Pratyakṣa chapter of the Pramāṇavārttika is interpreted as a rejection of that
Sautrāntika position. In particular it is usually understood to present an alternative
idealist ontology that is incompatible with the ontology presented by the Sautrāntika
position. According to many scholars the result is that a unified account of
Dharmakīrti’s philosophy is not possible.
In order to reconcile this seeming incompatibility several scholars have
argued that Dharmakīrti employs a hierarchy of views and a sliding scale of analysis.
According to this view, Dharmakīrti
employs more than one systematic description of reality, and it appears that
these descriptions are mutually contradictory. Nevertheless, these descriptions
are not in fact contradictory because they are not applied at the same level of
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discourse; instead, they fall into a hierarchy of discourses... where more
accurate descriptions of what we perceive and think supersede less accurate
ones. (Dunne 2004, 53) 56
On this view, the Sautrāntika level of discourse, which Dunne calls the level of
“External Realism,” is employed for a significant portion of Dharmakīrti’s work only
for pedagogical reasons. In the spirit of the Buddhist notion of skillful means,
Dharmakīrti is said to use this less accurate kind of discourse in order to help his
audience, who may not be ready for the ultimate truth, to gradually arrive at it.
Dunne explains that “a treatise that exceeds the abilities of its audience would not
remove their confusion; hence, a composition that is superior in its analytical
accuracy may be inferior soteriologically in relation to a particular audience” (54).
For this reason, it is argued, Dharmakīrti employs multiple levels of discourse. The
analytically inferior positions are eventually discarded and superseded by
increasingly more accurate levels until the Yogācāra position is arrived at (Dunne
refers to this position as “Epistemic Idealism”) (58-59).
The interpretation of Dharmakīrti’s work as employing a hierarchy of views
presupposes that the Sautrāntika position and the Yogācāra position are incompatible.
This incompatibility is due to each position presenting a conflicting ontology. This
presupposition in turn presupposes that both the Sautrāntika and the Yogācāra views
are ontological realist views; it is only if both views are taken to present conflicting
ontological existence assertions, that is to say, it is only if these views are taken to be
giving diﬀerent purportedly objective answers to the basic question of ontology, that
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it makes sense to say that they conflict with one another. However, as I argued in
chapter 3, the Yogācārins are not ontological realists. They may be metaphysical
realists, i.e. they may maintain that there is some way reality ultimately is, but the
Yogācāra are not ontological realists because the way they understand the nature of
ultimate reality as non-conceptual and ineﬀable precludes the possibility of there
being objective answers to the basic question of ontology. Such a reality cannot
determine an absolute domain of entities over which existence assertions can
quantify.
Yogācāra ontological anti-realism is therefore best understood as a
metaontological position that only comes into conflict with the Sautrāntika position if
the Sautrāntika position is understood to be making ontological existence assertions
-- only if that position is understood to be an ontological realist position. While this
is clearly how the Ābhidharmikas understand the position, there is evidence that this
is not how Dharmakīrti understands it. In verse four of the Pratyakṣa chapter of the
Pramāṇavārttika, Dharmakīrti makes it clear that he does not take the distinction he
draws between ultimately real entities and conventional entities to be an absolute or
objective distinction. Responding to an objection against the causal power of
svalakṣaṇas, he says,
If it be objected that nothing is eﬃcacious, we say in response that this kind of
eﬀectiveness is seen when, for example, we see a sprout arise as a result of a
seed. If it be objected that such eﬀectiveness is only admitted by convention,
then we answer, let it be so. (4)
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In this verse, in responding to an objection to the eﬀect that the capacity to be
eﬃcacious (arthakriyāsamartha), which is the distinguishing mark of an ultimately
real entity, is itself only conventionally admitted, Dharmakīrti responds with “astu
yathā tathā” – let it be so. In so answering Dharmakīrti undermines a realist
interpretation of the distinction between ultimate and conventional reality by
relegating the very capacity that is supposed to be an indicator of an entity’s ultimate
reality to a conventional designation. The understanding that the svalakṣaṇa is an
entity that exists distinct from consciousness and that causes an image of itself to
arise in consciousness, is a view that can only be accepted, if at all, at the
conventional level because the causal process in general is itself only accepted
conventionally.
Relegating the distinction he draws between ultimate and conventional reality
to the level of convention suggests that Dharmakīrti does not intend for the account
he gives with respect to this distinction to constitute an attempt at giving an objective
answer to the basic question of ontology. This account is not intended as an
ontological realist account. And if this right, then there is no conflict between that
account and the Yogācāra account. There is no need, therefore, to interpret
Dharmakīrti as presenting a hierarchy of views since the two main positions he
adopts are not in conflict.
The compatibility of the so-called “Sautrāntika” position and the Yogācāra
position is further suggested by the account that Dharmakīrti gives of the nature of
the svalakṣaṇa. Given their ineﬀable and radically particular nature, it may be
inappropriate to understand Dharmakīrti’s account of svalakṣaṇas as presenting even
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a conventional domain of entities. Examine, for example, the following comments
made by Siderits (2007) about the particularity that Dignāga and Dharmakīrti ascribe
to svalākṣaṇas.
So here [with respect to the particularity of svalakṣaṇas] Yogācāra-Sautrāntika
seems to be honoring the Yogācāra side of its heritage. Diṅnāga and his
followers are also saying that the true nature of reality is inexpressible. This
is not just because we humans can’t describe things carefully enough, or in
fine enough detail. Any words that were used to describe reality would falsify
it...If the real particulars are genuinely unique, they can never be described.
We are aware of them in perception. But because they don’t have shared
natures, we could never express the content of our awareness in words. (213)
Here Siderits points out that because svalakṣaṇas are not tokens of any type, they are
inexpressible and, as such, they cannot be the basis on which answers can be given to
ontological questions, even at the conventional level. They cannot constitute a
domain of entities in the sense relevant for answering ontological questions at any
level. If this is true, then Dharmakīrti’s account of svalakṣaṇas precludes the
possibility of attempting to reduce sāmānyalakṣaṇas to them the way that the
Abhidharma attempts to reduce ordinary objects to dharmas. This suggests that the
svalakṣaṇas are playing a very diﬀerent kind of role in Dharmakīrti’s account of
pramāṇa than the usual Sautrāntika interpretation claims.57
The preceding considerations lead me to conclude that Dharmakīrti is an
ontological anti-realist and is in this respect to be considered a Mahāyānist. This
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For an account of the role of this kind of reduction see Dunne 2004, 63 & 72.
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means that his account of pramāṇa, and the associated account of meaning, are in a
position to help the Mahāyāna answer the question about the sense in which
conventional truth is true. In the next chapter I will show how Dharmakīrti’s work
provides the resources to give an account of meaning that can supplement the
deflationary theory of truth that Priest, Siderits and Tillemans propose as an account
of conventional truth.
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CHAPTER 5
DHARMAKĪRTI’S THEORY OF MEANING

In the last chapter I argued that Dharmakīrti should be understood as
presenting an ontological anti-realist position and that for this reason he should be
counted as follower of Mahāyāna. I argued that it is possible to read his account of
pramāṇa as consistent with his overall anti-realist position when the ontology that
that account presupposes is understood to be accepted only conventionally.
Dharmakīrti does not, I argued, present that ontology as being objective or absolute
in the way required of realist views. Therefore his account of pramāṇa, along with
the commitments to the associated entities, need not be superseded or abandoned in
favor of the Mahāyāna position because it is fully consistent with that view.
In this chapter I will argue that insofar as Dharmakīrti can be read as
presenting his account of pramāṇa as explicitly conventional, what he presents to us
is in eﬀect an account of the framework for what Carnap calls “the world of things.”
This account, which is ultimately pragmatically justified, explains how the
propositions concerning empirical objects -- things -- can be meaningful and
referential despite the global anti-realist position that all Mahāyāna Buddhists share.
This provides the account of meaning that is required to supplement the deflationary
theory of truth that in chapter three I endorsed as the most promising account of truth
for Mahāyāna Buddhism.
I will begin this chapter by outlining the role a framework plays in an antirealist metametaphysics. Drawing on the work of Price and Horwich I will explain
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how functional diﬀerences in language use can be understood to mark boundaries
between linguistic frameworks and how once set, frameworks allow for a deflationary
account of reference.
Since this account makes questions about language and meaning more
fundamental than those of ontology, I then proceed to explain Dharmakīrti’s account
of one particular use of language: describing our environment in terms of discrete
and classifiable things and events, in other words, Carnap’s thing-language. I explain
the unlike the realists that explain our use of such language by appealing to the
independent nature of the world, Dharmakīrti instead gives an account of how the
world of things is constructed out of non-conceptual and ontologically neutral
perception. This process, which involves the distinctively Buddhist notion of apoha,
shows how an engaged agent can come to understand the world in terms of discrete
and classifiable empirical objects without presupposing an absolute domain of
entities. Because the concepts developed by the this process are generated for the
purpose of guiding behavior and are understood in functional terms, the result is a
use theory of meaning. This use theory then serves as the foundation for drawing a
natural boundary around the distinctive use of the thing-language. The empirical
framework of that language, I argue, is precisely what Dharmakīrti’s account explains.
Thus I understand Dharmakīrti’s account as providing a Carnapian, use theory of
meaning that allows for a deflationary understanding of reference and truth, at least
with respect to empirical claims.

The Role Of A Framework
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In chapter three I introduced Carnap’s (1950) view that questions concerning
the existence of entities can only be meaningfully posed with reference to the
linguistic framework that talk of such entities presupposes. A framework, for
Carnap, is a system of “rules for forming statements and testing, accepting, or
rejecting them” (23). According to him, any statement or question must be made as
part of a larger system of language whose use is governed by a certain structure and
set of rules. A Wittgensteinian way of putting the point might be to say that making
claims and asking questions are moves made within a larger language-game whose
structure and rules make those moves meaningful as parts of the game and govern
what counts as an appropriate and acceptable move.
On this view, in the very act of asking a question, such as “Is three a prime
number?”, we are invoking a larger language system that makes talk of numbers
meaningful and provides rules according to which an answer to the question can be
derived. Carnap’s point is that we cannot make sense of asking a question about the
existence of an entity outside of a linguistic framework that provides the system and
structure necessary to make the question meaningful and to provide the resources to
answer it. And thus, when we ask basic questions such as “Do numbers exist?”, the
answers end up being trivial insofar as any system of language that talks about
numbers -- a system of language that must be employed even to ask the question -presupposes their existence as part of its framework. The question only makes sense
internal to that framework and from that perspective the answer is trivial.
As I noted in chapter three, for Carnap the acceptance of a domain of entities
in light of our acceptance of particular ways of talking is metaphysically non-
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committal; it does not make one a metaphysical realist about those entities. The idea
that accepting the existence of entities implicit in accepting a form of language does
not commit one to a metaphysical realist position fits nicely with the deflationary
account of truth that I endorsed in chapter three. Horwich (2005a) notes that insofar
as the notions of truth and reference are inter-definable, reference also is deflated
such that the following equivalence schema accounts for reference: “(y)[Singular
concept N refers to y iﬀ n = y]” (178). According to this schema, for example, the
concept DOG refers to an individual if and only if that individual is a dog (77). Our
understanding and use of the term ‘refers’ conforms to this equivalence schema and
thus we are prepared to infer from the acceptance of the claim that some individual is
a dog that the concept DOG applies to it and vice versa. From this simple
equivalence it follows that in our employment of a concept, such as DOG, in our
language we commit ourselves in a deflationary way to the existence of the referent
of the concept, in this case to the existence of dogs. This simply follows from our
accepting and using a language that expresses propositions that include the concept.
And because the deflated notion of reference does not require any constitutive
relation between the concept and the class of objects to which it refers, the use of the
concept does not commit the user to any substantive metaphysical position that may
be implicitly required of more substantive accounts of truth and reference.
For both Horwich and Carnap it appears that questions of ontology are
explanatorily less fundamental than question about language. Horwich (2010), for
example, argues that the facts that we take to represent reality are, in terms of
explanatory priority, dependent on propositions. He says,
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the schematic relation between p and the fact that p will be
There exists such a thing as the fact that p because p
rather than the other way around. For we explain why the fact that p exists,
not by deducing it directly from laws and initial conditions. But by first
deducing that p (thereby explaining why it is that p), and by then invoking the
biconditional, ‘The fact that p exists iﬀ p’, to deduce that the corresponding
fact exists. Thus ‘the fact that p exists’ is always less fundamental in our
explanatory deductive hierarchy than ‘p’ is. (311)
It thus follows that from the deflationary perspective, the acceptance of the
propositions that our language expresses is primary to there being any particular
ontology or set of facts. Similarly, Carnap’s position entails that it is the structure and
system of a linguistic framework that will determine the nature of the facts for any
particular class of entities. For both these views, language must come first.
Because of the central role that language and the associated frameworks play,
it is critical that accounts like these be able to give an account of language and
meaning that explains how we come to develop and use language without appealing
to a pre-existing domain of entities to serve as the content of that language. I have
already noted in chapter three that this is a necessary supplement for the deflationary
theory of truth. Carnap’s account, while providing a promising general strategy for
approaching questions of meaning and reference, is sparse on the details about how
frameworks develop and work. This has opened him up to the criticism, famously
from Quine, that no meaningful sense can be made of a framework, the boundaries it
draws between internal and external, and thus how it operates to determine meaning.
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While scholars such as Bird (1995) and Price (2010) have made compelling
cases that most of Quine’s criticisms of Carnap miss the mark, Price still
acknowledges that Carnap does not provide a satisfactory defense of the charge that
“there is no principled basis for Carnap’s distinction of language into
frameworks” (329). Price explains that,
Quine’s claim is that there are no purely internal issues, in Carnap’s sense. No
issue is ever entirely insulated from pragmatic concerns about the possible
eﬀects of revisions of the framework itself. Pragmatic issues of this kind are
always on the agenda, at least implicitly. In the last analysis, all judgments are
pragmatic in nature. (326)
Quine argues this way because he thinks that the distinction between frameworks is
drawn by appealing to the analytic-synthetic distinction, which he argues is
untenable. While there is reason to doubt that Carnap uses the analytic-synthetic
distinction in the way Quine charges him of using it (see Bird 1995), even if Carnap
did draw the distinction that way, it may still be possible to salvage his account by
drawing the distinction in some other more plausible way. Price explains further that,
The main eﬀect of abandoning the analytic-synthetic distinction is that
Carnap’s distinctions are no longer sharp -- there are no purely internal (nonpragmatic) issues, because linguistic rules are never absolute, and pragmatic
restructuring is never entirely oﬀ the agenda. (326)
It is possible to accept this consequence, argues Price, while still maintaining a
Carnapian type view by explaining the distinction between frameworks in some other
way.
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Price thinks that underlying Carnap’s distinction between frameworks is the
presupposition that functional diﬀerences in language mark natural boundaries that
generate category mistakes when talk about one kind of entity is confused with talk
about another (330). On this view, it is because we use language to do diﬀerent
things, and the kinds of entities we talk about are bound to the language we use to
talk about them, that there are diﬀerent frameworks. Since, for example, talk about
material objects, talk about mental states, and talk about numbers are used diﬀerently
for diﬀerent purposes, they are structured and operate diﬀerently, reflecting the uses
to which each kind of talk is put.
Price explains this view, which is a kind of marriage between Carnap and
Ryle, in the following way:
On this view, the subject-predicate form, and indeed the notion of an object
itself, have a one-many functional character. In one sense, it is the same tool
or set of tools we employ whenever we speak of objects, or whenever we use
the subject-predicate from, or -- what seems part of the same package -whenever we use the existential quantifier. However, there’s no further
unitary notion of object, or substance, or metaphysical bearer of properties,
but “only a subject position in an infinite web of discourses.58 ” Similarly, it is
the same tool or set of tools we use whenever we speak of truth, whenever we
make a judgment or an assertion. But in each case, the relevant tool or set of
tools may have incommensurable uses, if there are important senses in which

This is a quotation of a remark made by David Lodge. See footnote 8 of Price for reference (2010,
332).
58
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the bits of language they facilitate have diﬀerent functions (in a way which
doesn’t simply collapse into diﬀerences in the objects talked about). (332-333)
Here Price explains that even though we employ the notions of existential
quantification and truth in uniform ways, this does not entail that the concepts to
which they are applied are uniform. On this view, by taking the diﬀerences between
concepts as functional diﬀerences, we can explain why it seems strange and
inappropriate to claim in the same breath that cats and numbers and Wednesdays
exist. In each case the existential quantifier is the same, but because these concepts
function diﬀerently in language, the resulting existential assertions can also be
diﬀerentiated in functional terms. Likewise, while there is a basic sense in which we
take cats and numbers and Wednesdays all to be objects insofar as they can occupy
the subject position in a sentence, this does not entail that they are objects in the same
sense. We can mark the diﬀerence between these kinds of objects by noting the
functional diﬀerence between the concepts used to identify them, without needing to
posit some deep metaphysical diﬀerence.
Price thinks that Carnap presupposes such pragmatic and functional
boundaries between languages in giving his account of frameworks; Carnap
considers our choices of syntax to mark the already present functional boundaries,
thereby creating a framework. The syntactical choices are therefore not arbitrary but
rather reflect more fundamental, albeit more fuzzy, functional or pragmatic
distinctions. The consequences of understanding framework boundaries in terms of
functional diﬀerences between languages are that the boundaries between
frameworks are not sharp or absolute and that frameworks are not static insofar as
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changes in usage can entail changes in framework. But these consequence need not
undermine the intelligibility of the notion that frameworks can be identified and
diﬀerentiated.

Explaining the Thing-language
According to the preceding account of frameworks, frameworks are
demarcated by natural boundaries created by functional, pragmatic diﬀerences in
language use. With respect to the Buddhist case Dharmakīrti is particularly
concerned to give an account of one particular use of language and the framework it
demarcates: our use of language to describe our environment as being composed of
discrete and classifiable objects and events. Such an account is, in eﬀect, an account
of what Carnap (1950) calls the thing-language, which Carnap describes as the
“spatio-temporally ordered system of observable things and events” and as the most
basic language, the one we have all accepted early in our lives “as a matter of
course” (22).
The brahmanical realists of Dharmakīrti’s time explain our use of the thinglanguage by appealing to the real things that such language refers to. According to
them, we talk about and describe our environment in terms of discrete and
classifiable objects and events because, according to them, our environment is, in and
of itself, composed of discrete and classifiable objects and events, to which we have
access through perception. Through perception we cognize objects of various types
and we formulate concepts and language to correspond to those objects we see. On
this view we perceive, for example, type-token objects such as cows. We see a cow
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both as a discrete object and as an instantiation of cowness. So, according to the
realists, we use the thing-language in order to reflect the structure and nature of the
world, which is directly presented to us in perception.
Dharmakīrti describes our use of the thing-language very diﬀerently, in a way
that is consistent with his anti-realism. He does not deny that we cognize entities
such as cows, however, he denies that these cognitions of type-tokens are perceptual.
Consistent with his anti-realism, he claims that what is given in perception does not
arrive already organized and categorized. According to Dharmakīrti, we do not
experience our environment in the first instance as composed of type-tokens. If antirealism is true, this makes sense given that the world does not already, in and of itself,
comprise an absolute domain of entities that could be revealed to us directly in
perception. Instead, argues Dharmakīrti, in perception we are presented with the
qualitative particulars that Dharmakīrti calls svalakṣaṇas. As I explained in the last
chapter, these svalakṣaṇas do not themselves comprise a domain of entities and thus
are ontologically insignificant. In light of this they are better thought of as something
akin to sense-data rather than as proper objects.59 Because these svalakṣaṇas are
ineﬀable, qualitative particulars, their representation of the environment is consistent
with an anti-realist understanding of it.
From this we can see that in Dharmakīrti’s view, there is a sense in which our
environment is given to us in perception -- it is given to us as svalakṣaṇas. This
givenness, however, which presents itself as of something external to the cognitive
Because perception is often associated with not merely seeing but seeing-as, it may be preferable to
think of what Dharmakīrti calls pratyakṣa, which is commonly translated as perception, as sensation
and reserving the term preception for those cognitions subsequent to sensation that present
recognizable objects.
59
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act itself (what we are here calling the environment), is, according to Dharmakīrti,
built into the very structure of cognition itself, at least for the unenlightened. As was
noted in the last chapter, according to Dharmakīrti, it is due to beginningless
ignorance that we experience cognition as bifurcated between subject and object -between a subject who cognizes and an object cognized.60 Ultimately, Dharmakīrti
claims these two are really non-diﬀerent. Just as the Buddhists generally deny that
there is an independent subject that is the haver of cognition, Dharmakīrti also denies
that there is an independent object that is represented in cognition. Both the subject
and the object are, on this view, ultimately internal to the cognition itself. This means
that the externality of the environment that is given to us in our perceptual
experiences is a kind of illusion.
A helpful way to think about the sense in which svalakṣaṇas represent the
environment for Dharmakīrti is to use the distinction that Price (2011) draws between
“external representation” (e-representation) and “internal representation” (irepresentation). The first notion, “e-representation,” “gives priority to the idea that
the job of representation is to to co-vary with something else -- typically, some
external factor, or environmental condition” (20). This notion of representation
understands representation to be constituted by some kind of relation between the
representation and some external representatum. A representation is thus taken to be
about something that is external to that representation and that aboutness is
accounted for by appealing to a relation between the representation and the thing
represented. Understanding representational structures on this view entails

60

See page 80-83.

120

understanding what the system-world link is that makes representation possible. For
the brahmanical realists, this link is provided by perception, which links the
perceptual cognition to the object that the cognition is then taken to represent.
On this external understanding of representation, we understand what the
representation is of and assess its accuracy by examining the kind of relation it has to
the world. To illustrate how this is thought to go, Price uses the following helpful
analogy:
Imagine a child’s puzzle book, arranged like this: The left-hand page
contains a large sheet of peel-oﬀ stickers, and the right-hand page shows a line
drawing of a complex scene. For each sticker -- the koala, the boomerang, the
Sydney Opera House, and so on -- the reader needs to find the unique outline
in the drawing with the corresponding shape. The aim of the game is to place
all the stickers in their correct locations, in this sense.
Now think of the right-hand page as the world, and the stickers as the
collection of all the statements we take to be true of the world. For each such
statement, it seems natural to ask what makes it true -- what fact in the world
has precisely the corresponding “shape.” Within the scope of this simple but
intuitive analogy, matching true statements to the world seems a lot like
matching stickers to the line drawing. (3)
If we were to follow this analogy in understanding Dharmakīrti’s account of
representation, we would have on the left-hand side two kinds of stickers -perceptual and conceptual. On the right-hand side we would either have two diﬀerent
kinds of shapes, svalakṣaṇas and sāmānyalakṣaṇas, or, given that Dharmakīrti
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identifies the former as ultimately real and the latter as only conventionally real, we
could adopt a reductionist approach that would have on the right-hand side only one
kind of shape -- svalakṣaṇas -- but allow the placement of the sāmānyalakṣaṇa
stickers by means of some process that maps them onto svalakṣaṇas. In both these
cases, the world, represented by the right-hand page of the sticker book, would serve
as the standard according to which the accuracy of the representations would be
determined.
As I explained in chapter four, this way of understanding Dharmakīrti’s
account of representation is a common one. However, given Dharmakīrti’s ultimate
rejection of the position that what is given in cognition is something external to it, it
does not make sense for him to understand representation in this way. Accounts of
representation that require some kind of constitutive relation between the
representation and some distinct thing represented are not available to him given his
anti-realism. To use Price’s analogy, according to the anti-realist there are no predefined demarcations on the right-hand page that can serve as the objective guide in
placing the stickers. So, I argue, it is a mistake to understand Dharmakīrti as
employing the notion of e-representation in giving his account of the representational
capacities of cognition. Instead, I suggest that we think of Dharmakīrti’s
understanding of representation in terms of what Price calls “internal representation”
or “i-representation.”
Price explains that the notion of “i-representation,” which is common in the
fields of psychology and cognitive science, gives priority to the internal cognitive
role of representation. Price explains that “a token counts as a representation, in this
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sense, in virtue of its position, or role, in some sort of cognitive or inferential
architecture -- in virtue of its links, within a network, to other items of the same
general kind” (20). With respect to the sticker analogy, Price says that this kind of
representation oﬀers “an account of what gives a sticker its propositional shape; what
makes it the particular sticker that it is” in a way that makes no appeal to a relation
between the sticker and already defined shapes on the right-hand page. Instead, the
account explains representation in terms of the token’s functional role in our
“cognitive economy” (22).
With this kind of representation in mind, we can understand the stickers on
the left-hand page as representing the environment on the right-hand page in a more
deflationary way. The structure of the right-hand page is, on this account, determined
by the stickers on the left by, say, tracing the outlines of the stickers onto the page.
The right-hand page does not provide constraints but is rather structured by the
stickers themselves.
In order to help clarify how i-representations represent, Price oﬀers the
following alternative metaphor:
Think of a data projector, projecting internal images onto an external screen.
Even better, helping ourselves to one of tomorrow’s metaphors, think of a
holographic data projector, projecting three-dimensional images in thin air.
This isn’t projection onto an external, unembellished world. On the contrary,
the entire image is free-standing, being simply the sum of all we take to be the
case: a world of states of aﬀairs, in all the ways that we take states of aﬀairs to
be. (28)
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Applying this metaphor to Dharmakīrti’s view, we can understand svalakṣaṇas as
representing the environment in the trivial sense that they constitute a projection of
that very environment. It seems to us as if the environment projected by cognition is
external to it but upon reflection we can come to understand that this externality is
merely an illusion. And according to the Yogācāra Buddhists, if we engage in a long
and rigorous process of meditative training, we can eventually come to realize the
illusory nature of such cognition directly for ourselves. However, so long as we
remain in an ordinary, unenlightened state of mind, our experience remains as of erepresentation -- as of a subject representing in cognition objects external to her.
It is clear that from this kind of account that we cannot explain our coming to
use language to describe our environment in terms of discrete and identifiable objects
and events by making reference to features that the environment already has. In
particular, Dharmakīrti’s understanding of perception and its contents makes it clear
that our coming to understand our environment in these terms is not the result of
perception. This understanding is instead, according to Dharmakīrti, a subsequent
constructive product of the mind. The process whereby we come to represent our
environment in terms of discrete and identifiable objects and events is given in
Dharmakīrti’s account of apoha.

Apoha
The theory of apoha, the first formulation of which was given by
Dharmakīrti’s predecessor Dignāga, in its most basic articulation states that the
meaning of kind terms is to be explained in terms of negation or exclusion (apoha)
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such that, for example, a term like “cow” or “dog” amounts to “not non-cow” or “not
non-dog.” This understanding of the meaning of kind terms is intended to avoid
commitment to the real existence of universals and is thus considered to be a form of
nominalism. Chakrabarti and Siderits (2011) explain the theory generally in the
following way:
The apoha theory is first and foremost an approach to the problem of
universals -- the problem of the one over the many. That problem is one of
explaining how it is possible, when we see a pot, to think of it as a pot and call
it by the name “pot,” a name that applies to many other particular pots. What
is the one thing, being-a-pot, that this particular shares with many other
particulars? Is there really such a thing in the world, over and above the
individual pots, or is it just a mental construction of some sort? To hold the
first alternative is to be a realist about universals, to hold the second is to be a
nominalist. The apoha theory is a distinctive Buddhist approach to being a
nominalist. (1)
The idea behind this distinctively Buddhist approach seems to be, roughly, that the
members of the complement class to the class of non-dogs, for example, need not
share any common property and thus no universal need to be invoked in order to
explain membership in the class. Ganeri (2011) explains this in terms of the absence
of identity conditions. He points out there are no identity conditions for membership
in the class of, for example, non-dogs; there is a wide variety of things that would be
included such as lamps and cats and people. Because this is so, it would seem that
there would also be no identity conditions for the members of the complement class,
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which is determined by negation of the original class. Thus the double negation
alleviates the need to appeal to some common property -- a universal -- that is shared
or instantiated in all the members of a class.
What the apoha view exactly amounts to is a matter of much debate. Much
ink has been spilled since Dignāga’s time by scholars clarifying, criticizing, and
defending the idea that a double-negation can do the job of a universal. Most of this
work approaches the issue from what Tillemans (2011) describes as a “top-down”
approach (54). This approach, most often associated with Dignāga’s formulation,
takes the function of the double-negation to be to stand-in for universals and to be
what a word primarily expresses. However, there is an increasing body of work that
seeks to make sense of the apoha theory using a “bottom-up” approach that is
associated with Dharmakīrti’s articulation of the theory. This approach explains
general concepts by giving an account of their formulation from particulars -- an
account that makes no appeals to universals and thus is appropriately nominalist. It
is this approach that will be the focus of the following account as it is the account that
is presented by Dharmakīrti in his texts.
In Dharmakīrti’s hands, apoha, or exclusion, operates as part of the process
whereby conceptual cognitions are generated from non-conceptual, perceptual ones.
This process begins with perception. As I have already explained, perceptual
cognitions represent (i-represent) the environment in a non-conceptual way involving
only svalakṣaṇas, which do not themselves constitute objects in the relevant sense. In
order to better understand the nature of Dharmakīrti’s non-conceptual,
representational, perceptual content and the distinction that Dharmakīrti makes
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between perceptual and conceptual cognitions, I think it is helpful to look at how the
distinction between conceptual and non-conceptual forms of representation is drawn
by Jerry Fodor (2007) and Richard Heck (2007).
Fodor diﬀerentiates between two mutually exclusive kinds of representation:
iconic representation and discursive representation. The main diﬀerence between
these two kinds of representations is that they have diﬀerent compositional structures
and thus represent in very diﬀerent ways. Fodor says that, “all the kinds of
representations we are concerned with are compositional,” that is to say of a
representation that its “syntactic structure and semantic content are both determined
by the syntactic structure and semantic content of its parts” (107). However, how the
parts compose to determine the content diﬀers between discursive and iconic
representation.
Discursive representations, because they involve concepts, must be structured
in such a way as to follow certain rules of combination and composition. For
example, subjects and predicates contribute in distinct ways to the composition of a
meaningful sentence. Elements like these must be arranged and related in the right
kinds of way in order to be structured so as to represent a state of aﬀairs. These
various elements and relations contribute in a variety of ways to the composition of
the whole, making the structure of discursive representations complicated. However,
this complicated structure makes it possible for these representations to have “a
galaxy of representational properties that icons don’t,” notably the ability to take
logical form and thus play a role in inference (109).
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Iconic representations, on the other hand, do not have such a complicated
structure. The way in which an iconic representation represents is in a manner
analogous to how a picture or a map represents. Fodor explains that these kinds of
representations have a compositional semantics that follows what he thus calls the
“Picture Principle”:
If P is a picture of X, then parts of P are pictures of parts of X.
This principle entails that iconic representations have structurally homogeneous
parts. No matter how you slice up the representation, each part contributes equally to
the composition of the whole, much like each piece of a jigsaw puzzle contributes to
the composition of the whole no matter how arbitrarily the pieces are cut. This
means that iconic representations do not have a specific constituent structure -- there
are no joints; there is no specific way that elements must be identified and related.
Fodor explains that they are a “homogeneous kind of symbol from both the syntactic
and the semantic point of view. They don’t have logical form, they don’t have a
structure to make explicit” (109). All the parts of an iconic representation contribute
equally to the interpretation and in the same way. Because of this, Fodor points out
that iconic representations cannot do the same kinds of things that discursive
representations can do. In particular they cannot enter into logical relations and
cannot form part of an inference. Iconic representations are still semantically
evaluable insofar as they are of something -- they are, after all, still representations -but they are a diﬀerent kind of representation in that they represent in a diﬀerent way.
In order to help explain how a perceptual mental state could be iconic, Heck
compares it to “cognitive mapping.” He claims that

128

There is strong empirical evidence that our ability to find our way around in
the world depends upon our employment of what are known as “cognitive
maps.” Each of us has a mental map of our surroundings that places locations
we encounter relative to other, known locations. (125)
These maps are representational yet they are non-conceptual. We can see this, Heck
points out, by noticing that having such a mental map is not the same as having a
collection of beliefs about one’s environment. In fact, because the structure of the
map is non-discursive, Heck explains that there is no objective way to describe the
map’s contents; “there is no unique structured proposition that gives the content of a
map because there is no such structure in the map; a map lacks the syntactic structure
present in a verbal description of what it represents” (126). Thus a complete
description of the environment and a mental map of it are two diﬀerent things, and
one can have the latter without having the former. This is evident, Heck points out, in
the phenomenon of “knowing how to get somewhere” without being able to give
someone else directions (125).
If we follow this way of characterizing the distinction between conceptual and
non-conceptual representations and apply it to Dharmakīrti’s work, the
representations (ākāras) of perceptual cognitions, which would be composed of
qualitative particulars, can be thought of as iconic representations that are not
linguistically expressible because they are not appropriately structured. Analogous to
Heck’s cognitive mapping, we might think of these representations as qualitative
maps of sensory space for each sense modality.
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A similar line of interpretation is oﬀered by Ganeri (2011) who, drawing on
the work of Austen Clark and Christopher Peacocke, argues that what Dharmakīrti’s
perceptual representations present us with are “spatially located instances of
phenomenal qualities” (229). On this view, perceptual cognitions present a
phenomenal appearance of qualitative features, which for Dharmakīrti would be the
svalakṣaṇas, and their apparent locations relative to each other and to the perceived
subject (234).61 As was noted before, for Dharmakīrti this experience of qualities
distributed in a relatively defined space that is oriented around a subject is part of the
illusory structure of cognition for ordinary beings. By my interpretation, this illusory
array constitutes an iconic representation -- a primitive sensory map -- that is
momentary and confined to a particular sense modality. At this level of perception,
there are no objects, no individuals, and no cross-modal connections. As Ganeri
notes, this kind of feature placing does not involve the employment of concepts and
“isn’t enough for the introduction of objects. For that we need sortal concepts,
concepts that provide identity conditions for the things that fall under them” (235).
The sortal concepts that are needed for the introduction of objects are
Dharmakīrti’s sāmānyalakṣaṇas. The conceptual cognitions that are made up of
sāmānyalakṣaṇas can be considered to be discursive representations that, unlike
iconic representations, are structured in a way that is expressible (as Dharmakīrti puts

This feature-placing attribute of perceptual representation is non-conceptual. As Chakrabarti and
Siderits (2011) point out, for the Indian tradition, including the realists, colors, smells, tangible
textures, etc. are not considered to be universals but quality particulars (14). So the perceptable
features that are relevant here are not like instantiations of redness, for example. This is true of the
Indian tradition generally, but it is certainly true of Dharmakīrti who explicitly describes svalakṣaṇas
as particulars.
61

130

it in his Pramāṇaviniścaya, in a way that “is fit to be associated with words” 62) and
that can thus play a role in inference. The goal of Dharmakīrti’s apoha theory is to
explain the cognitive process whereby discursive representations are generated from
iconic ones.
According to Dharmakīrti, in ordinary, unenlightened circumstances a
perceptual cognition initiates a cognitive process that generates a discursive
representation on its basis. This process occurs mostly below the level of
consciousness, sub-personally, wherein the cognitive system generates a subsequent
conceptual cognition that represents the environment in terms of discrete and
categorizable objects. It does this by bringing past experience to bear on the
interpretation of the sensory information presented in an occurrent perceptual
cognition.
The process begins by a perceptual cognition triggering certain subconscious
mental factors -- latencies, imprints, and capacities -- called vāsanās. In giving an
account of the role of vāsanās in Dharmakīrti’s system, Dunne (2011) points out that
“although he [Dharmakīrti] refers repeatedly to imprints [vāsanās], the precise
mechanism of their operation receives no attention” (100). This means that giving a
precise account of their operation is diﬃcult. It is, however, clear from Dharmakīrti’s
work that vāsanās play a very important role in explaining how the mind generates
conceptual cognitions from perceptual ones. For example, in his own commentary to
verses 68-70 of the “Svārthānumāna” chapter of his Pramāṇavārttika, Dharmakīrti
states:
Dreyfus (2011, 219) highlights this aspect of Dharmakīrti’s understanding of conceptualization
(kalpanā) and it is his translation that I am using here.
62
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A conceptual awareness arises in dependence on things which are excluded
from what is other than those [that have the same cause or eﬀect]. In
conformity with the nature (prakṛti) of its imprints, that awareness conceals
the distinct form of each of those things, and ascribes to them its own
nondiﬀerent appearance. Doing so, that conceptual awareness conflates those
things and presents them as nondiﬀerent. Those things conceptualized as
nondiﬀerent are excluded from others in that they have the same eﬀects and
causes; there is also a cognitive imprint (vāsanās) that induces one to
conceptualize those things in that fashion. The nature (prakṛti) of those
distinct things themselves and the nature of the imprint are such that the
cognition that arises from those things and that imprint appears in this way
[i.e., such that those things seem nondiﬀerent]. (Dunne 2011, 339)
Here we see that the svalakṣaṇas that are the elements of perceptual cognitions are
not alone responsible for the generation of a subsequent conceptual cognition. It is
the perceptual cognition in conjunction with vāsanās that “induces one to
conceptualize those things in that fashion,” i.e., that leads the cognitive system to
interpret the data presented in perception as presenting a describable object, one that
can be taken to be similar to other objects. This kind of account is to be expected
given the iconic nature of perceptual representation and its incommensurability with
discursive representation. It is clear that some additional, intervening factor would
have to be in operation in order to derive a conceptual cognition from a perceptual
one. For Dharmakīrti, this role is played by vāsanās.
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In Dharmakīrti’s system, vāsanās thus seem to function to organize and
process the information derived from the senses through perception. Dunne explains
that generally in the Yogācāra tradition of which Dharmakīrti is a part, vāsanās are “a
mechanism for the expression of karma,” that is to say, vāsanās are the way in which
past experience gets encoded by the cognitive system (99). From Dharmakīrti’s
discussion of vāsanās it is clear that he considers some of these vāsanās to be innate
(anādi) and others acquired (āhita) (Dunne 100). The innate vāsanās include certain
dispositions that a sentient creature has in virtue of being the particular type of
creature that it is. In the Buddhist context this is commonly understood to be a
product of experiences from past lives, which are said to determine the kind of form
in rebirth a particular consciousness stream (commonly called a “being”) takes.
Since this process is said to be beginningless, these vāsanās are also commonly
described as beginningless. In more modern and secular parlance, we can understand
innate vāsanās in terms of evolutionary acquired dispositions that a sentient being
has in virtue of being the kind of being that it is. These are relatively stable
dispositions that are not easily susceptible to change in the course of the being’s life.
Acquired vāsanās, on the other hand, are formed through experience within a
lifetime and develop in number and complexity as more experience is acquired. One
important example is linguistic experience. For creatures with the capacity for
language, past experiences of language learning and use leave vāsanā imprints that
are then brought to bear in interpreting perceptual data from future perceptual
cognitions. The generation of conceptual cognitions for such creatures capable of
language is thus aﬀected by the acquisition of language, a point that will be relevant
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in appreciating how linguistic frameworks contribute to determining cognitive
content.
When triggered, vāsanās operate automatically and unconsciously to
transform perceptual experience into a tokening of a type that the system can then
use to make the environment easier to negotiate and predict. At the most basic level,
this involves associating present experience with past experience in order to draw
functional similarities. This involves the operation of one of the innate imprints
present in the subconscious of all sentient creatures: a disposition to judge perceived
particulars as being the same as previously perceived particulars. Dunne describes
this vāsanā as “part of a sentient being’s cognitive architecture” and as what serves as
the foundation for the capacity to form even the simplest concepts (101). This
vāsanā is a necessary part of the cognitive architecture for any being that represents
the world conceptually because the objects of perception are particulars and thus do
not themselves share any similarities. The perceived similarities are not read oﬀ
perceptual experience but must be constructed by the mind. For this reason, Dunne
points out, this vāsanā is, and must be, innate; it is not possible to learn through
experience. He explains that,
this disposition is not learned; indeed, on Dharmakīrti’s view it would be
impossible to acquire it through experience because this would require an
experience of two objects that are in fact the same, but for Dharmakīrti all
perceptible objects are necessarily diﬀerent in all ways. (101)
In order to draw the similarities that are necessary for acts of recognition and concept
formation, the minds of sentient beings thus have an innate vāsanā that is disposed to
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take the contents of present experience to be the same as the content of previous
experience. When these vāsanās of past experiences are triggered, the mind is quick
to take the present content to resemble the content of the past and thereby takes them
all to be tokens of the same type. But as Dreyfus (2011) points out, for Dharmakīrti
“the similarities that he posits are not objective but exist only in our experience or,
rather, in the ways in which we spontaneously conceptualize our experiences” (213).
And it is an innate vāsanā that allows for such spontaneous conceptualization.
As the above account makes clear, this innate dispositional vāsanā works in
conjunction with acquired vāsanās that encode past experience. Which of the
vāsanās from past experience are triggered is determined not only by the initial
perceptual cognition but also by what Dunne calls “subjective factors” (98). These
subjective factors, which like vāsanās “may be thought of as involving conditioning
(saṃskāraṇa)” serve as the background against which the cognitive process occurs
(99). These factors include our aversions and desires, our purposes and interests, and
the goal-oriented expectations we have in light of those purposes and interests. They
basically constitute our engaged situation at the time of cognition and they create the
subjective context that helps to bring certain features of the perceptual cognition into
focus.
These subjective factors, in conjunction with perceptual cognition, thus
trigger the vāsanās of past experiences that bear on the situation of engagement and
together they bring into focus certain features of iconic perceptual representations.
This creates a demarcation between focus and field. What is in the focus range are
features that are taken by the system to be functionally equivalent. These are then
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contrasted with those features that are not taken to be functionally equivalent.
Dharmakīrti describes this as an exclusion. For example, in the passage from the
Pramāṇavārttika included earlier in this section on pages 127 and 128, Dharmakīrti
described the exclusionary manner in which similarities are derived as one in which
“things are excluded from what is other than those.” This exclusion occurs when the
features in the focus range, though particular, are taken to be non-diﬀerent and are
excluded from the remaining features that do not share the functional similarity. The
focus range, which we can identify as X, can thus be described as being not non-X -the classic articulation of apoha.
The unification of features produced by the vāsanās and subjective factors at
the simplest level involves simply lumping together features to form stable, uniform
representations. For example, generating a representation of an enduring patch of
color from a continually changing flux of color particulars involves unifying all the
color particulars into the same color by taking them to be functionally equivalent.
Taking a spatial expanse of color, say the color of a wall, to present uniformly the
same color at the same time, as well as over time, requires formulating an abstract
and general representation of the color, which all the particulars are mistakenly taken
to share.
More complex unifications involve lumping various focus features together,
both within a modality and cross-modally, to form representations of individual
objects and object types. To use a common Indian example, a water-jug
representation would involve associating a wide variety of cross-modal features -color, shape, heft, texture, solidity -- that all get lumped together into the same
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unified object. The multiplicity of features are taken to be non-diﬀerent in so far as
they are taken to be functionally equivalent, generating the same eﬀect, and thus to
constitute a unified object. In addition, when identified as specifically a water-jug
type object, this constructed object is taken to be functionally similar to other
collections of features that were also in the past taken to be objects of that type. Such
a representation thus involves generalizations on several levels, which the subjective
factors and the vāsanās are responsible for generating by constructing similarities.
Thus, the way that the mind is able in this way to judge diﬀerent particulars as
the same is by ignoring irrelevant diﬀerences and focusing on mostly functional
features that seem relevant to our interests, activities, and general interactions with
the world. So, when current experience is compared with the past experience
encoded in vāsanās, the assessments of similarity are made by excluding or ignoring
the diﬀerences between the experiences in order to focus on their functional
similarity. They are in eﬀect judged to be non-diﬀerent with respect to each other
and diﬀerent from all those things that cannot play the same functional role.
In his own commentary to verses 137-142 of the “Svārthānumāna” chapter of
the Pramāṇavārttika, Dharmakīrti uses the water-jug example to explain how apoha
works:
Those particulars that when conglomerated perform a single eﬀect have no
distinction from each other with regard to that eﬀect. Therefore, it would be
pointless to express any such distinction. For this reason, in order to refer
(niyojana) to all of them at once, people apply one expression to them, such as
“water-jug.” Those [i.e., the particulars that form a water-jug] are all equally
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diﬀerent from their respective homologues and heterologues, but since they
contribute to the accomplishment of that single purpose [such as containing
water], they are distinguished from others that do not do so. Hence, they are
cognized as non-distinct due to that nondiﬀerence. (Dunne 2004, 356-357)
Here Dharmakīrti emphasizes that the conglomeration of particulars that we take to
be a water-jug is taken to be the same in the sense of being a single, whole object in
virtue of the fact that we take them of perform a single eﬀect. In virtue of their
function, the diﬀerences are glossed over and that conglomeration of features is
excluded from all the other features present in perception that could not play the
appropriate functional role. Thus they are judged not to be a non-water-jug. This
identification will involve vāsanās and subjective factors that will bring together past
experiences involving practical engagement with other not non-water-jug objects.
This functional understanding, plus the associated sensory experience from the past,
will then inform the present judgment of sameness between the present experience
and those past experiences, which then will result in a conceptual cognition that will
represent the general water-jug object. This is then mistakenly confused with the
original perceptual experience.
Chatterjee (2011) who likens Dharmakīrti’s account to accounts common in
cognitive science, describes this exclusionary process, which is the hallmark of the
apoha account, as one wherein the cognitive system “learns to conflate some
diﬀerences and superimpose a single form on distinct representations” (251). She
explains that what happens in the cognitive process is that the cognitive system uses
vāsanās to determine that diﬀerent stimuli are, though diﬀerent, compatible, and
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through the power of overgeneralization comes to react to them in the same way. In
particular, it comes to generate a general representation that obscures diﬀerence and
presents the stimuli as the same. To illustrate this idea she uses the example of a frog
being unable to discriminate between diﬀerent kinds of moving black dots and
reacting to them all in the same way (251). Whether what is presented in perception
is a fly or a stone pellet, the frog overgeneralizes, ignores diﬀerences, and treats them
as the same. The frog’s cognitive system in eﬀect represents these diﬀerent stimuli as
the same in virtue of taking them to be functionally equivalent. Chatterjee
understands Dharmakīrti’s account of human cognition to operate in much the same
manner. Although we receive an infinite variety of stimuli through perception, we
are disposed to overgeneralize for pragmatic reasons: in order to help us negotiate
our environment and predict future events.

Pragmatic Context, Use, and the Framework of Things
The concepts generated by the cognitive system through the apoha process are
heavily influenced by the engaged context in which the process occurs. This is
because concepts are used by the system in guiding behavior. For example, Dunne
notes that
This appeal to experience and dispositions highlights the importance of mind
dependency or “subjective factors” in the process of constructing exclusions.
That is, Dharmakīrti maintains that when we construct exclusions, we do not
do so haphazardly or out of some pernicious habit; rather, we have some
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purpose in mind, and that purpose provides expectations and interests that
form the context of our concept formation. (98)
The purpose of concept formation in this specifically empirical context is to aid the
system in negotiating and predicting the environment, which is given to the system
through perception.63 The concept forming process thus begins and ends with
engaged activity. In the middle is the apoha process that constructs concepts based
on the assessment of functional similarities between features given in perception.
The concepts are then used by the system to guide behavior oriented towards the
environment. In Dharmakīrti’s account this orientation towards the environment is, of
course, really just an orientation towards future sensory stimulation, since the
environment represented in perception is only seemingly external. Regardless,
concepts are thus understood primarily in terms of the functional role they play in
successfully guiding our actions. To be an X is to function as one.
The concept forming process is a recursive process. The eﬀectiveness of any
given constructed concept, along with the associated sensory stimuli, subjective
factors, and vāsanās that contributed to its construction are stored as vāsanās that
then are available for use in future iterations of the process. This means that as a
system acquires more experience, it acquires more resources for assessing functional
similarities between perceptual stimuli. Unlike the frog’s system, perhaps, pragmatic
success or failure can make a diﬀerence to the features that our system brings into
focus and how it draws functional boundaries. This success or failure, which is itself
I say here empirical context in order to indicate that we are focusing on concepts formed from
perception, as opposed to, say, mathematical or logical contexts where perception most likely plays no
role at all in concept formation. Of course, in those contexts too there is an active engagement on the
part of the cognizer, however, the goal-oriented activity in those contexts is non-empirical and thus
those concepts will play a significantly diﬀerent role due to the diﬀerent uses to which they are put.
63

140

experienced through perception, contributes to the vāsanās that the system brings to
bear in generating future concepts.
Insofar as the cognitive process depends heavily on the engaged situation of
the system, the functional similarities that a cognitive system draws in order to
formulate concepts are entirely contingent. Chatterjee (2011) explains that for
Dharmakīrti and cognitive scientists alike,
Ontologically speaking, all these abstracted elements, be they representations
of properties, of class characters, or of objects, are on a par, since they are
constructions of our sensory-motor system and cannot be found in the
external world. This tacit categorization, however, has not been done once
and for all. Depending on the background provided by the context, the system
might opt for some diﬀerent schemes and cut up the world diﬀerently.
Moreover, there may be many correct categorizations for the very same set of
representations, correctness being a function of success in everyday life. (252)
Here Chatterjee highlights the important relationship between conceptualization and
pragmatic success. The manner in which we categorize the world is closely tied to
the uses to which we put those categories in guiding our actions. The innate capacity
we have to draw similarities and to formulate concepts does itself determine how the
concepts are formulated. That depends on our experience, which is an entirely
contingent matter. Conceptualization thus does not carve the world up at its natural
joints, for no joints are naturally occurring, but rather constructs joints in order to
facilitate goal oriented action.
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Dunne explains the lack of ultimate ontological ground for our conventionally
constructed world of things in the following way:
In eﬀect, he [Dharmakīrti] is saying that when we can call all fires “fire,” for
example, it is not that they all instantiate the universal “fireness”; nor that they
all possess some real, specifiable similarity; nor even that they all have the
“same” eﬀect in a way that we can ultimately specify in objective terms.
Rather, all those things are just diﬀerent from nonfire things, and the reason
for their diﬀerence is simply that by their nature they appear that way to us
when we attend to what we mean by “fire.” Even the seeming objectivity of
this appeal to nature may disappoint some, for a thing’s “nature” (svabhāva) is
also conceptually constructed through the apoha theory... in ultimate terms,
there is no metaphysically defensible reason for the fact that we call them
“fire.” Thus, if one is hoping for an ultimately defensible metaphysical
reason, then Dharmakīrti’s answer to the problem of sameness is dissatisfying.
(99)
On my reading, the abandonment of the search for “an ultimately defensible
metaphysical reason” to explain our use of concepts is the whole point of
Dharmakīrti’s account of concept formation. For an anti-realist no such reason is to
be had. Instead, Dharmakīrti argues that we carve up the world into non-fires and not
non-fires for purely pragmatic reasons -- because doing so serves our interests.
In this respect Dharmakīrti’s view closely resembles Carnap’s. As was noted in
chapter three, Carnap considers the acceptability of a framework to be a pragmatic
matter, not a factual one. This pragmatic utility is tied explicitly to the use to which a
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language is put. If a particular form of language serves some useful purpose that is
not better served by employing a diﬀerent form of language, then the language is
worthy of acceptance. For example, with respect to the “thing-language” Carnap
says that “to accept the thing world means nothing more than to accept a certain form
of language, in other words, to accept rules for forming statements and for testing,
accepting, or rejecting them” (1950, 23). And insofar as the thing-language has
proven very useful for the purposes of everyday life, this eﬃcacy justifies the
acceptance of that language.
In giving his account, Carnap focuses exclusively on language use.
Dharmakīrti on the other hand grounds his account of language use in his contingent
and use-governed account of concept formation. Dharmakīrti’s account of linguistic
meaning is thus derived from a more fundamental account of intentional mental
content, which as we have seen is the focus of his account of concept formation. On
his view, the veridicality of a conceptual cognition is parasitic on the truth of its
intentional content, p, such that a cognition of p is veridical if and only if <p> is true,
and <p> is true if and only if p. This intentional content of conceptual cognitions is,
as has already been noted, what Dharmakīrti takes to be fit to be associated with
words. Thus Dharmakīrti’s account of intentional mental content provides an account
of the meaningful content of our linguistic expressions
As we have seen, Dharmakīrti’s account of intentionality presents two distinct
kinds of intentional mental content. According to Dharmakīrti a cognition can have
one of two kinds of ākāra, or ‘representation,’ which diﬀer with respect to the kind of
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intentional objects that compose them.64 Perceptual, or sensory, cognitions have
ākāras that are composed of svalakṣaṇas.65 In contrast to these cognitions there are
conceptual cognitions that have ākāras that are composed of sāmānyalakṣaṇas.
Sāmānyalakṣaṇas, which are the conceptual products of the apoha process, insofar as
they are objects that are general and repeatable, are those that are capable of being
linguistically expressed. Being linguistically expressible means that such
representation has a discursive structure. Transforming iconic representations into
discursive ones introduces a discursive structure that, as Fodor explains, gives the
representation the ability to take logical form and play a role in inference. This
ability involves the representation in a structured framework, what we might call a
discursive framework, that when associated with language constitutes a linguistic
framework. Thus we can take Dharmakīrti’s account of concept formation as in eﬀect
providing an account of the associated discursive or linguistic framework.
The framework of things in particular is presented by Carnap as an example
of an empirical framework, i.e. one that includes empirical evidence as part of its
system. An empirical framework, as opposed to a purely logical one, includes as part
of its system a role for empirical evidence such that the “results of observations are

The term ‘ākāra’ is often translated as ‘image,’ ‘form,’ or ‘appearance’ since it is qualitative in
nature -- there is something it is like to have one as a mental object and it is most often associated with
the content of perception. However, I think the term as it is used in this context is better translated as
‘representation’ in order to highlight the fact that ākāras are semantically evaluable and to highlight
the fact that the term applies also to conceptual or linguistic forms in cognition (for more on the use of
the term ‘ākāra’ see Kataoka 2010 and Arnold 2012). I will leave ākāra’ untranslated and use it to
refer to a representation (i-representation) that is the content of a cognition.
64

In verse 207 of the Pratyakṣa chapter of the Pramāṇavārttika Dharmakīrti makes it clear that a
perceptual cognition takes multiple objects. See pages 81-82.
65
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evaluated according to certain rules as confirming or disconfirming evidence” for the
existence of entities within that framework (22). Carnap explains that,
To recognize something as a real thing or event means to succeed in
incorporating it into the framework of things at a particular space-time
position so that it fits together with the other things recognized as real,
according to the rules of the framework. (22)
The rules of this kind of empirical framework require the incorporation of empirical
evidence in deciding for or against the reality of a proposed entity within the system.
The account Dharmakīrti gives of concept formation describes the generation
of discursive representations that are empirical insofar as they are derived from
perception, which constitutes an empirical element that would not be required, for
example, in accounting for discursive representations of mathematical or logical
objects. Thus the concepts, discursive representations, and associated framework
described by Dharmakīrti in giving his apoha account basically amount to Carnap’s
framework of things. Like Carnap’s framework, Dharmakīrti’s framework requires the
incorporation of sensory information. This is what perceptual representations of the
environment provide. Of course, for Dharmakīrti this information has to be
understood in the internal sense described by Price in his account of i-representation.
However, it remains empirical nonetheless insofar as it plays that functional role in
our cognitive processing. It is a necessary element in the construction of discursive
representations of our environment and, in conjunction with the subjective factors
and vāsanās, accounts for our coming to describe our world in terms of discrete and
categorizable things and events.
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If we think of what is given in perception as being ultimately real, as
Dharmakīrti does, then the resulting conceptual cognitions will be in one sense
erroneous -- they do not reflect what is given in the sensory cognitions from which
they are derived. Dharmakīrti emphasizes this in various places. Here I think he
calls attention to the anti-realist context in which his account of the conventional is
situated. What is presented in conceptual cognition is not what is given in
perception, which is itself ontologically neutral. Conceptual cognitions do not reflect
reality as it is in and of itself because there is no way reality is in and of itself
(ontologically speaking) and this is reflected even in the contents of perception,
which are also devoid of ontological significance. By calling the contents of
perception “ultimately real” he thus drives home the anti-realism of his account while
leaving room for the conventional reality of the objects of our ordinary discourse -the only kind of reality one can hope for, at least ontologically speaking.

In Summary
This essay began by asking in what sense conventional truth claims could be
understood as true from a Mahāyāna perspective, given the ontological anti-realism
that characterizes those positions. In chapter three I introduced the idea that adopting
a Carnapian approach to the meaning of conventional claims, instead of a fictionalist
one, allows one to take the attributions of truth to those claims to be literal but also
deflated. The associated deflationary theory of truth, which is metaphysically
neutral, is, as Priest, Siderits, and Tillemans point out, well suited to account for truth
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in an anti-realist context, when supplemented with an account of meaning like the
one provided by Carnap’s frameworks.
Employing the Carnapian approach as a general strategy, in this chapter I have
shown how the work of Dharmakīrti can be understood as providing an account of at
least one framework -- the framework Carnap refers to as the framework of things.
Dharmakīrti’s account, unlike Carnap’s, explains how the most basic of linguistic
frameworks is formed -- how it is we come to understand the world in those
conceptual terms -- by explaining how our cognitive systems imaginatively transform
non-conceptual, iconic representations of our environment into discursive ones. This
process occurs within a context of practical engagement and relies heavily on that
pragmatic context in generating the concepts that constitute the meaning of our
words. Because these concepts are functionally defined in terms of the use to which
they are put in guiding action, not in terms of the nature of the referents, the theory of
meaning that emerges is a use theory of meaning. This use, as Price explains, then
creates an associated framework, in this case the framework of things.
On this view, the use to which a concept is put fixes its extension, which for
Dharmakīrti can include a wide variety of things that need not share any features in
common. In fact, on this view, the use to which concepts are put creates the
conventional domain of entities of the associated framework. For Dharmakīrti, as for
Carnap, Price, and Horwich, conceptualization and language come before ontology.
Dharmakīrti has shown how this is possible by showing how it is possible to form
concepts and acquire language without presupposing an absolute domain of entities.
Thus Dharmakīrti provides an anti-realist account of meaning that can, in a
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deflationary way, explain the sense in which we take conventional truth to be true.
This account thus recommends itself to all the Mahāyānists who share Dharmakīrti’s
commitment to ontological anti-realism, but who would still like to retain a
normatively constrained sense in which conventional claims can be assessed as
meaningful and truth-apt.
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CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION

In this essay I have argued for a particular solution to the problem of giving
an account of conventional truth in Mahāyāna Buddhism. In laying out the problem I
identified two main criteria that any adequate account of such truth should meet: the
account must be robust enough to support the objectivity and normativity of truth, as
well as be consistent with Mahāyāna anti-realist commitments. As was made clear in
chapter two, the latter requirement poses a special challenge for the Mahāyāna that is
not shared by their Abhidharma co-religionists. All Buddhists maintain that our
ordinary experience of a world populated by medium sized objects and enduring
events does not reflect the world’s ultimate nature. It is on these grounds that it, and
the claims made describing it, are considered to be merely conventional. However,
unlike the Ābhidharmikas, the anti-realist Mahāyāna deny that the ultimate nature of
the world is such that it can serve as an ontological foundation for the conventional
world. While the Abhidharma maintains that the conventional world can be reduced
in some way to entities called dharmas, the ultimate constituents of reality, the
Mahāyāna is precluded from giving such an account due to their denial of the
ultimacy of any entities. According to the Mahāyāna, all entities are empty of such
inherent, ultimate existence. There is no absolute domain of entities that can serve as
the basis of a reduction.
In order to meet the challenge of giving an account of truth from an antirealist perspective, I have here oﬀered the work of Dharmakīrti. Dharmakīrti’s work,

149

as I interpret it, describes how the conventional world is constructed by the mind out
of an ontological nothing. Without presupposing an absolute domain of entities, on
the basis of nothing more than non-conceptualized and radically particular sensory
information, the mind, through a process of overgeneralization and exclusion
(apoha), creates the world of our experience. This constructed, conventional world
then constitutes the world -- a framework -- against which truth can be assessed.
Like Carnap’s frameworks, Dharmakīrti’s conventional world provides a discursive
structure and system of rules for assessing thoughts and claims pertaining to that
world. However, unlike Carnap, Dharmakīrti provides an account of the generation
of the conventional world that explicitly makes reference to the role that pragmatic
considerations play in fixing the functional meaning of our concepts and regulating
their use. This account goes a long way to dispel the concerns that frameworks or
conventional worlds are arbitrarily determined and thus not normatively constrained.
With this account of the conventional world in hand, the Mahāyānist is at
liberty to use the deflationary account of truth to explain conventional truth. The
conventional world framework fixes the meaning of our concepts (in a truth
independent way) and the norms of usage built into the framework provide
assertability conditions for propositions employing those concepts. The deflationary
account of truth then describes our use of the concept ‘true’ with respect to those
propositions. In a ontologically and metaphysically neutral way, the deflationary
account simply tells us that whenever a proposition is assertable, so is the claim that
that proposition is true. On this view, when we think and make assertions with
respect to a particular framework, such as the framework of things, we simply use the
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associated concepts and attempt to conform with the appropriate norms of usage.
The question of truth does not really arise. Questions of truth in eﬀect arise from
within a diﬀerent framework, a framework that uses concepts to think and talk about
concepts, instead of, for example, things. Because the concept truth has a use within
a diﬀerent kind of functionally defined framework, it need not be presupposed as
operative within the context of other frameworks, like the framework of things.
One implication of this account is that the Buddhist notion of two truths is
reduced to just one. The deflationary account of truth is a unitary account so there is
just one kind of truth -- the deflationary, conventional kind. That there would be only
one kind of truth is consistent with the Mahāyāna anti-realist position, which denies
that there could be objective answers to the basic question of ontology. There is no
way on this view to make truth-apt assertions about the ultimate nature of reality.
Such assertions would be, in Carnapian terms, assertions made external to a
framework and thus meaningless and not assessable for truth or falsity. This denial of
the possibility of an ultimate truth is a position that is often associated specifically
with the Madhyamaka tradition of Mahāyāna Buddhism. The account presented here
extends that position to apply to all of Mahāyāna Buddhism. For all these schools, as
Siderits puts it, the ultimate truth is that there is no ultimate truth. The conventional
truth is all there is.
Since the only kind of truth available to the Mahāyāna is conventional, the
conventional takes on new level of importance. It no longer need be thought of as an
inferior, second-class kind of truth. It becomes the kind of truth that it is important to
get right. In particular, it is important to the Buddhists, as it was perhaps for Carnap,
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to appreciate truth’s conventionality. In other words, it is important to dispel the
mistaken idea that our truths reflect an absolute reality. Much of Mahāyāna
philosophical literature aims precisely at undermining that intuitive, realist position.
However, this appreciation that truth lacks ultimate ground need not lead to the
acceptance of the dismal slough or the abandonment of inquiry and rational
discourse. This is what I take to be value of Dharmakīrti’s work. By highlighting the
important pragmatic and functional role that concepts play in our ability to reach our
goals, he brings them into focus as something that anti-realists should take seriously.
This is particularly important for Buddhists insofar as the Buddhist soteriological
project must be understood as being itself conventional. If the Buddhist path is to be
taken seriously by anti-realist Buddhists, then the conventional in general must be
taken seriously. Dharmakīrti’s work, as I read it, is an attempt by an anti-realist to
take the conventional seriously. Dharmakīrti recognizes that truth for the rest of us
turns out to be truth for all of us, and that this truth is important, despite its
conventionality, for helping us to find our way out of a world of suﬀering.

152

REFERENCES
Access to Insight, ed. Aṅguttaranikāya. Access to Insight, 2012. http://
www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/an/index.html.
Anuruddha. A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidharma: The Abhidhammattha Sangha.
Edited by Mahāthera Nāranda and Bhikkhu Bodhi. Seattle: BPS Pariyatti
Editions, 1999.
Arnold, Dan. Buddhas, Brains, and Believing: The Problem of Intentionality in
Classical Buddhist and Cognitive-Scientific Philosophy of Mind. New York:
Columbia University Press, 2012.
---. Buddhists, Brahmins, and Belief: Epistemology in South Asian Philosophy of
Religion. New York, Columbia University Press, 2005.
Bird, Graham H. “Carnap and Quine: Internal and External Questions.” Erkenntnis
42 (1995): 41-64.
Bodhi, Bhikkhu, trans. The Connected Discourses of the Buddha: A Translation of the
Saṃyutta Nikāya. Edited by Bhikkhu Bodhi. Boston: Wisdom Publications,
2000.
Bodhi, Bhikkhu, and U Rewata Dhamma. “Introduction.” In Abhidhamattha
Sangha: A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidharma, edited by Bhikkhu Bodhi.
Seattle: BPS Pariyatti Editions, 2000.
Buddhaghosa. Aṅguttaranikāya Aṭṭhakathā. Edited by M. Walleser. London: Pali
Text Society, 1966-1979.
Buddhaghosa. Saṁyuttanikaya Aṭṭakathā (Sāratthappakāsinī). 3 vols. Edited by Pali
Text Society. London: Pali Text Society, 1977.
Carnap, Rudolf. “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology.” Revue Internationale De
Philosophie 4 (1950): 20-40.
Chakrabarti, Arindam, and Mark Siderits. “Introduction.” In Apoha: Buddhist
Nominalism and Human Cognition, edited by Arindam Chakrabarti, Mark
Siderits, and Tom Tillemans. New York: Columbia University Press, 2011.
Chakrabarti, Arindam, Mark Siderits, and Tom Tillemans, eds. Apoha: Buddhist
Nominalism and Human Cognition. New York: Columbia University Press,
2011.
Chalmers, David. “Ontological Anti-Realism.” In Metametaphysics, edited by David
Chalmers, David Manley, and Ryan Wasserman. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2009.
Chatterjee, Amita. “Funes and Categorization in an Abstraction-Free World.” In
Apoha: Buddhist Nominalism and Human Cognition, edited by Arindam
Chakrabarti, Mark Siderits, and Tom Tillemans. New York: Columbia
University Press, 2011.
Conze, Edward. Buddhist Thought in India. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press, 1967.
Cowherds. Moonshadows: Conventional Truth in Buddhist Philosophy. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2011.

153

de Silva, Lily, trans. Dighanikāya Aṭṭhakathā. 4 vols. London: Pali Text Society,
1970.
Dharmakīrti. The Pramana Varttikam of Acarya Dharmakīrti: With Commentaries
Svopajnavrtti of the Author and Pramanavarttikavrtti of Manorathanandin.
Edited by Ram Chandra Pandeya. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1989.
Dreyfus, Georges. “Apoha as a Naturalized Account of Concept Formation.” In
Apoha: Buddhist Nominalism and Human Cognition, edited by Arindam
Chakrabarti, Mark Siderits, and Tom Tillemans. New York: Columbia
University Press, 2011.
---. Recognizing Reality: Dharmakīrti’s Philosophy and Its Tibetan Interpretations.
Albany: SUNY Press, 1997.
Dunne, John. Foundations of Dharmakīrti’s Philosophy. Boston: Wisdom
Publications, 2004.
---. “Key Features of Dharmakīrti’s Apoha Theory.” In Apoha: Buddhist Nominalism
and Human Cognition, edited by Arindam Chakrabarti, Mark Siderits, and
Tom Tillemans. New York: Columbia University Press, 2011.
Eltschinger, Vincent. “Dharmakīrti.” Revue Internationale De Philosophie 64 (2010);
397-440.
Fodor, Jerry. “The Revenge of the Given.” In Contemporary Debates in Philosophy
of Mind, edited by Brian P. McLaughlin and Jonathan Cohen. Oxford:
Blackwell Publishing, 2007.
Frauwallner, Erich. Studies in Abhidharma Literature and the Origins of Buddhist
Philosophical Systems. Translated by Sophie Francis Kidd under the
supervision of Ernst Steinkellner. Edited by Wilhelm Halbass. New York:
SUNY Press, 1995.
Ganeri, Jonardon. “Apoha, Feature-Placing, and Sensory Content.” In Apoha:
Buddhist Nominalism and Human Cognition, edited by Arindam Chakrabarti,
Mark Siderits, and Tom Tillemans. New York: Columbia University Press,
2011.
Garfield, Jay L. Empty Words: Buddhist Philosophy and Cross-Cultural
Interpretation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
---. “Reductionism and Fictionalism: Comments on Siderits’s Personal Identity and
Buddhist Philosophy.” APA Newsletter on Asian and Asian-American
Philosophers and Philosophies 6, no. 1 (2006): 1-7.
---. “Taking Conventional Truth Seriously: Authority Regarding Deceptive Reality.”
In Moonshadows: Conventional Truth in Buddhist Philosophy, edited by
Cowherds. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
Gethin, Rupert. The Foundations of Buddhism. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1998.
Harvey, Peter. An Introduction to Buddhism: Teachings, History, and Practices.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

154

Heck, Richard G. Jr. “Are There Diﬀerent Kinds of Content?” In Contemporary
Debates in Philosophy of Mind, edited by Brian P. McLaughlin and Jonathan
Cohen. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007.
Horwich, Paul. “Reference.” In Deflationary Truth, edited by Bradley P. ArmourGarb and JC Beall. Chicago: Open Court, 2005.
---. “Truth.” In Deflationary Truth, edited by Bradley P. Armour-Garb and JC Beall.
Chicago: Open Court, 2005.
---. Truth. 2nd Edition. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998.
---. Truth, Meaning, Reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
Jayatilleke, K. N. Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass,
1963.
Kalupahana, David J. Buddhist Philosophy: A Historical Analysis. Honolulu:
University of Hawaii Press, 1976.
Karunadasa, Y. The Dhamma Theory: Philosophical Cornerstone of the
Abhidhamma. Wheel Publication 412/413. Kandy: Buddhist Publication
Society, 1996.
---. “Theravāda Version of the Two Truths.” Paper presented at the Korean
Conference of Buddhist Studies at the Haein-sa Monastery in Gyeongsangdo,
South Korea, April 2006.
Kataoka, Kei. “Dharmottara’s Theory of Apoha.” Paper presented at the 17th
Conference of the Association for the Study of the History of Indian Thought.
Kyoto, 2010.
Katsura, Shoryu. “From Abhidharma to Dharmakīrti -- with Special Reference to the
Concept of Svabhāva.” In Religion and Logic in Buddhist Philosophical
Analysis: Proceedings of the Fourth International Dharmakīrti Conference,
edited by Helmut Krasser, Horst Lasic, Eli Franco and Birgit Kellner. Vienna:
Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2011.
Kimura, T. “A New Chronology of Dharmakīrti.” In Dharmakīrti’s Thought and Its
Impact on Indian and Tibetan Philosophy: Proceedings of the Third
International Dharmakīrti Conference, edited by Shoryu Katsura. Vienna:
Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1999.
Krasser, Helmut. “How to Teach a Buddhist Monk to Refute the Heretics?
Bhāviveka’s Relationship to Kumārila and Dharmakīrti.” Journal of Rare
Buddhists Texts Research Department 51 (2011): 49-76.
Lindtner, Christian. “Apropos Dharmakīrti: Two New Works and a Date.” Acta
Orientalia 41 (1980): 27-37.
Lusthaus, Dan. Buddhist Phenomenology: A Philosophical Investigation of Yogācāra
Buddhism and the Ch’eng Wei-Shih Lun. London: Routledge Curzon, 2002.
Matilal, Bimal Krishna. Epistemology, Logic, and Grammar in Indian Philosophical
Analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
McClintock, Sara L. Omniscience of the Rhetoric of Reason. Boston: Wisdom
Publications, 2010.

155

McCrea, Lawrence J., and Parimal G. Patil. Buddhist Philosophy of Language in
India: Jñānaśrīmitra on Exclusion. New York: Columbia University Press,
2010.
Nagatomi, M. “A Study of Dharmakīrit’s Pramanavarttika: An English Translation
and Annotation of the Pramanavarttika, Book I.” PhD diss., Harvard
University, 1957.
Newland, Guy, and Tom J. F. Tillemans. “An Introduction to Conventional Truth.” In
Moonshadows: Conventional Truth in Buddhist Philosophy, edited by
Cowherds. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
Price, Huw. “Metaphysics After Carnap: The Ghost Who Walks?” In
Metametaphysics, edited by David Chalmers, David Manley, and Ryan
Wasserman. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
---. Naturalism Without Mirrors. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
Priest, Graham, Mark Siderits, and Tom J. F. Tillemans. “The (Two) Truths About
Truth.” In Moonshadows: Conventional Truth in Buddhist Philosophy, edited
by Cowherds. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
Pruden, Leo M. “The Abhidharma: The Origins, Growth, and Development of a
Literary Tradition.” In Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam byVasubandhu, translated by
Louis de La Vallée Poussin and Leo Pruden, vol. 1. Berkeley: Asian
Humanities Press, 1988.
Quine, W. V. O. Philosophy of Logic Englewood Cliﬀs: Prentice Hall, 1970.
Rhys Davids, T. W., trans. Milindapañha: The Questions of King Milinda. Vol. 35 of
Sacred Books of the East. Mineola: Dover Publications, 1963. http://
www.sacred-texts.com/bud/sbe35/index.html.
Ronkin, Noa. Early Buddhist Metaphysics: The Making of a Philosophical Tradition.
London: Routledge Curzon, 2005.
Siderits, Mark. Buddhism as Philosophy: An Introduction. Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing, 2007.
---. “Is Everything Connected to Everything Else? What the Gopīs Know.” In
Moonshadows: Conventional Truth in Buddhist Philosophy, edited by
Cowherds. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
---. Personal Identity and Buddhist Philosophy. Hampshire: Ashgate, 2003.
---. “Replies to Garfield, Taber, and Arnold.” APA Newsletter on Asian and AsianAmerican Philosophers and Philosophies 6, no. 1 (2006): 16-21.
Stcherbatsky, Th. Buddhist Logic. 2 vols. New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1993.
Steinkellner, Ernst. “Is Dharmakīrti a Mādhyamika?” In Earliest Buddhism and
Madhyamaka, edited by D. Seyfort Ruegg and Lambert Schmithausen.
Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1990.
Taber, John. A Hindu Critique of Buddhist Epistemology. London: Routledge
Curzon, 2005.
Tarski, Alfred. “The Semantic Conception of Truth.” Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 4 (1944): 341-376.

156

Tillemans, Tom J. F. “How Far Can a Mādhyamika Buddhist Reform Conventional
Truth? Dismal Relativism, Fictionalism, Easy-Easy Truth, and the
Alternatives.” In Moonshadows: Conventional Truth in Buddhist Philosophy,
edited by Cowherds. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
---. “How to Talk About Ineﬀable Things: Dignāga and Dharmakīrti on Apoha.” In
Apoha: Buddhist Nominalism and Human Cognition, edited by Arindam
Chakrabarti, Mark Siderits, and Tom Tillemans. New York: Columbia
University Press, 2011. In Moonshadows: Conventional Truth in Buddhist
Philosophy, edited by Cowherds. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
Vasubandhu. Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam. Translated by Louis de La Vallée Poussin
and Leo M. Pruden, vol.3. Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, 1989.
Williams, Paul. Buddhist Thought: A Complete Introduction to the Indian Tradition.
London: Routledge, 2000.
Wood, Thomas E. Mind Only: A Philosophical and Doctrinal Analysis of the
Vijñānavāda. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1994.
Wright, Crispin. “Truth: A Traditional Debate Revisited.” In Truth, edited by Simon
Blackburn and Keith Simmons. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

